Douglas Palaschak

v

Sheriff Tom Templeton of LaSalle County, Governor of Illinois

Case #_____

Petition #3433

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Mandamus per 735 ILCS §5/10-103.

Affidavit of Douglas Palaschak

Affidavit of Indigency

Request for Appointment of Counsel

Application for Temporary Restraining Order, Order to Show Cause, Temporary Injunction, Declaratory Relief and Permanent Injunction.

Proof of Service. The Original Handwritten Petition contained no tables of contents or tables of authorities but did contain the correct citations to authorities which citations I extracted from my 8 volume private library in jail which library was permitted by jail rules but nonetheless confiscated and lost by jailers upon my extradition.

List of Exhibits 76

Exhibit A-A The arrest warrant. The exhibit that should have been. Having only one copy of my arrest warrant, I sent it off earlier and could not send it to this Illinois Supreme Court. This significance of the warrant is that it commands any agent to take me before the nearest U.S. magistrate. Had Eley done as he was told, the magistrate would have released me because the U.S. Attorney would not have filed a complaint in this case - and Eley told me as much. 76

Exhibit A-1 Warrant signed by my enemy Barry Klopfer who should have recused himself. Also, I had no chance to appear voluntarily before the warrant issued because I had already left the state a year prior. They should not be able to obtain a warrant without first permitting me to appear. 76

Exhibit A-2. Page 1 of 8 June 1999 complaint charging me with B&P 6126 advertising without a license - an abridgment of my speech rights. Note that this complaint was file 1 month after I was arrested! 76

Exhibit B. Page 2 of the complaint. How could it be sworn before Judge Clark in 1999 if it the signature of the swearing party was signed in 1998 over a year earlier? 76

Exhibit C. Letter #2901 with my photo on it. Cover letter for the Notice of appeal. 76

Exhibit D. 2^nd Notice of appeal. Filed in Ventura 27 may 1997. Signed by Melvin Looser. 76

Exhibit E. (Labeled "Exhibit 3" at the top) Page 1 of Motion #2871 filed 14 May 1997 in Ventura.
76

Exhibit F. Page 1 of Glen Kitzmann's 3 page statement of probable cause. 76

Exhibit G. Page 2 of Kitzmann's 3 page statement of probable cause. 76

Exhibit H. Page 3 of Kitzmann's 3 page statement of probable cause. 76

Exhibit J. Page 4, the signature page of Kitzmann's statement of probable cause. 76

Exhibit K. Docket sheet with illegible writing by the clerk. Public defender was assigned but was not present at this first arraignment hearing. Bail was reduced to $250,000.00.
76

Exhibit L. Eleven page Motion #3396 for bail reduction signed 25 May 1999 citing all the factors mentioned in the Illinois bail statute. I sent this to the public defender who simply ignored it. 76

Exhibit M. Copy of 18 USC 1073 which I requested on 14 May 1999, and again in writing on 17 may 1999, on 26 May 1999, and other times also. Finally, 42 days after I requested a copy of this statute, I received this on 28 June 1999, the very day that I first attempted to mail my 70 page Petition #3433 to the Illinois Supreme Court. Coincidence? I think not. I have seen no probable cause affidavit pertaining to the crime of 18 USC 1073. Apparently there was no complaint written or filed. 76

Appendix 1. Text of 18 USC 1073 (Added 8 August 2001) 77

Proof of Service 78

Tables of Authorities Cited Herein:

Cases Cited Herein:

Alvarez-Machain (1992) 112 US 2188. The U.S. Supreme Court permits the government to kidnap in Mexico those who interfere with our drug agents there attempting to foist on Mexico a drug policy that we don't even approve at home. 65

Argersinger (1974) 32 L Ed 2d 530, 407 US 25, 92 S Ct 2006 . The U.S. Supreme court says that we have a right to assistance of counsel wherever there is a possibility of jail t. 44, 68

Beck v Ohio (1964) 379 US 89, 91 "The standards and procedures for arrest and detention have been derived from the 4^th amendment and its common-law antecedents . . . The standard for arrest is probable cause [is] defined in terms of facts and circumstances "sufficient to warrant a prudent main in believing that the [suspect] had committed or was committing an offense." - as cited in Gerstein v Pugh (1975) 43 L Ed 2d 54. 24

Bell v Burson (1971) 26 L Ed 90, 401 US 535 State cannot take a driver license without hearing. 1, 2,
19, 20, 25, 63

Bradwell v. People of State of Illinois, (U.S. Ill. 1872) 83 U.S. 130, 21 L.Ed. 442, 16 Wall. 130. Myra Bradwell was denied permission to practice law in Illinois because she was a married woman. Supreme court affirmed. 70

Bradwell v. People of State of Illinois, (U.S. Ill. 1872) 83 U.S. 130, 21 L.Ed. 442, 16 Wall. 130. The Court affirmed an Illinois decision denying Bradwell a law license because she was a married woman.
70

Brandenburg v Ohio (1969) 23 L Ed 2d 430, 395 US 444, 89 S Ct 1827. Clarence Brandenburg was Ku Klux Klan member. Clear and Present Danger test was finally used to overrule an obstruction to speech. 53

Calandra, U.S. v, (1974) 38 L Ed 2d 561. Bill of rights. 2

Debs, Eugene v U.S. (1919) 63 L Ed 566, 249 US 211, 39 S Ct 252. Application of the clear and present danger test. 61, 71

Dred Scot 71

Ex Parte Cohen, 23 NJ Super. 209, 92 A 2d 837, Affirmed 12 NJ 362, 96 A 2d 794. Contemplation of the constitution. 39

Ex parte Garland 4 Wall 333, 380, 18 L.Ed. 366 20

Ex Parte Reggel 114 US 642, 29 L Ed 250, 5 S Ct. 1148. Contemplation of the constitution. 39

Ex Parte Rubens (1951) 73 Arizona 101, 238 P 2d 402, cert. denied (1952) 344 U.S. 480, 97 L Ed 653, 73 S Ct 50 The affidavit warranting commitment for extradition is that made before the magistrate issuing the warrant - not one by the prosecutor de jure like David Day herein. This case is cited in the very first note in this group at page 117 of Bancroft Whitney's annotations to 18 USC §3182.
51

Ex Parte Terner (Texas Criminal) 410 SW 2d 639. I have a right to counsel for extradition hearings. 39

Ex Parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265, 2 S. Ct. 569, 27 L.Ed 552 (1882) 20

Frisbie v Shirley Collins (1952) 96 L Ed 541, 72 S Ct 509, 342 US 519 which is likely out of date. Shirley Collins was a murder suspect in pro per in U.S. district court. Shirley had been kidnaped in Chicago and hauled to Michigan where he was convicted 25, 65

Fuentes v Shevin (1971) 32 L Ed 2d, 92 S Ct 1983, 407 US 67. Before you can repossess a cheap gas stove you must give hearing to the possessor of the stove. 20

725 ILCS §225/b any arrest under Illinois extradition law must be based on sufficient affidavits to meet the criteria of 725 ILCS §225/b and 31A Im Jur 2d.
19

725 ILCS §5/107-4 defines "law enforcement agency." The FBI is not included in this definition. 19

725 ILCS §5/107-4 defines "peace officer". An FBI agent is not included in this definition. 19

735 ILCS §5/10- 123(3) not justifying continued detention 19

735 ILCS §5/10-105: "Any sheriff or other officer or person having custody of any prisoner committed on any civil or criminal process of any court who shall neglect to give such prisoner a copy of the process or order of commitment by which he or she is imprisoned within 6 hours after demand made by the prisoner, or anyone on behalf of the prisoner, shall forfeit to the prisoner or party affect not exceeding $500." 21

735 ILCS §5/10-123, 24 list causes to discharge and not to discharge under habeas corpus. 43

735 ILCS §5/10-124 Palaschak must be discharged " 6. Where the process appears to have been obtained by false pretenses . . ." 46

735 ILCS §5/10-124 says that Palaschak may be discharged: "2. Where, though the original imprisonment was lawful, nevertheless, by some act, omission, or event which has subsequently taken place, the party has become entitled to be discharged." 46

735 ILCS §5/10-1-3. 1

8 U.S.C. 1251(a)(11) - deportation; 526 U.S.C. 7203 20

Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798 which were upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court 70

B&P §6126 Advertising that one is entitled to practice law while one is suspended. Prior to 1996 is was a misdemeanor. Now it can be a felony for bar members - but not for others - but for Palaschak's de minimis action it would be a misdemeanor. 27, 34, 41, 42, 45, 50, 65

California Penal Code §17 was amended in 1969 or 1972 to define a new less-than-a-misdemeanor crime. This permitted California to do an end run around the constitution. Now California could resume the practice of trying traffic tickets without a lawyer. Also, this is proof of my theory of inflation of crime. The police state has converted many misdemeanors to felonies. Even the misdemeanors carry heavier punishment. The liberals have demanded our constitutional rights to counsel and juries. To satisfy both sides and avoid the truth, the legislature invented the infraction. The catch is that although you cannot be imprisoned for having committed an infraction, you can be sent to jail for inability to pay the fine - and now we have come full circle because Palaschak interceded in Melvin Looser's case to protest this legislative fiat intended to take away our constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel. Melvin Looser was being sent to jail without benefit of counsel. 67

Illinois rule 526. 56

§6126(b). Advertising or holding oneself out to be entitled to practice law. 18

Treatises and Historical Records Cited Herein:

91 ALR 1246. Fugitivity must be proven. 39

ALR 2d 64:288 discusses Schware v Board of Bar examiners (1957) 1 L Ed 2d 796, 3553 US 232, 77 S Ct 752 in which the U.S. Supreme Court held it not permissible to bar a lawyer from practice because he had once been a member of the communist party. 41

Am Jur 2d Vol 31A Extradition §96. "A governor, in his discretion, may also refuse to issue a rendition warrant where there is a showing that the requisition was made with an ulterior motive or in bad faith . . . or to gratify personal malice" 39

Am Jur 2d Volume 31A Extradition. 19, 22, 26, 41, 45

Am Jur. Vol 31A §102. Fugitivity must be proven. 39

Annals of Congress 438 (1834) 3

Bancroft Whitney's annotated 18 USCS §3182, note 55, page 117. 45

Black's Law Dictionary, 5th Edition 1 20

Blackstone, William, Commentaries on the Laws of England. 1765-69. Volume 4 discusses criminal law. He defines a "Bill of Pains and Penalties" which is unconstitutional being a variety of a "Bill of Attainder".
27, 44, 66, 68

Charles Francis Adams, A Chapter of Erie. 54

Chrisman, Tin Horns and Calico 54

Friedman, Professor Lawrence, History of American Law, 2^nd Edition. Logic is more persuasive than cases
.26, 54

Hentoff, Pat. The First Freedom, 1980, Namar Productions, page 64. One of many accounts of the trial of Peter Zenger. 70

History of American Law, page 634. 55

Josephson, Matthew, The Robber Barons 54

Justice Heiple on the Illinois Supreme Court explains the predatory nature of traffic court in his dissent to rule 526. 56

Langdell , Harvard Law School Dean Christopher. Concept of "the science of law". Circa 1870s. 56

Milton, John Areopagitica - a Speech for the Liberty of Unlicensed Printing, 1644: "Truth and understanding are not such wares as to be monopolized and traded in by tickets and statutes ans standards." 71

Reich, The New Property, 73 Yale L.J. 733 (1964) 20

Ron Chernow, House of Morgan 54

The Power Elite 57

Vol 31A Am Jur Extradition §115. Warrant issued under an invalid state statute is void and unenforceable.
39

Woodward and Bernstein, The Brethren 57

Zinn, Howard. A People's History of the United States, page 249. 54

Constitutional Clauses cited herein:

14^th amendment 19, 22, 40, 45, 74

1^st amendment 23, 26, 46, 61, 62, 64, 65, 72-74

4^th amendment "The standards and procedures for arrest and detention have been derived from the 4^th amendment and its common-law antecedents . . . The standard for arrest is probable cause [is] defined in terms of facts and circumstances "sufficient to warrant a prudent main in believing that the [suspect] had committed or was committing an offense." - Beck v Ohio (1964) 379 US 89, 91 as cited in Gerstein v Pugh (1975) 43 L Ed 2d 54. Writing a petition cannot be a crime; Palaschak should have been freed in Illinois under this standard. 24, 74

6^th amendment 48, 50, 72, 73

7^th amendment says: "In suits at common law . . . the right of trial by jury shall be preserved." 65

Bill of Attainder. Definition: A legislative act that taints one's reputation. Such an act violates the constitution. A Bill of Pains and Penalties is a variety of a Bill of Attainder. See Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England, 1765-69. 65

Bill of pains and penalties. Definition: A legislative act that disenfranchises a person or class by imposing pains and penalties. B&P 6126 is such an act. The constitutional forbids them. They are void ab initio. See Blackstone's Commentaries on the Law of England, 1765-60. 65

Declaration of Independence: "He has sent hither swarms of Officers to harass our people, and eat out their substance." 60

Due Process Clause 63

Equal Protection Clause 66, 68

Extradition clause - the Fugitive Lawyer Clause: "A person charged in any state with treason, felony, or other crime, who shall flee from justice, and be found in another state, shall, on demand of the executive authority of the state from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the state having jurisdiction of the crime." - Art. IV, clause 2: extradition clause - next to fugitive slave clause. 19, 23, 35, 40, 45

fugitive slave clause 19

Illinois constitution provides for right to counsel? Don't know. I was denied access to the Illinois constitution in an Illinois jail. 48

Magna Charta, Chapter 39. "No Free man shall be captured or imprisoned. . . outlawed or exiled or in any way destroyed except by the lawful judgment of his peers and by the law of the land." 20

Palaschak's theories cited herein:

Law follows emotion." 57

Palaschak's theory #2: The prosecution should be willing to prosecute the federal flight charges - and prove it by filing a complaint - before obtaining an arrest warrant; otherwise it is obvious pretext. 47

Palaschak's theory: the penalty for failure to pay the penalty must never be more serious than the original penalty!! 44

Petition

Regarding exhaustion, see page 3 below.

1. This court has original jurisdiction under 735 ILCS §5/10-1-3.
2. Having been denied a copy of the Illinois constitution, Petitioner Palaschak does not know if individual justices may issue orders of relief - as Justices of the United States Supreme Court may do, and therefore Petitioner addresses this petition to the attention of Justice Heiple solely on the basis that Justice Heiple in his dissent to Rule 526 as amended used the work "predatory" to describe traffic fines. The word "predatory" strikes a strong resonance with Palaschak because for a quarter century Palaschak has litigated to attempt to correct predatory traffic court actions.

Deep Background

1. In 1990-92 Palaschak became embroiled in California traffic court litigation stemming from the DMV's (Department of Motor Vehicle's) having unconstitutionally and therefore invalid purported suspension of Palaschak's driver license for 3 months without a hearing before a neutral magistrate in violated of the due process clause as enunciated in Bell v Burson (1971) 26 L Ed 90, 401 US 535.
2. Like Mr. Bell, Palaschak was a victim of a car crash where he was not at fault. The DMV attempted to take his driver license without a hearing.
3. In Palaschak's case the California BAR unconstitutionally (and therefore invalidly) purported to suspend Palaschak's bar license for minor traffic violations despite the absence of nexus. Palaschak honored the disputed bar suspension and closed his office. He moved to Illinois for the 1996 harvest and then moved to his now permanent farm home in August 1997. On 10 May 1997 a letter under Palaschak's letterhead including the words "Attorney at Law" delivered a pro per notice of appeal to traffic court for Defendant Melvin Looser. Nearly a year later, in 1998, after Palaschak had moved to Illinois, Ventura charged Palaschak with "holding himself out to be a lawyer." Now 2 years later they attempt extradition.

Affidavit of Douglas Palaschak

I, Douglas Palaschak, declare the following under penalty of perjury:

Arrest(s)

1. I was arrested 14 May 1999 at my farm home near Streator, Illinois, by FBI Agent Eley on a pretextual May 7, 1999 federal warrant from Santa Barbara, California. I know what this is about having dispatched a lawyer to Ventura in July 1998. I was released 8 June, 1999. Deputy Schroeder told me that the "Ventura warrant [was] recalled." While sitting outside the jail waiting for a ride home, I was asked by Deputy Karen to come back inside the jail because "we're waiting for a governor's warrant." I've not been to court since 28 May despite having put myself on calendar for 14 June.
2. Reserved
3. Reserved

The underlying non-crime

1. I am being prosecuted for using the words "Attorney at Law" on my letterhead on 10 May 1997 on a cover letter sending a notice of appeal to court for a friend. Anybody could lawfully have sent the cover letter; that it, it is not a task subject to the lawyer's monopoly. The Notice of Appeal was in pro per. It was unusual in that it was approximately 12 pages long and summarized the case including appellate points and authorities. There was no fraud alleged (by my accusers in Ventura). In fact a long footnote in the petition fully explains my bar status: license unconstitutionally suspended/ revoked due to traffic tickets, specifically, several counts of driving while my license was unconstitutionally (and therefore invalidly) suspended in violation of Bell v Burson.

Justice Heiple's "Predatory Traffic Courts"

1. I've spent my adult life attempting to appeal cases in traffic court in order to change the law. California traffic courts are very oppressive. Despite the ruling of Griffin Griffin v Illinois (1956) 100 L Ed 891, 351 US 12, 79 S Ct 585, a traffic court wrongfully convicted me and denied me a transcript. They don't use court reporters; they use defective tape recorders. I served nearly a year in jail and was not able to type my own transcript in that time. My appointed lawyer was very incompetent. I don't know how my appeal ended - or if it indeed has ended.

State Bar Court is also Predatory

Conclusion: Money from desperate people feeds both the traffic court and the bar.

1. Justice Brennan in U.S. v Calandra (1974) 38 L Ed 2d 561 recalled the prediction of James Madison in 1789:

"If they [the bill of rights] are incorporated into the constitution, independent tribunals of justice will consider themselves in a peculiar manner the guardian of those rights; they will be an impenetrable bulwark against every assumption of power in the legislative of executive; they will be naturally led to resist every encroachment upon right expressly stipulated for in the constitution by the declaration of rights."

- Annals of Congress 438 (1834)

This is my 6^th Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

1. I wrote a habeas petition on Sunday 16 May (my 3^rd day in jail). I have a record of the letters that I sent. I sent it to the local court by inter- departmental mail. It's been 31 days so far (today is 15 June 1999)and I have received no denial from the court but at my only meeting with public defender Dan Bute, I saw it in his file. Our meeting was brief (12 minutes). He asked if the problems had been resolved but did not wait for my answer.
2. On 29 May 1999 I wrote a habeas corpus petition for this supreme court of Illinois. Pursuant to jail rules the jailer refused to make a copy of that petition. I dispatched the original to public defender Dan Bute by interdepartmental jail mail. I received no copies - nor the original - nor any response.
3. On 5 June 1999 having received ludicrously defective forms from the federal court I mail a habeas corpus petition to them in Chicago. On 18 June 1999 I received a receipt from the federal court. On 21 June 1999 the federal court denied my petition without prejudice or comment.
4. On 18 June 1999 before I was temporarily released from jail, I submitted my 4^th habeas corpus petition to Deputy Karen. Instead of copying it, she returned it to me and released me from jail. Then, 20 minutes later, she invited me back to jail. I gave the petition back to here for copying. She copies it. By interdepartmental mail I dispatched the original to Judge Chris Ryan in the Circuit Court in this same building complex where the jail is located. I sent copies to the state's attorney and the public defender. I combined the habeas corpus petition with a motion for release pursuant to the uniform extradition act. I set the hearing date for 14 June. That date came and went. Nothing happened. This habeas corpus petition also contained a Faretta⁽¹⁾ Motion. I've heard nothing from anybody in response to this 4^th habeas corpus motion.
5. On 10 June I dispatched Petition #3422 to the local court with service on the sheriff. I received no response or acknowledgment.
6. On 15 June I began writing this Habeas Corpus Petition #3433, the petition that you now read.
7. I began on 15 June 1999 writing a 2^nd habeas corpus petition to the Federal Court in Chicago.
8. On 21 June 1999 I mailed a 28 page Complaint #3435 pursuant to 42 USC 1983 et seq to the Federal Court in Chicago seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.
9. Reserved.

21 June 1999. 5 pm:

Overview

1. This case is about a failure to by car insurance in 1998 which the Ventura prosecutor is attempting to parlay into a felony having failed twice before (in 1993 and 1992) to convict me of some felony.
2. This case is about competing constitutional goals.
3. This case is about reviewing the prerequisites to extradition.
4. This case is about due process, a probable cause hearing, and a bail hearing - and the absence thereof.
5. This case is about the right to petition for redress of grievances.
6. Reserved.
7. Reserved.
8. Reserved.

Background and History

1. Palaschak is a 4^th generation farmer. He farms with his brother, Jerry Palaschak and Greg Palaschak. Greg runs the family farm now upon the retirement of Palaschak's Father, Richard Palaschak. The farm 2000 acres but Douglas Palaschak received only $10,000 gross revenue in 1998 - and he spent half of that revenue on legal research material and farm supplies.
2. Douglas Palaschak farmed with his Grandfather 40 years ago. He farms that same farm now. His family has farmed that farm for 66 years.
3. Palaschak is need badly at corn and soybean harvest, generally September 1 to November 24, later in we years. Palaschak has for 2 years grown a garden - since he moved to his farm home. Jerry Palaschak now tends Palaschak's garden but will be gone after 25 June to return in September. Palaschak depends on his garden for food over the winter.
4. Palaschak's sell sweet corn in July and August. Douglas has for the past 3 years been the main help for sweet corn. Douglas Palaschak planted most of the sweet corn patches this year.
5. Having deprived Palaschak of his ability to earn a living in California (Palaschak's California state bar license was revoked (unconstitutionally) for traffic tickets) Ventura prosecutors no attempt to deprive Palaschak of his ability to earn a living in Illinois, but I digress.
6. Palaschak enjoyed an idyllic childhood starring in 4-H and FFA. He was 1^st in his high school class and an honors student at the University of Illinois where he earned a bachelor's degree in Engineering. Palaschak worked as a Registered professional Engineer designing machinery for Exxon, Mobil, The U.S. Navy and other oil-field manufacturers. He went to law school at night and received a doctor of jurisprudence from Ventura college of law. He passed the bar exam on the 1^st attempt. He immediately went in to private practice specializing in vindication of the right of victims of bureaucratic oppression such as a nudist resort owner. He handled drug and sex cases, a helicopter crash case, RICO cases, and represented other lawyers before the then new (created in 1990) unconstitutional state bar pseudo court. He sued the state bar in California federal court for his attorney clients.
7. Reserved.

End of page 4 in original handwritten petition #3433 written 21 June 1999 at 5 pm.

1. Palaschak has since 1984 been a zealous, courageous advocate of the oppressed. As a result of his fearless prosecution of bureaucratic instruments of oppression he has incurred the wrath of powerful bureaucracies, namely: the California state bar, Ventura traffic court, and the Ventura county district attorney, who appears to aspire to state office.
2. In years prior to the current Ventura arrest warrant signed by former Ventura prosecutor Barry Klopfer, Palaschak sued Klopfer in federal court.
3. The warrant upon which this extradition is founded is signed by Judge Klopfer. He recused himself from my cases when I asked him to do so. He should have recused himself here.
4. Although Commissioner Covarrubius had most of the allegedly incriminating evidence before him, he did not initiate prosecution.
5. Prosecution was initiated by Judge vin O'Neill who sits on the county appellate panel that reviews appeals of traffic cases such as Melvin Looser's traffic case. See exhibit F, lines 22-25.
6. Vince O'Neill is a former prosecutor who was in the Ventura district attorney office during prior unsuccessful attempts to convict Palaschak of a felony.
7. I have no idea how Melvin's appeal turned out, but O'Neill also has recused himself when I requested him to do so - - due to his bias. He should have recused himself from Melvin Looser's case.
8. Courageous lawyers often suffer attaches. Example: The late attorney William Kunstler was successful in his 1968 defense of the Chicago 7 but angry Judge Julius Hoffmann sentence the lawyer, William Kunstler to 4 years and 13 days in prison. Kunstler's lawyer friends rallied to his side and won Kunstler's freedom on appeal. See Kunstler's autobiography entitled My Life as a Radical Lawyer. (Added 16 June 2001: See also the website of famous trials: http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/Chicago7/contempt.html.)
9. Example #2: Attorney Steven Yagman of Santa Monica/ Venice, California was asked to critique the performance of federal court judges in Los Angeles. As a result of his candid criticism, a group of federal court judges revoked Yagman's federal license for 2 years. A group of Yagman's lawyer friends, including former U.S. Attorney General Ramsey Clark won Yagman's reinstatement on appeals. (Added 16 June 2001: See Standing Committee on Discipline of the United States District Court for the Central District of California v Stephen Yagman, defendant (9^th Circuit, 1995) 55 F.3d 1430 which is reprinted completely in Palaschak's brief #3596.)
10. In 1993 Ventura district attorney bureau of investigation Investigator Glen Kitzman (author of the deceptive declaration in exhibits F, G, H, and J) led a police raid on Palaschak's law office. He is actually a very nice guy and I think that he is not the malicious person behind the tortious malicious prosecution of me for writing a petition critical of traffic court. The district attorney office simultaneously in 1993 issued a defamatory press release. The Los Angeles Time printed in large headlines that I had been arrested on 7 counts of §6126 - the very same alleged crime that is the basis for this extradition request. The headlines screamed "Ventura Attorney arrested for 7 felonies" or something like that.
11. The were wrong.
12. I learned through that experience that these bureaucrats are not ry bright.
13. I also learned that bureaucrats can get away with lies with impunity and therefore. . . well, they sometimes lie.
14. Case in Point: in handcuffs in 1993 during the raid I quickly explained to Glen Kitzman that my state bar suspension was obtained by a lie. The state bar suspended me while my misdemeanor SD conviction was on appeal. They used a provision that permits interim suspension for felonies. They lied. They said that I had a felony conviction. They lie was convincing. Having accused me of 3 drug felonies they dismissed these 3 when the grand jury indicted me on 2 felonies and a misdemeanor. The petit jury acquitted me on the felonies an convicted me of the sole misdemeanor of eating one does of LSD, but before I could litigate their lie, they court of appeal overturned my misdemeanor conviction. Even then the bar continued to withhold the license from me for 2 months. They reinstated me in February 1994.
15. This raid in 1993 was at a time when, as now, I was honoring as invalid suspension while litigating it.
16. I explained then to Kitzman that I was doing only federal work for which I had a federal license.

Lie by Federal Clerk Izabell Katapodis

1. Having thoroughly researched the matter before I resumed federal work I reminded Kitzman that I had cleared the matter with then Chief Federal Judge Manuel Real. . . despite the "summary suspension" announced by Clerk Izabell Katapodis on February 1993. She was angry when I told her that In Re William R. Ming (1971)469 F 2d 1352 (CA 7 (Chicago) 1972), precluded summary suspension. She was apparently angry at me when Kitzman called her to inquire. She lied. She said that my federal license was suspended. Although it was not until December 1993 that the federal court clerk's office admitted its mistake in writing, the district attorney knew immediately that I was right. They declined to file a complaint against me - but . ...

Beginning of page 7 of original handwritten petition to Illinois Supreme Court:

. . .that did not undo the defamatory headlines.

1. I did not sue the Los Angeles Times. My policy is that they have been good o me and almost always get my side of the story - and they pay attention to my press releases also.
2. Now, returning to the day of the raid, although I explained my innocent immediately, the sheriff kept me in jail for 6 days without ever taking me to court.
3. Investigator Kitzman and his raiders seized my computers, laser printer, currency, checks, files, client files, completed bankruptcy petitions done with the requisite license (ready to drop in the mail box), and other items.
4. They kept these items for over year! I had to buy a new computer and laser printer.
5. Without any apparent reason they read my diaries going back to 1989 even though my suspension was not started until 1992.
6. They shared their files with the state bar.
7. At that time I had never been d9sciplined.
8. This current bar discipline is primarily for traffic ticket and is my 1^st disciplinary procedure by the bar.
9. My legal competence and honesty have never been questioned.
10. I have experience other police raids. Police abuse of intellectuals troubles me but is a pattern of history.
11. It is only in the past 8 year that I learned the history and current magnitude of anti-intellectualism.
12. Only courageous courts can protect minorities from majoritarian oppression. Outspoken intellectuals are a minority. Palaschak's theory: If the status quo were correct, we would not need leaders.
13. The complete story of Palaschak's suffering the dirty tricks of bureaucracies is not told here. Palaschak has been overwhelmed - as humans can indeed be overwhelmed by bureaucracies.
14. The story of Palaschak's 1991/92 LSD case is told incorrectly in a published opinion, People v Palaschak (1995) 9 C4th 1236, 40 Cal Rptr 2d 722, 893 P2d 717.
15. That opinion is neither the complete nor accurate story. My lawyer (who was appointed by the supreme court) failed inadvertently (an negligently) to include the transcript of the critical 1^st day of the suppression hearing. The 2^nd day was after a 4 day holiday. It was reported by a new reporter who was unaware that they was the 2^nd day of the hearing. It appeared to be the beginning of the hearing. (Retrospective note added 16 June 2001: While I was in jail in Ventura some weeks after mailing this petition #3433 to the Illinois Supreme court I saw on television that the officer Matz whose testimony alone was inconsistent (but who was nonetheless believed by slacker judge McNally) had just been arrested for shoplifting. Matz's lying testimony was the basis of the denial of my motion to suppress evidence. Of course at trial we are not permitted to question police about their backgrounds absent some grist. We now have grist. Incidentally, Matz, who had 25 years experience with the DEA was dispatched especially to my case - and the dispatcher resigned from the police after we subpoenaed her to the suppression hearing - and she failed to appear at the suppression hearing. There was another irregularity regarding this suspicious dispatcher: When the snitch/ temp drove to the police station and told her story, this dispatcher mentioned my name without being told. Apparently they have some information on me that they did not reveal. Later I discovered that a secretary had taken some of my files - innocent job applications - to the police.)

Beginning of page 8 of the original handwritten petition #3433:

1. Why haven't I resolved my problems? Answer: I have no money. I have a lifetime of litigation to do. I have been homeless for short periods. I slept in my car for 5 months - until it broke and the mechanic let me sleep at his shop.
2. Palaschak has suffered homelessness, and the seizure of 4 cars and a motorcycle over the years.
3. The seizure of Palaschak's diaries is similar to the seizure of the diaries of the McSurely family described by Caroline Kenned in her book entitled In Our Defense, and at 753 F2d 88 (D.C. 1985).
4. Palaschak's battle with Palaschak's appointed attorneys is like that of Harrison Cronic described by Caroline Kennedy at page 261 of In Our Defense and at U.S. v Cronic 466 U.S. 684 (1984).
5. The McSurely case took 14 years to resolve. Palaschak's case is more complicated. Palaschak is on year #11.

Written 22 June 1999. Tuesday 7 a.m. Ottawa, Illinois. In jail:

1. I too have experience the wrath of an angry Judge who vented at me for the acts of my client. In Ventura, Judge Bradley (who was recently forced to leave the bench due to 2 drunk driving convictions) cited me for being late for court. I had forgotten to write the date in my calendar. This was the only time that I failed to write a court date in my calendar. Bradley's antagonism in court flustered me. My client was a sex offender. The citation for contempt of court was inconsistent with what happens to other lawyers. Even a dog knows the difference between being kicked and being tripped over.
2. In Indiana, federal judge Allen Sharp unfairly dismissed my client's case when my quadriplegic client failed to fly from California to Indiana to testify at a hearing regarding my request for a temporary restraining order. I was unable to appeal the dismissal with client consent - or so I thought. In retrospect I should have appealed my own fine. Judge Sharp mistakenly read my silence as agreement. He wrote an inflammatory published rules decision.
3. Lesson: Statutes of repose can be the worst instrument of oppression for overwhelmed humans.
4. I don't mean to whine. I chose to be an advocate against tyranny . . . and my adversity was foreseeable.
5. I thought that it was about justice; sometimes it is merely about power.
6. I have ben frustrated by court of mass production . . . like traffic court.
7. My parents cannot understand why I suffer imprisonment in jail. . . but like most people, they don't want to take the time to even read my briefs.
8. Disbarment is always hardest on the father of the lawyer - whether it is a justifiable disbarment or not.
9. I have enjoyed some of the best that life has to offer. My mission remains the same.

Beginning of page 9 of the original petition.

1. In 1996 I became financially distressed and overwhelmed with my all-consuming battle to appeal the reposed cases, but hat is a bland summary. Here is a chronological detail of the vortex:

1988 I moved from my old apartment, where I lived during law school, into a bigger better brand new apartment in the new part of Ventura. I suffered a car crash; Cigarette delivery van rear-ended my Nissan Sentra.

1989. June. I met an 18 year old orphan who was an aspiring actress.

1990. The orphan and I moved into a bigger better brand new apartment near the court house.

How a mistaken license number on a police report leads to my disbarment.

1990. April 30 - May 1. I drove to a court appearance in Santa Monica for Attorney Judy Fogel. There was some rain. The entrance gate at the parking lot was stuck in the up position. Therefore I received no entrance ticket. I parked my car I want to court. The appearance was quick - maybe 20 minutes. The parking attendant wanted me to pay for the whole morning because he says that I lost my ticket. I explained that I did not lose my ticket. I asked him to call his supervisor. The supervisor refused to come out in the parking lot in the rain. Soon the police arrived. As I was explaining the story to Officer Hurt, he suddenly changed his attitude, began frisking me roughly, and arrested me for grand theft auto. I asked him to check the registration papers in my glove box but he refused. He took me to Santa Monica police station. I was the only prisoner there. Eight hours later they released me and told me that the police had made a clerical mistake filling out a theft report some time ago. I spent the rest of the night arguing with police officers at several police stations. I took a taxi across town to another division, maybe rampart division. Finally a police lieutenant drove me to the storage yard and told the attendant to release my car.

As I was driving home up the coast from Malibu I saw flashing orange lights on the side of the road. I cautiously shifted to the left lane to avoid any debris that might be at the scene of an accident. I was the only car on the road. A police officer was there early for a movie gig. He apparently thought I was drunk. I don't drink or smoke. Several miles later police pulled me over and tried to give me a ticket for crossing the yellow line. This is about 5 in the morning. I have not had sleep in 24 hours. I have spent the entire day in jail due to a police mistake and now the police are making another mistake and giving me a ticket for it. I did not find out until years later (in state bar discovery papers) that the police officer was on a movie gig. I refused to sign the ticket. They persisted and deceived me about it. The police officer who was writing the ticket was obviously not the one who saw me - and therefore they would have had problems arresting me - but they did not tell me that. They persisted and I eventually signed the ticket. The state bar used this event to say that I should be disbarred for not signing the ticket. I say that anybody can refuse to sign a ticket - and had I followed my instincts I might have discovered the police deceit years earlier and avoided paying a ticket. Eventually this ticket went to a warrant because a lawyer failed to appear for me.

1990. June. The orphan went her own way sadly. I met another wonderful woman.

1991. Wonderful woman #2 went her own way. I opened a new office in a gorgeous glass building across from the court house.

1991. May. Having thoroughly researched neurotransmitters for 2 years, I at a dose of LSD given to me by my secretary. It was my birthday party. Police came. Illegal search and seizure followed. (Added later: See my brief #1172 regarding the seizure of my computers.)

1991. November. Hard Copy and Inside Edition cover my LSD case on the same evening. The angle is that I have a contract mutually consenting to sex in the office. This contract was designed to prevent false accusations of sexual harassment after I became suspicious of police sending informants to my office. In retrospect I was correct in my suspicion. Although I enjoyed the publicity, my Mom was embarrassed.

1992, April 1. Judge Barry Klopfer in traffic court reneged on my traffic plea bargain. He sent me to jail before my LSD trial was finished despite the court's having promised not to do so in exchange for my plea. My superb trial lawyer and friend, Attorney Robert Schwartz of Ventura, won before a jury on the 2 felony counts. We suffered a conviction on the misdemeanor count of eating LSD.

Having filed my appeal 1 day late on the traffic case I now had to serve 11 months in jail. My friend Rusty Garvin and his friends, who he refused to name, cleaned out my law office and lost or stole 30% of my $10,000 law library.

Beginning of page 10 on the original handwritten petition #3433 from jail.

1. Because the district attorney's office mistakenly (or maliciously) persisted in calling my LSD case a "felony" conviction, I was put in with the bad boys in jail . . but at dinner time on my first day in the bad boy cell block, the guys were watching a rerun of Love Connection. To my delight the bad boys recognized me on The Love Connection. From that time on I had no problems there - and they called me "Senator".
2. In jail a kind senior deputy (and ex law student) named Cook got me a job cleaning and filing updates in the jail law library. The court of appeal appointed me to do my own appeal in my LSD case. I objected. They appointed another lawyer. My appointed lawyer won but it was frustrating for me. I sent him approximately 70 pages from jail detailing approximately 30 issues. He argued only 1 or 2 issues.

(Now here in an Illinois jail I experience deja vu as my public defender ignores my letters and fails to appear in court. Dan Bute is his name. Okay, Dan did not know that he was my lawyer yet on 17 May . . .but being the public defender he could easily have foreseen that on Tuesday there may be an arraignment of the guy who was brought to jail on Friday and that the defendant might need a public defender for all stages of the criminal proceeding.) I see myself in the words of Harrison Cronic:

"He was relentless in all respect - relentlessly polite, relentlessly upbeat ("Never once did I see him downcast" says Colston, "no matter how bad things got") and relentless about pursuing and perfecting his defense. He blanketed the court with his own motions and briefs." - Ellen Alderman and Caroline Kennedy, In Our Defense, 1991, Avon books. See U.S. v Cronic 839 F2d 1401 (10^th Cir 1988).

"I spent as much time writing my own briefs as I did battling my attorney . . . It was absolutely exasperating." - Harrison Cronic.

I peppered the court of appeal with copies of my evolving brief during and after my 11 month jail term. I also had an appeal going on in my traffic case. My appointed lawyer Jill Hatfield did not have a clue that our problem was the absence of a transcript. She wanted to agree in a statement for appeal; absence of a record is precisely the issue. Traffic court uses tape recorder that don't work well - but even if they worked well it would be a problem.

1993 February. Upon my release from jail I eventually go to live at Good Nite Inn. I carefully research the law and persuade Chief Federal Judge Manuel Real that my federal license must remain valid.

1993 August. My income source dried up when Ventura District Attorney Investigator Kitzman raided my office on Friday 27 August 1993 and took my computer, files, laser printer, currency, checks, etc. I began living in my car. I was now battling on 5 fronts:

#1 I was trying to find a new way to earn a living;

#2 I was litigating my LSD appeal;

#3 I was litigating my traffic appeal;

#4 I was litigating against the state bar regarding their illegal interim suspension. My brother Jerry shipped an old computer back to me. I use a printer at the office of Attorney Steve Pell.

#5 I was battling to get my computers and laser printer back so that I could battle effectively on the other fronts.

Beginning of page #11 in the original handwritten petition #3433.

1993 December 23. I drove my car to the court of appeal. My appointed lawyer had filed a pathetic 8 page brief 6 months ago. I was now there to file another version of my own evolving brief. I saw my name on the top page of one of the several court opinions on the table The court of appeal reversed my misdemeanor LSD conviction!

1994 Jan 25. Tuesday. This is my first night sleeping in a building since the August raid at Good Nite Inn. The engine broke on my car. I search the Yellow Pages and find Engines R Us. Frank and Brian at Engines R Us - now called Engine Place - invited me to sleep in the former mechanic's room until they can fix my car. There is a phone line back there and a fax machine up front at the office. Frank buys me a new laser printer.

1994 Feb 16 Finally the state bar says that I may practice again and owe no dues until 15 February 1995. I drive to the Los Angeles Times office for a 1.5 hour interview. The next day even the deputy district attorney congratulated me. KNX news radio had a story about me. Although the court of appeal ruled in my favor on 23 December, the state bar dragged its feet nearly 2 more months before licensing me.

1994 Nov 8. Tuesday. The LSD cop Dawson is the backup on a traffic stop for expired registration. They take my blue car and I never get it back.

1994 December. I sued the California Supreme Court and the state bar in federal for my client. See complaint #1875 in federal court.

1994 21 December. Client offers me a brand new car and an office in Chinatown and a home in his Mom's guest house. Downside: he wants me to do all his work while he is in trial for 2 wasted weeks. He gets less money from trial than I got offered at the settlement conference.

1995 March 16. Thursday. I buy a red Hyundai.

1995 Oct 12 Police arrest me and keep my red Hyundai. That is the 2^nd car taken from me in a year. Pursuant to a new unconstitutional statute they take the car accusing me falsely of driving on a suspended license. My license was at one time suspended unconstitutionally for failing to appear in Malibu but I cleared that up. I began litigation to get my car back. I continue to perfect my appeal to the California Supreme court. . . but before I can perfect my appeal, my appointed lawyer Durfee like the previous appointed lawyer Dolge . . . submitted a brief without my approval or review.(Added 17 June 2001: He forgot to submit half of the transcript of the critical suppression hearing. I eventually filed a class action case in federal court to challenge this statute. Click here to see a copy of my class action complaint #2557 filed 6 May 1996 in federal court.

1995 May 8. My birthday. He California Supreme court retaliated for having been sued. They overturn the court of appeal thereby reinstating my LSD misdemeanor conviction saying that I cannot eat LSD to thwart the police raid; the LSD was eaten 3 hours prior to the raid with no expectation of a raid. Also, they did not have the transcript of the suppression hearing. See the opinion People v Palaschak (May 1995) 9 C4th 1236, 40 Cal Rptr 2d 722, 893 P2d 717) reprinted at this link:

1995 August? I miss the short deadline to appeal to the U.S. Supreme court - but I can still do Habeas Corpus.

1995 Wed Dec 6. A guy from the fugitive department is in Port Hueneme looking for somebody else. I am walking because the police took my red Hyundai on October 12. I am walking back from the store where I spent some meager money for raw meatloaf. The fugitive guy amicably arrests me. I ask him to keep the meatloaf frozen until I get out of jail. I just now serve the 90 days for my LSD misdemeanor in 1991 - because I missed the short (90 day? ) appeal window. In mail they ship me to the new Todd Road jail which is only months old. There they deny me access to any law library. Actually they truck me back to 800 South Victoria one day to go to the library but then they announce to me that the trip was a waste of time and the library is unavailable.

The sheriff department bragged to visitors about the new "electronic" law library at Todd road but in the time I was there I never saw anybody use it - and I was not permitted to use it. I carefully hand wrote a petition for writ of habeas corpus and then carefully hand copied 9 copies (although Draconian hand copying is forbidden by a court case demanding access to copying equipment). I gave my finished copy to the jailers to mail to the California Supreme court. Apparently they thought that it was a big joke. When I was released February 1, 1996, after serving 60 days, they guard handed me my writs of habeas corpus saying "We thought that you could just mail them when you got out of jail". They had refused to mail the petition of habeas corpus to the California Supreme Court.

1996 Feb 1. I had saved $1 in my commissary account. I took the bus back to my shared apartment. I discover from Simon Chan that were are being evicted - even though the rent is paid in advance. Simon had stupidly accepted service process for me while I was in jail and did not tell me. I was due for a bankruptcy. I can do a bankruptcy in an hour. I filed. I notified the sheriff of the automatic stay. City of Port Hueneme is the landlord.

1996 Feb 12 On eviction day the sheriff deputy warns me not to return. I warn the deputy that he is violating the automatic stay order. Eventually Port Hueneme will be ordered to pay me $1000 for violating the order but the deputy will go unpunished despite my having taken him before a bankruptcy judge. Although I already have a storage place in Ventura, I store my 800 pounds of books and my computers in a steel storage building in Port Hueneme.

Beginning of page 12 of original handwritten petition #3433:

1. Severe change of status: My legal work suffers a setback because I have no home and no computerized law library. In the process of moving I lose my West cd roms with my law library on them - or maybe they were stolen from my pile of stuff which was stacked in Simon's truck for 4 days until I could find a storage place and a truck to take it there. I begin sleeping in Simon's broken Honda civic. My own car was taken by the police in October 1995 - 4 months prior.

1996 February. Now I am homeless without a car. I wash and shave at the police station - as did people in depressions and other situations - as I later discover by reading Upton Sinclair's The Jungle - or maybe Howard Zinn's A People's History of the United States.

1996 Feb 27. After 12 days of homelessness petition the bankruptcy court on a manilla folder ripped into 3 strips and written by hand.

1996 Feb 29. Thursday. Leap year day. My Mom wired me $300. I dressed in my suit and met with the rental agent for an office in a building abandoned by defense contractors. I move in. I move my stuff from the local storage room to the office. What a relief. It has been nearly 4 years since I had a place to call my own - and 5 years since I had an apartment. This is an office - not an apartment. Now I have an address and a telephone - but more important - my computer and laser printer.

I have little money. Each night at 3 a.m. I raid the dumpster behind the Taco Bell. I have no refrigerator or microwave or shower.

1996 March 7. I walk to the post office. Surprise! The bankruptcy judge acted on my petition handwritten on ripped manilla folder. She set a hearing for this afternoon. Simon drives me to court. Judge orders Port Hueneme to pay me $1000 for contempt of court for evicting me despite bankruptcy order.

1996 June. I am facing eviction from my office. Rescue comes like this: My Dad cautiously invites me to come to Illinois for the family reunion in July but he insists that I buy a round trip ticket. (Later he would make a scene by gathering my luggage and driving to my brother's house with a baseball bat to insist that I get in the van for a ride to the airport. I jumped out at the first stop sign.) Dad sends me $700. I pay my storage bill in Ventura. I am so relieved that they did not sell my possession including my 27 years of diaries and my old photographs.

1996 July. I have 2 weeks between when I am evicted from my office and when the airplane leaves for Illinois. I have a court date in Santa Barbara. I sleep on a cardboard at the freeway entrance in Ventura behind Arby's roast beef. I walk to my storage place each day and wash there. I took a 3 day hike from the ocean to the top of Meditation Mountain in Ojai. I ate the oranges, figs and avocados there.

1996 July. Melvin Looser drives me to the airport. I have not been home to Illinois since Christmas of 1990 - nearly 6 years ago. My Dad won't let me sleep in the house. He makes me sleep on the porch.

1996 August. Dad brings a baseball bat and my luggage and insists that I get in the van to go to the airport. Greg let me stay at his house and work the farm for him.

1996 September - November. Great fun as I harvest with my Brothers Jerry and Greg, and my Dad. I have never before actually harvested full time. I was always in school or living out of state during harvest.

1996 November. Jerry returns to New Orleans. Greg and I cannot live in that small house. We go to counseling. Greg refuses to pay me the $2300 that he admits owing me for harvest work. I fly to Florida to visit my sister Julia.

1997 January. Greg sends the $2300 that he owes me. I fly to California and eventually live at the Missile Motel. I buy a $650 car. I deliver veterinary supplies. I write legal papers for an attorney friend.

1997 August 18. I write a letter to Greg asking to work for him again this year.

1997 September 5. I telephone Greg at the bar but Jim Baudino answers and says that Greg has a house for me.

1997 September 8. Greg returns my call and leaves a message with Lois at Judy Fogel's office. He says that I need to get home right away to work.

1997 Sept 13. Sat. I arrive at Greg's farm at about 1 a.m. I moved into my own house the next day and lived there until about noon on 14 May 1999 when the FBI arrested me. I have not seen the inside of my house since that day because new people moved into my house.

1998 I am appointed to the Charter Allen Township Land Use Commission.

1999 May 3. Although I have done most farm jobs, I was never permitted to plant corn until this day when my nice brother Jerry said to me "Get up on that tractor and plant; otherwise you may never get a chance to do it."

Beginning of page 13 of original 44 page complaint - plus 20 pages of exhibits.

1. On 14 May, 1999, Brothers Douglas and Jerry Palaschak returned to their farm home in their pickup truck to find 3 Ford Crown Victoria Sedans in their driveway.
2. Douglas walked into his house and found 5 men wearing suits and guns.
3. FBI agent Eley amicably arrested Palaschak stating that the arrest was for "interstate flight to avoid prosecution for practicing law without a license."
4. FBI agent Eley told Jerry Palaschak in Douglas's presence: "Your brother is unique. I've never arrested anybody for practicing law without a license before."
5. Some weeks later Palaschak obtained a copy of the arrest warrant.
6. Palaschak was arrested on the basis of a 7 May 1999 warrant from federal magistrate McElwyn of Santa Barbara charged with 18 USCS §1073.
7. Despite numerous requests to the jail and to the public defender, Palaschak has been unable to obtain a copy of 18 USCS §1073.
8. This LaSalle County, Illinois, jail has no law library accessible to inmates. They allow no hardcover books.
9. Jail rules say that they will copy a particular section of law but Chief Jailer Preci told me that he relayed to the public defender my request for a copy of 18 USCS §1073.
10. Having mailed (by interdepartmental mail) my copy of the warrant to my public defender, I have been 4 times denied another copy. Illinois state provides for a monetary penalty to be paid to a prisoner whose request for a warrant of commitment is denied for more than 6 hours. 735 ILCS §5/10-105. Therefore I cannot provide a copy of the federal warrant to append as an exhibit to this complaint.

Tuesday 22 June 1999. 6 pm:

1. In the form here is a place for the bail amount. "Detention" is written there.
2. FBI agent Eley told me at my house that the FBI only gets involved if the underlying crime is a felony; at its best, even if all the allegations were true and the statute were constitutional this crime, being de minimis, would only be a misdemeanor. All defendants knew that the allegations constituted merely a misdemeanor - and Judge Clark had the courage to say so in court when he released me after I had served the misdemeanor sentence of 6 months. Eley circumvented FBI internal policy or the FBI conspired to deny Palaschak the benefit of internal policy. (This paragraph has been changed from the original. Everything after "at its best" was added during transcription on 20 June 2001.
3. The warrant directs a federal agent to take me immediately before a federal magistrate. It's been 40 days and I've not been taken before a federal magistrate.
4. FBI Agent Eley told me that "the federal case is usually dismissed."
5. Issue: This seems to be a pretextual arrest . . . and as I shall show, a pretextual detention. (Added June 21, 2001: When I finally did receive a copy of the Santa Barbara warrant, I noted that there was no bail set, only the words "detention" which indicates to me that the magistrate did not know that I have a right to bail. Illinois authorities set a bail amount so high that I could not pay.)
6. Upon arraignment on 17 May 1999 before Judge Lanuti, Prosecutor David Day presented a perjurious complaint that , even if it were true, nonetheless fails to meet the criteria of 725 ILCS §225/13 as explained in the annotations to 18 USCS §3182.

Beginning of page 14 of original 40 page petition #3433.

1. The exhibits, although self-exculpatory, nonetheless describe the alleged underlying crime.
2. Exhibit A-1 shows that the alleged crime is codified as §6126(b).
3. Palaschak knows that §6126(b) was amended circa 1996 rendering it unconstitutional, a denial of equal protection, to wit: the penalty for a 1^st time offense is a misdemeanor penalty unless the defendant is a former bar member, in which case the penalty is a felony.
4. This statute is new. I haven't a copy of annotated California statutes to see if it has been challenged.

More Issues

1. Suddenly we have some more issues:
2. On the evidence before us, the intention of FBI Agent Eley at the time of arrest was not to properly follow the direction of the warrant.

725 ILCS §225/14 does not authorize FBI arrest under Illinois uniform extradition law. Under Illinois statutes, an FBI agent is neither a peace officer nor a private person.

1. FBI Agent Eley put his hands up in frustration saying "I don't want to hear about the underlying offense" at my house.
2. The FBI had insufficient information to arrest without a warrant but this is a moot point because Eley has no authority to arrest under Illinois law. His only authority comes from the warrant - - and he did not comply with the warrant.

Written at 7 pm. Tuesday. 22 June 1999. An Illinois storm approaches at the jail:

1. 725 ILCS §5/107-4 defines "peace officer". An FBI agent is not included in this definition.
2. 725 ILCS §5/107-4 defines "law enforcement agency." The FBI is not included in this definition.
3. Also, any arrest under Illinois extradition law must be based on sufficient affidavits to meet the criteria of 725 ILCS §225/b and 31A Am Jur 2d.
4. This court must find that the initial arrest was pretextual.
5. This court must interpret 735 ILCS §5/10- 123(3) as not justifying continued detention unless the requirements of the above paragraphs are met. The more specific supersedes the more general statute.
6. This court must find that the 14^th amendment and bill of rights supersede the constitution and its extradition clause - just as they superseded the fugitive slave clause.

8 a.m. wed 23 June 1999:

Refocus: Pretextual arrest. No bail. No effective Assistance of Counsel.

1. Extradition being much less common than the ordinary criminal prosecution, its procedure has been less finely honed by case law through the years. In particular, the right to bail, and to a probable cause hearing - and to a consideration that some offenses are non-extraditable - are foreign to LaSalle county.
2. Subject to the qualification that petitioner has not had access to a copy of 18 USC §1073 and therefore knows not its authority, petitioner contends that FBI Agent Eley's arrest of Palaschak was pretextual.
3. Petitioner Palaschak contends that even if the procedure followed in his case "is the way it's always done" it is nonetheless unconstitutional.

Beginning of page 15 of the original 44 page handwritten petition to the Illinois Supreme court:

1. Due Process includes the right to a hearing before deprivation of life, liberty, or property. Authority: Bell v Burson (1971) 29 L Ed 2d 90, 402 US 535, 91 S Ct 1586 , Goldberg v Kelly (1970) 25 L Ed 2d 287, 90 S Ct 101, 397 US 254.
2. Due process is not a mere loophole for use by slick lawyers.
3. The concept of due process can be traced back nearly 800 years to the Magna Charta written in 1215 ans signed by King John in a field at Runnymede at the point of a sword.
4. Chapter 39 of the Magna Chart: "No Free man shall be captured or imprisoned. . . outlawed or exiled or in any way destroyed except by the lawful judgment of his peers and by the law of the land." - Magna Charta, Chapter 39.

1. In 1639 Maryland's act of the liberties of the people paraphrased chapter 39 of the Magna Charta.
2. The first American use of the term "Due Process of Law" was in 1787 in the amendments to the constitution proposed by New York state.
3. Before you can repossess a cheap gas stove you must give hearing to the possessor of the stove. Fuentes v Shevin (1971) 32 L Ed 2d, 92 S Ct 1983, 407 US 67.
4. Before you can suspend a federal bar license for conviction of a crime you must give the lawyer a hearing. In Re Ming.469 F 2d 1352 (1971) ( Added 23 June 2001: Here are the cases and statutes upon which the Ming decision was based: Ex parte Garland 4 Wall 333, 380, 18 L.Ed. 366; Ex Parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265, 2 S. Ct. 569, 27 L.Ed 552 (1882);Goldberg v Kelly 397 U.S. 254, 90 S.Ct. 1011,25 L.Ed2d 287 (1970); Grannis v Orlean, 234 U.S. 385, 394, 34 S.Ct. 779, 783, 58 L.Ed. 1363] (1914); In Re Crane, 23 Ill.2d 398, 400-401, 178 N.E.2d 349 (1961); In Re Echeles 430 F.2d 347, 349-350 (7th Cir. 1970); In re Fisher, 179 F.2d 361 (7th Cir. 1950), cert. denied sub nom. Kerner, et. al. v. Fisher, 340 U.S. 825, 71 S.Ct. 59, 95 L. Ed. 606 (1950); In Re Ruffalo 390 U.S. 544, 550, 88 S.Ct. 1222, 1226, 20 L.Ed.2nd 117 (1968); I n Re Sawyer, 256 F.2d 553 (9th Cir. 1956); Morrissey v. Brewer 408 U.S. 471, 92 S.Ct. 22593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972);Randall v Brigham, 74 U.S. (7 Wall) 523, 540; 19 L.Ed. 285 (1868); Selling v Radford 243 U.S. 46, 51; 37 S.Ct. 377, 379; 61 L.Ed. 585; Spevack v Klein 385 U.S. 511, 516, 87 S.Ct. 635, 629, 17 L.Ed.2d (1967); Will v Immigration and Naturalization Service 447 F.2d 539, 531 & 533 (7th Cir. 1971); Treatises: Black's Law Dictionary, 5th Edition 1; Reich, The New Property, 73 Yale L.J. 733 (1964); Statutes; 8 U.S.C. 1251(a)(11) - deportation; 526 U.S.C. 7203 3)
5. When a person gets into a car crash with the required car insurance, the department of motor vehicle may not suspend that person's right to drive until after a hearing. Bell v Burson (1971) 29 L Ed 2d 90.
6. Before you can suspend a student from public school you must give him a hearing. Goss v Lopez 419 US 165.
7. Even where a state statute gives a defendant a criminal preliminary hearing in 30 days, that is not good enough! It mus be before commitment. Gerstein v Pugh (1975) 45 L Ed 2d 54, 420 US 103, 95 S Ct 854. (The current state of the law seems to permit 0, 48, or 72 hours detention but a more progressive view would absolutely forbid any detention before the prelim except in cases of threat of violence. I contend that if the state can send police out to arrest people 24 hours a day, then they can provide magistrates 24 hours per day also.)
8. Palaschak's contention: Under the U.S. constitution, the Magna Charta, the Illinois constitution (to which Palaschak has unconstitutionally been denied access) and 725 ILCS §225/13 a meaningful hearing is required to ascertain that the statutory requirements are met before commitment to permit extradition.
9. The hearing in Palaschak's case was a sham, a farce, a fraud, and a violation of Palaschak's constitutional rights. It was not a meaningful hearing, to wit: Palaschak, having qualified as indigent and having been assigned to the public defender, was denied assistance of counsel. The public defender was not in court! Judge Lanuti should have immediately telephoned the public defender. Today's remedy: Release Palaschak immediately with prejudice. It's exemplary.

Beginning of page 16 in the original handwritten petition #3433. Written 1 pm Wed June 23 1999. Transcribed 23 June 2001. Coincidence? I think not:

1. Palaschak's only hearing was on 17 May 1999. His only other appearances were 2 continuances until July 2.
2. Even after Palaschak was released on 8 June and re-arrested there was no hearing.. . despite (or maybe because of) the federal warrant's already having been executed.
3. Query: Will Palaschak appear before a federal magistrate in California? (Retrospect: No.)
4. Answer: Irrelevant. He should have been taken before a federal magistrate on 14 May 1999 as directed in the warrant.
5. This Illinois Supreme Court suffers an additional burden because the sheriff (by his agents) has refused to give me another copy of the federal warrant. . .despite the clear language of 735 ILCS §5/10-105 which says:

"Any sheriff or other officer or person having custody of any prisoner committed on any civil or criminal process of any court who shall neglect to give such prisoner a copy of the process or order of commitment by which he or she is imprisoned within 6 hours after demand made by the prisoner, or anyone on behalf of the prisoner, shall forfeit to the prisoner or party affect not exceeding $500." - 735 ILCS §5/10-105.

1. I either filed the federal warrant in a previous habeas or I sent it to my public defender.
2. Only 2 pieces of paper were presented at the hearing:
1. A perjured pretextual complaint written that day by persecutor David Day's computer or staff - who are incompetent in the area of extradition.
2. I don't remember the 2^nd piece of paper.
3. Case law collected at Volume 31A Am Jur 2d supports Palaschak's contention that David Day's case was insufficient to merit a warrant of commitment.
4. Judge Lanuti did not issue a warrant of commitment. Proving the negative is difficult. I asked for warrants in the past 41 days and received only 2, namely: #1 the federal warrant from Santa Barbara; and #2 the California state court warrant. (Added 23 June 2001: Enforcement by Illinois of the California warrant is a violation of the 14^th amendment which says that no state shall enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges and immunities of any citizen.)

2 pm Wed 23 June 1999:

1. It's been very load during the writing of this complaint. We are at 200% capacity in this jail. Therefore 18 of us sit in the 30' x 15' day room. Most of these guys have high testosterone levels and low social compatibility skills. They shout to be heard over the television. They pound on the table. They shout like aggressive animals. They posture. They exert as much dominance as possible. Therefore, my focus requires my effort.
2. Prosecutor Day's complaint was an affidavit notarized, as if the oath were talismanic.
3. David Day said nothing about the underlying crime. Obviously this was Monday morning. Palaschak arrived at the jail on the previous Friday afternoon. The actions of the prosecutor Day and Judge Lanuti are telling.
4. Day could have asked for a day continuance. See exhibit K. Lanuti (the court) moved for continuance to effect the appropriate remedy, re-arraignment.
5. At re-arraignment on 21 May appointed counsel did not have a clue that this was re-arraignment. Note that the 21^st was the Friday following the arraignment at which the public defender failed to appear. Any event except re-arraignment would not have been set so soon. This was obviously a re-arraignment - although it was not so obvious to the new different judge Chris Ryan and the public defender Dan Bute who I just met at this re-arraignment on the 21^st. Bute did not even have the courtesy to identify himself to me until my case was called. When we were called to the bench I asked who he was.

Beginning of page 17 of the petition handwritten 23 June 1999 at 3:44 pm in jail in Illinois. Transcribed 23 June 2001 at the library in Ventura:

1. On 21 May 1999 my appointed counsel Dan But said that he did not have time. He did no arraignment. He dropped the ball,
2. The public defender yesterday (22 June 1999) resumed work on my case at the beginning - a point Zero after weeks of vacation with no stand-in public defender to assist me, which is denial of assistance of counsel, but I digress.
3. Back to due process: Aside from the illegality of the arrest, which is discussed at paragraphs 108-120 herein) the procedure of 725 ILCS §13, 14, and 15 should have been followed. These sections are entitled "arrest without a warrant," "arrest prior to requisition," and "commitment to await requisition."
4. We can see from exhibit B that as late as 26 May 1999 - nearly 2 weeks after my arrest - the original underlying complaint was being signed in Ventura County court.
5. On 17 May and on 21 May, Prosecutor Day could not have met his burden of proof.
6. Arrest without a warrant mandates a hearing specified in 725 ILCS §225/13.
7. Section 13 is authorized by 18 USC 3182 and may not enlarge the scope of authority beyond that of the cases defining §3182.
8. 18 USC §3182 in turn is authorized by the extradition clause of the U.S. constitution.
9. Section 3182 may not enlarge authority behind that limited by the 14^th and 1^st amendments; These subsequent amendments supersede, abridge, limit, and change the meaning of the extradition clause so that it is not as strong as it says.
10. This bears upon the meaning of the words "felony" and"crime" but I digress.
11. The bill of rights and its numerous interpretations supersede the extradition clause.
12. Of course there are competing societal goals. . . and every court must eventually balance them against the constitutional rights of the defendant.
13. Example: Illinois extradition law denies bail for crimes punishable by death or life imprisonment.
14. Nonetheless Gerstein V Pugh (1975( 43 L Ed 2d 54, 420 US 103, 95 S Ct 854 clearly spells out pertinent guidelines that apply in the case of extradition also, although extradition is not mentioned.

6 pm 23 June 1999:

1. "The standards and procedures for arrest and detention have been derived from the 4^th amendment and its common-law antecedents . . . The standard for arrest is probable cause [is] defined in terms of facts and circumstances "sufficient to warrant a prudent main in believing that the [suspect] had committed or was committing an offense." - Beck v Ohio (1964) 379 US 89, 91 as cited in "The standards and procedures for arrest and detention have been derived from the 4^th amendment and its common-law antecedents . . . The standard for arrest is probable cause [is] defined in terms of facts and circumstances "sufficient to warrant a prudent main in believing that the [suspect] had committed or was committing an offense." - Beck v Ohio (1964) 379 US 89, 91 as cited in Gerstein v Pugh (1975) 43 L Ed 2d 54.

1. ( Added 23 June 2001: Palaschak should have been released by the above standard because writing a petition cannot possibly be a crime - and the 14^th amendment forbids Illinois to help California enforce any law that abridges Palaschak's privileges and immunities.) Having been denied access to a law library, to my own hardcover books, and to copies of requested documents, I now contend that the "detention" of the 7 May federal 18 USC §1073 warrant means "less than 72 hours for purposes of ascertaining probable cause at an adversarial hearing"!
2. At the 17 May hearing, Judge Lanuti declined to issue a warrant. Palaschak should then have been released! At least he should have been release at the 21 May re-arraignment which did not happen.

Beginning of page 18 of the original handwritten petition:

1. Recall that the only warrants shown to Palaschak after his approximately 8 statutory demands are:
1. The federal warrant of 7 May 1999 alleging 18 USC 1073 but that charge went away and the detainer should have been brief to determine the validity of the charge which federal prosecutors obviously have declined to pursue; and
2. The warrant of Ventura county court - which has interstate validity only by virtue of action taken in Illinois - by the governor or local judge - and neither have acted to warrant commitment in this case.
2. Palaschak should be freed immediately! That is the result of Lanuti's have failed to commit Palaschak!
3. Is there an effective post deprivation remedy? Yes! The remedy is discharge of Palaschak with prejudice.
4. However, Gerstein also holds that "Illegal detention does not void a subsequent conviction: Frisbie v Collins (1952) 342 US 519 but that is old law - before Miranda or even Gideon. (Retrospect: What is the effect of subsequent acquittal? Palaschak was extradited and acquitted.)
5. The callous treatment of an innocent or at best de minimis criminal says to us that we need some remedy. A case on point is Frisbie v Shirley Collins (1952) 96 L Ed 541, 72 S Ct 509, 342 US 519 which is likely out of date. Shirley Collins was a murder suspect in pro per in U.S. district court. Shirley had been kidnaped in Chicago and hauled to Michigan where he was convicted. (A man named Shirley is destined to have legal problems.)
6. It is time to limit the ancient case of Ker v Illinois (1886) 119 US 436 to its precise factual situation and to free Palaschak . . . but we can free Palaschak without cutting into Ker v Illinois . . . but the righteous vindication of human rights by the U.S. Supreme court in the ensuing years since 1886 points to a dire need to re-evaluate extradition law in view of the enhanced recognition of our inalienable rights - like Palaschak's right to speak and petition. The Ker case is 10 years older than Plessy v Fergeson (1996) 421 L ed 256, 163 US 537, 16 S Ct 1138 which held that Negroes are not entitled to equal protection under the laws.
7. Had there been an effective deterrent to illegal detention, Palaschak would not have been detained in violation of the 14^th amendment as he was in Illinois and California.

_:45 pm 23 June 1999. Wed.:

1. In dissent in Gerstein, Justices Stewart, Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall say:

"I see no need in this case for the court to say that the constitution extends less procedural protection to an imprisoned human being than is required to test the propriety of garnishing a commercial bank account, North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601; the custody of a refrigerator, Mitchell v W. T. Grant Co.. 416 US 600; the temporary suspension of a public school student, Goss v Lopez, 419 US 565; or the suspension of a driver license, Bell v Burson, 402 US 535. Although it may be true that the 4^th amendment's 'balance between individual and public interest always has been thought to define the [magnitude of the ] process that is due for seizures of person or property in criminal cases' [answering the concurring opinion note #27] this case does not involve an initial arrest, but rather the continuing incarceration of a presumptively innocent person." - Dissenting Justices Stewart, Douglas Brennan, and Marshall in Gerstein v Pugh (1975) 43 L Ed 2d 54.

1. I do not know the current state of the law pertaining to the rights to an adversary hearing. I have been denied access to annotated Illinois statues. Also, §59 of Volume 31A of Am Jur 2d at note 50 indicates that the following case may shed some light: State v Hughes (RI) 494 A2d 85 Cert Den 474 US 1009, 88 L Ed 2d 466, 106 S Ct. 536.
2. I do know that Professor Lawrence Friedman in his History of American Law, 2^nd Edition, says that the best supreme court decisions rely on persuasive logic rather than nitpicking case law - and I agree. Also, I have given some thought to the subject, especially during these past 40 days - and in 1993 when I was illegally detained without a warrant and released after 6 days while my computers remained in jail for over a year - at the behest of the same investigator who is behind the current extradition.. I thought about it while I was detained 8 hours on a police scrivener's error resulting in my false arrest for grand theft auto.

The prior false arrest and the paper record or lack thereof rebut the presumption of regularity.

1. Here's the logic: Palaschak's case is almost all on paper. The paper is self-exculpating! Palaschak has previously been falsely arrested by this same detective Glen Kitzman for the same crime! The comity extended to California is predicated on the presumption of regularity - the presumption that California's paperwork is credible. That prior false arrest rebuts this presumption of regularity!
1. There is no doubt that Palaschak is entitled to a hearing. He has been her 40 days without a hearing.
2. If ever there were a case for release after 30 days, this de minimis non crime is it.
3. Palaschak now asks this Supreme Court of Illinois to rule that as a matter of law Palaschak was denied due process. He should have been permitted to cross examine prosecutor Day . . . but Lanuti did not reward Day with commitment. So why am I still here?

Beginning of page 20 of original handwritten #3433, written 10 pm 23 June 1000.

1. Defendant Pugh in Gerstein v Pugh faced a life sentence; Palaschak faces whatever punishment there is for writing a petition - which is a much less severe crime, unless, of course, you subscribe to the 1^st amendment, in which case it is no crime.
2. Therefore a weighing of the constitutional issued would be more in Palaschak's favor that it was in Gerstein's.
3. In none of the cases did I find a detainee's contention that a hearing would exculpate him. I contend that a hearing will exculpate me as a matter lf law.
4. The mere act of extradition carries risk of injury to defendant Palaschak which risk is not justified by his alleged crime - writing a petition. Indeed the mere threat chills speech. The first amendment needs breathing room.
5. Palaschak has in the past experienced wrist pain and numbness from car journeys in handcuffs.
6. When a crime is do de minimis, or course, there will be many issues that come to surface by virtue of the weighing of constitutional issues.
7. Misdemeanors were not crimes at the time the constitution was written. Proof: Blackstone in his 1765-1769 Commentaries use the term "crimes and misdemeanors."
8. A related concept is "malum in se" compared to "malum prohibitum." The former means "inherently bad" and the latter means "merely prohibited." There is a strong correlation between the two concepts. Mere malum prohibitum offenses do not carry a felony stigma. They are generally misdemeanors - as was Palaschak's alleged crime, B&P §6126 (advertising that one is entitled to practice law while one is suspended) prior to the 1996 amendment which made it a possible felony for bar members - but not for others.
9. "Malum in se" crimes need not be legislated nor taught. They trigger empathy. The perpetrator, if he were sensitive would hear his conscience reprimanding him. Indeed it is the absence of adequate empathy and conscience that cause criminals to offend. "Malum in se" crimes are considered morally wrong and have been crimes for centuries. They include the 7 dangerous felonies and other felonies.
10. By comparison "malum Prohibitum" crimes do not offend (in Blackstone's view) the laws of god and nature.
11. At page 7-9 of Volume 4 of Blackstone's commentaries (Chapter 1: On the nature of crimes and their punishment) Blackstone struggles to justify "malum prohibitum" laws. He says that they are "part of the original contract into which they entered when they first engaged in society." - page 8. California breached its societal contract with me by violating my right to free speech.
12. Palaschak's alleged crime is really only a misdemeanor at best. In 1789 terms and in 1994 terms. It was no felony (and therefore non-extraditable) until the 1996 amendment - and then only for those persons formerly associated with the California bar. Discrimination on the basis of former association is unconstitutional In Schware v Board of Bar examiners (1957) 1 L Ed 2d 796, 3553 US 232, 77 S Ct 752 64 ALR 2d 288 "[the U.S. Supreme Court] held it not permissible to bar a lawyer from practice because he had once been a member of the communist party." - Griswold v Connecticut (1965) 14 L Ed 2d 510, 381 US 479, 85 S Ct 1678.
13. How much more unfair in Palaschak's case where the law required him to join and organization and now punishes him with a extraditable felony whereas if his had never joined this organization his crime would only be a misdemeanor at best and not extraditable!

Beginning of page 21 of original handwritten petition #3433. 9:42 a.m. 24 Jun 1999. Thursday. Illinois:

1. This court may rule on the validity or constitutionality of California's laws. Younger abstention is inappropriate here because there are extraordinary circumstances obvious to anyone who knows Palaschak's story. Official bad faith and harassment involved in the enforcement of state laws here justify an exception to Younger v Harris (1971) 401 US 37, 53. (Added 23 June 2001: Although Younger applies federal courts, the principle is somewhat applicable. The 14^th amendment requires that no state enforce a law that abridges my privileges and immunities. By extraditing me, Illinois violates this proscription.)
2. As society evolves we see a trend toward increased respect for the individual and human rights. The heartless dominance of the corporation and state are diminishing.
3. Almost everything about this crime is strange. The district attorney was alerted to the crime by my nemesis, ex prosecutor Vince O'Neill. Although alerted on 10 May 1997 the prosecution waited nearly a year before filing a criminal complaint and obtaining a warrant. See exhibit F, line 22.
4. Blackstone says that malum prohibitum crimes cannot justify punishment on the same basis as malum in se crimes. Malum in se crimes are punished, says Blackstone, because God commands it in the Bible. By comparison, malum prohibitum offenses are punished to deter future offenses.
5. In Palaschak's case, he has been gone for 2 years having established himself in a new career, namely, farming in Illinois. To deter Palaschak from calling himself a lawyer (which he is) and helping the helpless in California, they want to bring Palaschak back to California and put him in a cage with helpless people who need a lawyer. They will ask Palaschak "Why are you here." Palaschak will tell them. They will ask for help on their cases. Obviously if deterrence were the only goal (and Blackstone deems this so: deterrence is the sole reason for malum prohibitum crimes) then leaving Palaschak on his farm in Illinois would meet California's legitimate needs, assuming arguendo that California has any need to prevent the helpless from obtaining assistance of counsel and assuming arguendo that California has any need to prevent Palaschak from truthfully calling himself a lawyer.

11:15 a.m. Thursday 24 June 1999:

Refocus: Due Process Re: Gerstein hearing

1. Question of fact: Did Judge Lanuti permit Palaschak t prevail at the May 178^th event - the only Illinois event (so far) that was not a mere continuance? Answer: Obviously Yes! - unless the omission of a warrant of Commitment was inadvertent - and even then the burden would be on the prosecution to prove the mistake.
2. The issue is not essential to Palaschak's argument. Now there are 2 invalid warrants and neither of the is valid to detain:
1. #1 is the California state warrant which is invalid except as a basis for an Illinois warrant which was denied by Lanuti on May 17;
2. #2 is the stale detention warrant from Santa Barbara which was ignored by agent Eley who violated its command to take me before a federal magistrate.
3. Palaschak may at some time be given a hearing. An adversarial hearing is required. That is my contention. This is a fleeting issue. The detainee is usually distracted by the underlying criminal prosecution and the journey to a distant forum. This issue repeatedly arises by evades resolution . . . except as a last ditch desperate ploy of those serving a long sentence - which tends to result in decisions that favor the prosecution even if legal fiction is required. This explains why Shirley Collins and Mr. Pugh came out with less than total victory when the court weighed such factors as public safety, competing societal goals, irreparable harm, harmless error, etc. It made no difference in their case; it makes a difference in Palaschak's case were the alleged harm is only harm in the eyes of the prosecution who harass Palaschak he is an outspoken advocate of victims of predatory courts (like traffic court) and prosecution.

Beginning of page 22 of original handwritten petition #3433. 12 noon 24 June 1999:

Interjection of an exculpatory thought (or several)

1. Superior Court Judge O'Neill is the one who reported the crime. How do you suppose he discovered this crime? Does he peruse court records looking for people calling themselves lawyers? See line 22 , exhibit F.
2. Why didn't Kitzman's affidavit tell us the answer to this question?
3. When I was last at the traffic appeal court, Vince O'Neill was one of the judges there. He recused himself in my case as indeed he should have.
4. Obviously O'Neill was sitting in traffic appeal court when Melvin Looser's case came along.
5. Did O'Neill recuse himself in Looser's case. If not, then who will check with Melvin Looser to contest bias in his case at the court of O'Neill? Likely Looser had no lawyer or transcript in his case.
6. One of the issues in Melvin Looser's appeal is that the Ventura bench is way too disproportionately staffed with ex prosecutors such as Vince O'Neill who was likely offended when I chastised him indirectly.
7. Vince O'Neill is an ex prosecutor who litigated cases when I was an active Ventura defense attorney.
8. Maybe all ex prosecutors should have recused themselves. Who guards the guardians of justice if we punish that lawyer who speak out against injustice?
9. Why didn't Kitzman and the Ventura district attorney office include the entire 12 pages of Melvin Looser's notice of appeal? The omission was an omission of exculpatory evidence. Now maybe you can see why we need an adversary hearing. This is old news. A grand jury is not an adversary forum and that is why people say that a grand jury does whatever the district attorney requests. (Added 23 June 2001: I wonder if the prosecution attempted to get a grand jury indictment in the case against me?)

Previous Dirty tricks against Palaschak by the Ventura District Attorney

1. Vince O'Neill was in the district attorney's employ during the prosecution and dirty tricks against Palaschak.
2. Continued.

Beginning of page 23 of original handwritten petition #3433:

1. In 1993 Investigator Kitzman, the same guy on whose word you are asked forcibly remove Palaschak from the corn that must soon (July) be harvested, lied this same lie previously!
1. In 1993 I thought long and hard about an adversary hearing. In 1993 Kitzman presented a false affidavit to Judge Joe Hadden of Ventura Superior court. Then, as now, the lie could quickly and neatly been exposed by the truth engine of cross examination.
2. I contend that in the future, search warrants will be executed in 2 steps:
1. Step 1 will consist in obtaining a warrant to secure the premises;
2. Step 2 will be an adversary hearing - instead of the current ex parte hearing.
3. Only if the prosecution prevails will there be a search - and the adversarial process will better limit the scope of the search and accommodate the interest of both sides.
3. In Palaschak's 1993 case Palaschak could easily have proven that his license was valid . . . as he did immediately upon arrest.
4. Irreparable harm: Despite Palaschak's innocence in 1993 the Los Angeles Times carried a nearly half page story with headlines that said something like "Local attorney charged with 7 felonies". Although the district attorney never did file a criminal complaint against Palaschak in 1993, they issued a press release about the arrest.
5. The prosecution in 1993 asked Palaschak to plead guilty even though they had charged him with no crime! They offered to return Palaschak's laser printer if he would plead guilty to a crime - even though they accused him of no crime!
6. Palaschak was held in jail for 6 days. The prosecution kept his computers, diaries, cash, checks, files, answering machine, laser printer, and work product for over a year.
7. Having previously (in 1992/93) served nearly a year in jail for having failed to purchase car insurance in 1988 when he was the victim of a rear-ender car crash where he was not at fault, Palaschak in 1993 had just hooked up an 800 number expensive advertising in the Los Angeles times and was doing 1 hour bankruptcies. After the unjustified raid, Good Nite Inn would not let Palaschak stay in their Motel - even though he was innocent. They read the headlines that were the result of the district attorneys untruthful press release.
8. Palaschak not could recover access to his 800 line - and had no computers or printer to use anyway. Therefore the advertising was going to waste.
9. Palaschak was now deprived of his income stream and the money that he had already earned (which was seized by the investigators) but continued to incur the cost of advertising and the 800 number.
10. Palaschak had little or no money but he did have his car (which police would take the next year). Upon release from jail Palaschak for the first time began sleeping in his car to avoid motel expenses.
11. Now Palaschak was battling on 5 fronts:
1. He was battling to overturn his misdemeanor LSD conviction at the court of appeal - and ultimately prevailed there.
2. The district attorney interfered with Palaschak's appeal process by seizing the computers on which he had written his brief for the appeal.
3. He was battling to overturn his traffic tickets at the traffic appeal court without a transcript - and to this day does not know what was the outcome.
4. He was battling with the state bar to persuade them to undo the interim suspension which they applied in the mistaken belief that Palaschak's LSD case was not a misdemeanor.
5. Palaschak was simultaneously trying to find some way to earn a living.
6. Palaschak was now litigating in state court to get his computers back.
7. About this same time the state bar initiated a proceeding before Ventura Judge Hunter to assume control over Palaschak's practice which was not a matter for the state bar because Palaschak's practice was only in federal court. Palaschak had several bankruptcies in envelopes ready to be mailed to court. Judge Hunter delayed these bankruptcies by authorizing the state bar to give the cases to other lawyers.
12. The district attorney was now reading Palaschak's personal diaries in his computer and indeed read back to 1989 even though they had no probable cause. Their pretext was Palaschak's licensure problem which only went back to 1992, the year of the LSD trial.
13. Palaschak's brother, Jerry, returned an old computer to Palaschak so that he would have some computer to replace the ones that the district attorney office seized in August 1993.

Beginning of page 24 of original handwritten brief #3433. Subject: Habeas petition, Mandamus petition, dirty trick, virtue of the adversarial process:

1. Palaschak eventually developed a 100 page brief that should have been used in his LSD appeal but the first appointed lawyer discussed only 2 of the 50 issues. The 2^nd appointed lawyer only discussed approximately 2 issues and did not submit a complete transcript.
2. Issue: Investigator Kitzman, the investigator who instigated this fraudulent extradition, is the same investigator whose blunder caused delay on my LSD case; my brief was on my computer that he kept for a year! The court of appeal ruled on my case before the district attorney relinquished my computers and my brief.
3. Kitzman was also the investigator in the very LSD case that I was attempting to appeal; he took the computers on which I was writing my brief -and then attempted to read everything on the computer. That is dirty tricks, a violation of my constitutional right to privacy, and a cause of action under 42 USC 1983 and directly under the constitution.
4. One of the questions that we did not answer during my LSD suppression hearing we this: How did the police dispatcher already know my name when the temp went to the police station to tell them that I had said that I ate some LSD? Had they already been investigating me? Why? The dispatched refused to appear at my suppression hearing despite being subpoenaed to appear - and then she resigned from the police department. Was I being investigated without probable cause?
5. I discovered the answer in a stack of discovery papers from the state bar. One of my former secretaries had taken some application forms from my file - filled out forms containing data about job applicants - so she mistakenly presumed - as did the police perhaps. Her concern was that the forms contained more information on physical attributes than she considered appropriate. She did not know that the data pertained to aspiring actors - which is why the physical attributes were important. One does not always get the whole story by spying.
6. The police should have returned the stolen files to me. There was no crime to justify keeping the files. Not even close. The 4^th amendment is a blessing. Privacy is the insulation that keeps society from shorting out. The first amendment needs breathing space.
7. People get angry about what I write sometimes. On my most recent birthday, my angry brother Greg broke into my house and stole copies of my emails and brought them to my Mom's house and ruined our Mother's Day party. Local police declined to pursue the matter of his having broken into my house.

Offer of Proof

1. We see 2 trends:
1. Punishing Palaschak for speaking up when that speech does not please the court, for example:
1. The action of the California Supreme court in overturning my appellate victory after my client sued the California Supreme court.
2. The action of the California bar in suspending my license after my client sued the California bar.
3. The action of Ventura traffic Judge Hunter in giving me a disproportionately high sentence in minor traffic cases.
2. Raids based on falsehoods presented at a non-adversarial one-sided hearing, for example;
1. The current arrest by the FBI May 14, 1999.
2. The previous raid instigated by Kitzman in August 1993 based on an identical false allegation of practicing law while unlicensed.
3. The LSD raid in May 1991 based in part upon papers illegally taken from my office.
2. An element of B&P §6126(b) would appear to be "advertising" although Palaschak's public defender has failed in 42 days to obtain a copy of the amended statute; Ventura offers no factual basis to prove this element. (In retrospect this element and others were missing; I interviewed the jury afterwards. They said that the facts simply did not support the prosecution's allegations.
3. An element of the alleged crime is deception, to wit: "holding oneself out to be entitled to practice law at a time when one is not licensed" - although that must be qualified lest we run into the same problem as in 1993 when Kitzman was mistaken as to jurisdiction and license. (Added 24 June 2001: Ultimately the first amendment to the U.S. constitution is the only license needed to speak, write, and petition - and practice law!)
4. See Exhibit H, lines 20-21. Palaschak certainly did not tell Melvin Looser that he was licensed by the state of California. Quoting Kitzman's statement of what Melvin said as he was secretly taped by Kitzman: "He {Melvin] said that Douglas Palaschak told him [that] he [Palaschak] was a disbarred attorney." There is no deception by Palaschak there.
5. To whom did Palaschak hold himself out to be licensed? Kitzman says at Exhibit G, line 12: "the first paragraph of the motion began with the words 'This motion was written by Attorney Douglas Palaschak'."
6. Kitzman loses credibility by his deceitful ploy here. In fact the 1^st page speaks for itself at Exhibit E which is labeled Exhibit #3 at the top.
7. In fact, as you can see, the 1^st paragraph begins with "to District Attorney Michael Bradbury . . ."; Kitzman is lying or mistaken about what the first paragraph says.
8. Kitzman mistake footnote #1 for the first paragraph, He is an example and a product of the Peter Principle. He has risen to his level of incompetence.

3:15 pm. Thursday 24 June 1999:

1. I am reminded of a quote from perhaps Boyd v U.S. (1886) or some other case pertaining to searches: Without the intervention of a neutral and detached magistrate, our security and privacy in our homes is in the hands of every petty officer.
2. Barry Klopfer is not a neutral and detached magistrate!
3. See Exhibit A-1. Klopfer signed the arrest warrant. I sued Klopfer in about 1993.
4. Klopfer is an ex prosecutor and would be expected to be angry about my complaint in petition 2871 about too many ex prosecutors becoming judges.
5. Klopfer has always recused himself in my cases due to bias. He should have recused himself from my case herein!
6. Incidentally on of my specialties was sex crimes. Klopfer was a prosecutor in the sex crimes unit before becoming a judge.
7. Independent exculpatory fact: State of mind: Men Re: Belief that my act was legal.
8. Having practiced in state bar court and having thoroughly