Douglas Palaschak

v

Sheriff Tom Templeton of LaSalle County, Governor of Illinois

Case #_____

Petition #3433

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Mandamus per 735 ILCS §5/10-103.

Affidavit of Douglas Palaschak

Affidavit of Indigency

Request for Appointment of Counsel

Application for Temporary Restraining Order, Order to Show Cause, Temporary Injunction, Declaratory Relief and Permanent Injunction.

Proof of Service. The Original Handwritten Petition contained no tables of contents or tables of authorities but did contain the correct citations to authorities which citations I extracted from my 8 volume private library in jail which library was permitted by jail rules but nonetheless confiscated and lost by jailers upon my extradition.

List of Exhibits 76

Exhibit A-A The arrest warrant. The exhibit that should have been. Having only one copy of my arrest warrant, I sent it off earlier and could not send it to this Illinois Supreme Court. This significance of the warrant is that it commands any agent to take me before the nearest U.S. magistrate. Had Eley done as he was told, the magistrate would have released me because the U.S. Attorney would not have filed a complaint in this case - and Eley told me as much. 76

Exhibit A-1 Warrant signed by my enemy Barry Klopfer who should have recused himself. Also, I had no chance to appear voluntarily before the warrant issued because I had already left the state a year prior. They should not be able to obtain a warrant without first permitting me to appear. 76

Exhibit A-2. Page 1 of 8 June 1999 complaint charging me with B&P 6126 advertising without a license - an abridgment of my speech rights. Note that this complaint was file 1 month after I was arrested! 76

Exhibit B. Page 2 of the complaint. How could it be sworn before Judge Clark in 1999 if it the signature of the swearing party was signed in 1998 over a year earlier? 76

Exhibit C. Letter #2901 with my photo on it. Cover letter for the Notice of appeal. 76

Exhibit D. 2^nd Notice of appeal. Filed in Ventura 27 may 1997. Signed by Melvin Looser. 76

Exhibit E. (Labeled "Exhibit 3" at the top) Page 1 of Motion #2871 filed 14 May 1997 in Ventura.
76

Exhibit F. Page 1 of Glen Kitzmann's 3 page statement of probable cause. 76

Exhibit G. Page 2 of Kitzmann's 3 page statement of probable cause. 76

Exhibit H. Page 3 of Kitzmann's 3 page statement of probable cause. 76

Exhibit J. Page 4, the signature page of Kitzmann's statement of probable cause. 76

Exhibit K. Docket sheet with illegible writing by the clerk. Public defender was assigned but was not present at this first arraignment hearing. Bail was reduced to $250,000.00.
76

Exhibit L. Eleven page Motion #3396 for bail reduction signed 25 May 1999 citing all the factors mentioned in the Illinois bail statute. I sent this to the public defender who simply ignored it. 76

Exhibit M. Copy of 18 USC 1073 which I requested on 14 May 1999, and again in writing on 17 may 1999, on 26 May 1999, and other times also. Finally, 42 days after I requested a copy of this statute, I received this on 28 June 1999, the very day that I first attempted to mail my 70 page Petition #3433 to the Illinois Supreme Court. Coincidence? I think not. I have seen no probable cause affidavit pertaining to the crime of 18 USC 1073. Apparently there was no complaint written or filed. 76

Appendix 1. Text of 18 USC 1073 (Added 8 August 2001) 77

Proof of Service 78

Tables of Authorities Cited Herein:

Cases Cited Herein:

Alvarez-Machain (1992) 112 US 2188. The U.S. Supreme Court permits the government to kidnap in Mexico those who interfere with our drug agents there attempting to foist on Mexico a drug policy that we don't even approve at home. 65

Argersinger (1974) 32 L Ed 2d 530, 407 US 25, 92 S Ct 2006 . The U.S. Supreme court says that we have a right to assistance of counsel wherever there is a possibility of jail t. 44, 68

Beck v Ohio (1964) 379 US 89, 91 "The standards and procedures for arrest and detention have been derived from the 4^th amendment and its common-law antecedents . . . The standard for arrest is probable cause [is] defined in terms of facts and circumstances "sufficient to warrant a prudent main in believing that the [suspect] had committed or was committing an offense." - as cited in Gerstein v Pugh (1975) 43 L Ed 2d 54. 24

Bell v Burson (1971) 26 L Ed 90, 401 US 535 State cannot take a driver license without hearing. 1, 2,
19, 20, 25, 63

Bradwell v. People of State of Illinois, (U.S. Ill. 1872) 83 U.S. 130, 21 L.Ed. 442, 16 Wall. 130. Myra Bradwell was denied permission to practice law in Illinois because she was a married woman. Supreme court affirmed. 70

Bradwell v. People of State of Illinois, (U.S. Ill. 1872) 83 U.S. 130, 21 L.Ed. 442, 16 Wall. 130. The Court affirmed an Illinois decision denying Bradwell a law license because she was a married woman.
70

Brandenburg v Ohio (1969) 23 L Ed 2d 430, 395 US 444, 89 S Ct 1827. Clarence Brandenburg was Ku Klux Klan member. Clear and Present Danger test was finally used to overrule an obstruction to speech. 53

Calandra, U.S. v, (1974) 38 L Ed 2d 561. Bill of rights. 2

Debs, Eugene v U.S. (1919) 63 L Ed 566, 249 US 211, 39 S Ct 252. Application of the clear and present danger test. 61, 71

Dred Scot 71

Ex Parte Cohen, 23 NJ Super. 209, 92 A 2d 837, Affirmed 12 NJ 362, 96 A 2d 794. Contemplation of the constitution. 39

Ex parte Garland 4 Wall 333, 380, 18 L.Ed. 366 20

Ex Parte Reggel 114 US 642, 29 L Ed 250, 5 S Ct. 1148. Contemplation of the constitution. 39

Ex Parte Rubens (1951) 73 Arizona 101, 238 P 2d 402, cert. denied (1952) 344 U.S. 480, 97 L Ed 653, 73 S Ct 50 The affidavit warranting commitment for extradition is that made before the magistrate issuing the warrant - not one by the prosecutor de jure like David Day herein. This case is cited in the very first note in this group at page 117 of Bancroft Whitney's annotations to 18 USC §3182.
51

Ex Parte Terner (Texas Criminal) 410 SW 2d 639. I have a right to counsel for extradition hearings. 39

Ex Parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265, 2 S. Ct. 569, 27 L.Ed 552 (1882) 20

Frisbie v Shirley Collins (1952) 96 L Ed 541, 72 S Ct 509, 342 US 519 which is likely out of date. Shirley Collins was a murder suspect in pro per in U.S. district court. Shirley had been kidnaped in Chicago and hauled to Michigan where he was convicted 25, 65

Fuentes v Shevin (1971) 32 L Ed 2d, 92 S Ct 1983, 407 US 67. Before you can repossess a cheap gas stove you must give hearing to the possessor of the stove. 20

725 ILCS §225/b any arrest under Illinois extradition law must be based on sufficient affidavits to meet the criteria of 725 ILCS §225/b and 31A Im Jur 2d.
19

725 ILCS §5/107-4 defines "law enforcement agency." The FBI is not included in this definition. 19

725 ILCS §5/107-4 defines "peace officer". An FBI agent is not included in this definition. 19

735 ILCS §5/10- 123(3) not justifying continued detention 19

735 ILCS §5/10-105: "Any sheriff or other officer or person having custody of any prisoner committed on any civil or criminal process of any court who shall neglect to give such prisoner a copy of the process or order of commitment by which he or she is imprisoned within 6 hours after demand made by the prisoner, or anyone on behalf of the prisoner, shall forfeit to the prisoner or party affect not exceeding $500." 21

735 ILCS §5/10-123, 24 list causes to discharge and not to discharge under habeas corpus. 43

735 ILCS §5/10-124 Palaschak must be discharged " 6. Where the process appears to have been obtained by false pretenses . . ." 46

735 ILCS §5/10-124 says that Palaschak may be discharged: "2. Where, though the original imprisonment was lawful, nevertheless, by some act, omission, or event which has subsequently taken place, the party has become entitled to be discharged." 46

735 ILCS §5/10-1-3. 1

8 U.S.C. 1251(a)(11) - deportation; 526 U.S.C. 7203 20

Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798 which were upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court 70

B&P §6126 Advertising that one is entitled to practice law while one is suspended. Prior to 1996 is was a misdemeanor. Now it can be a felony for bar members - but not for others - but for Palaschak's de minimis action it would be a misdemeanor. 27, 34, 41, 42, 45, 50, 65

California Penal Code §17 was amended in 1969 or 1972 to define a new less-than-a-misdemeanor crime. This permitted California to do an end run around the constitution. Now California could resume the practice of trying traffic tickets without a lawyer. Also, this is proof of my theory of inflation of crime. The police state has converted many misdemeanors to felonies. Even the misdemeanors carry heavier punishment. The liberals have demanded our constitutional rights to counsel and juries. To satisfy both sides and avoid the truth, the legislature invented the infraction. The catch is that although you cannot be imprisoned for having committed an infraction, you can be sent to jail for inability to pay the fine - and now we have come full circle because Palaschak interceded in Melvin Looser's case to protest this legislative fiat intended to take away our constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel. Melvin Looser was being sent to jail without benefit of counsel. 67

Illinois rule 526. 56

§6126(b). Advertising or holding oneself out to be entitled to practice law. 18

Treatises and Historical Records Cited Herein:

91 ALR 1246. Fugitivity must be proven. 39

ALR 2d 64:288 discusses Schware v Board of Bar examiners (1957) 1 L Ed 2d 796, 3553 US 232, 77 S Ct 752 in which the U.S. Supreme Court held it not permissible to bar a lawyer from practice because he had once been a member of the communist party. 41

Am Jur 2d Vol 31A Extradition §96. "A governor, in his discretion, may also refuse to issue a rendition warrant where there is a showing that the requisition was made with an ulterior motive or in bad faith . . . or to gratify personal malice" 39

Am Jur 2d Volume 31A Extradition. 19, 22, 26, 41, 45

Am Jur. Vol 31A §102. Fugitivity must be proven. 39

Annals of Congress 438 (1834) 3

Bancroft Whitney's annotated 18 USCS §3182, note 55, page 117. 45

Black's Law Dictionary, 5th Edition 1 20

Blackstone, William, Commentaries on the Laws of England. 1765-69. Volume 4 discusses criminal law. He defines a "Bill of Pains and Penalties" which is unconstitutional being a variety of a "Bill of Attainder".
27, 44, 66, 68

Charles Francis Adams, A Chapter of Erie. 54

Chrisman, Tin Horns and Calico 54

Friedman, Professor Lawrence, History of American Law, 2^nd Edition. Logic is more persuasive than cases
.26, 54

Hentoff, Pat. The First Freedom, 1980, Namar Productions, page 64. One of many accounts of the trial of Peter Zenger. 70

History of American Law, page 634. 55

Josephson, Matthew, The Robber Barons 54

Justice Heiple on the Illinois Supreme Court explains the predatory nature of traffic court in his dissent to rule 526. 56

Langdell , Harvard Law School Dean Christopher. Concept of "the science of law". Circa 1870s. 56

Milton, John Areopagitica - a Speech for the Liberty of Unlicensed Printing, 1644: "Truth and understanding are not such wares as to be monopolized and traded in by tickets and statutes ans standards." 71

Reich, The New Property, 73 Yale L.J. 733 (1964) 20

Ron Chernow, House of Morgan 54

The Power Elite 57

Vol 31A Am Jur Extradition §115. Warrant issued under an invalid state statute is void and unenforceable.
39

Woodward and Bernstein, The Brethren 57

Zinn, Howard. A People's History of the United States, page 249. 54

Constitutional Clauses cited herein:

14^th amendment 19, 22, 40, 45, 74

1^st amendment 23, 26, 46, 61, 62, 64, 65, 72-74

4^th amendment "The standards and procedures for arrest and detention have been derived from the 4^th amendment and its common-law antecedents . . . The standard for arrest is probable cause [is] defined in terms of facts and circumstances "sufficient to warrant a prudent main in believing that the [suspect] had committed or was committing an offense." - Beck v Ohio (1964) 379 US 89, 91 as cited in Gerstein v Pugh (1975) 43 L Ed 2d 54. Writing a petition cannot be a crime; Palaschak should have been freed in Illinois under this standard. 24, 74

6^th amendment 48, 50, 72, 73

7^th amendment says: "In suits at common law . . . the right of trial by jury shall be preserved." 65

Bill of Attainder. Definition: A legislative act that taints one's reputation. Such an act violates the constitution. A Bill of Pains and Penalties is a variety of a Bill of Attainder. See Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England, 1765-69. 65

Bill of pains and penalties. Definition: A legislative act that disenfranchises a person or class by imposing pains and penalties. B&P 6126 is such an act. The constitutional forbids them. They are void ab initio. See Blackstone's Commentaries on the Law of England, 1765-60. 65

Declaration of Independence: "He has sent hither swarms of Officers to harass our people, and eat out their substance." 60

Due Process Clause 63

Equal Protection Clause 66, 68

Extradition clause - the Fugitive Lawyer Clause: "A person charged in any state with treason, felony, or other crime, who shall flee from justice, and be found in another state, shall, on demand of the executive authority of the state from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the state having jurisdiction of the crime." - Art. IV, clause 2: extradition clause - next to fugitive slave clause. 19, 23, 35, 40, 45

fugitive slave clause 19

Illinois constitution provides for right to counsel? Don't know. I was denied access to the Illinois constitution in an Illinois jail. 48

Magna Charta, Chapter 39. "No Free man shall be captured or imprisoned. . . outlawed or exiled or in any way destroyed except by the lawful judgment of his peers and by the law of the land." 20

Palaschak's theories cited herein:

Law follows emotion." 57

Palaschak's theory #2: The prosecution should be willing to prosecute the federal flight charges - and prove it by filing a complaint - before obtaining an arrest warrant; otherwise it is obvious pretext. 47

Palaschak's theory: the penalty for failure to pay the penalty must never be more serious than the original penalty!! 44

Petition

Regarding exhaustion, see page 3 below.

1. This court has original jurisdiction under 735 ILCS §5/10-1-3.
2. Having been denied a copy of the Illinois constitution, Petitioner Palaschak does not know if individual justices may issue orders of relief - as Justices of the United States Supreme Court may do, and therefore Petitioner addresses this petition to the attention of Justice Heiple solely on the basis that Justice Heiple in his dissent to Rule 526 as amended used the work "predatory" to describe traffic fines. The word "predatory" strikes a strong resonance with Palaschak because for a quarter century Palaschak has litigated to attempt to correct predatory traffic court actions.

Deep Background

1. In 1990-92 Palaschak became embroiled in California traffic court litigation stemming from the DMV's (Department of Motor Vehicle's) having unconstitutionally and therefore invalid purported suspension of Palaschak's driver license for 3 months without a hearing before a neutral magistrate in violated of the due process clause as enunciated in Bell v Burson (1971) 26 L Ed 90, 401 US 535.
2. Like Mr. Bell, Palaschak was a victim of a car crash where he was not at fault. The DMV attempted to take his driver license without a hearing.
3. In Palaschak's case the California BAR unconstitutionally (and therefore invalidly) purported to suspend Palaschak's bar license for minor traffic violations despite the absence of nexus. Palaschak honored the disputed bar suspension and closed his office. He moved to Illinois for the 1996 harvest and then moved to his now permanent farm home in August 1997. On 10 May 1997 a letter under Palaschak's letterhead including the words "Attorney at Law" delivered a pro per notice of appeal to traffic court for Defendant Melvin Looser. Nearly a year later, in 1998, after Palaschak had moved to Illinois, Ventura charged Palaschak with "holding himself out to be a lawyer." Now 2 years later they attempt extradition.

Affidavit of Douglas Palaschak

I, Douglas Palaschak, declare the following under penalty of perjury:

Arrest(s)

1. I was arrested 14 May 1999 at my farm home near Streator, Illinois, by FBI Agent Eley on a pretextual May 7, 1999 federal warrant from Santa Barbara, California. I know what this is about having dispatched a lawyer to Ventura in July 1998. I was released 8 June, 1999. Deputy Schroeder told me that the "Ventura warrant [was] recalled." While sitting outside the jail waiting for a ride home, I was asked by Deputy Karen to come back inside the jail because "we're waiting for a governor's warrant." I've not been to court since 28 May despite having put myself on calendar for 14 June.
2. Reserved
3. Reserved

The underlying non-crime

1. I am being prosecuted for using the words "Attorney at Law" on my letterhead on 10 May 1997 on a cover letter sending a notice of appeal to court for a friend. Anybody could lawfully have sent the cover letter; that it, it is not a task subject to the lawyer's monopoly. The Notice of Appeal was in pro per. It was unusual in that it was approximately 12 pages long and summarized the case including appellate points and authorities. There was no fraud alleged (by my accusers in Ventura). In fact a long footnote in the petition fully explains my bar status: license unconstitutionally suspended/ revoked due to traffic tickets, specifically, several counts of driving while my license was unconstitutionally (and therefore invalidly) suspended in violation of Bell v Burson.

Justice Heiple's "Predatory Traffic Courts"

1. I've spent my adult life attempting to appeal cases in traffic court in order to change the law. California traffic courts are very oppressive. Despite the ruling of Griffin Griffin v Illinois (1956) 100 L Ed 891, 351 US 12, 79 S Ct 585, a traffic court wrongfully convicted me and denied me a transcript. They don't use court reporters; they use defective tape recorders. I served nearly a year in jail and was not able to type my own transcript in that time. My appointed lawyer was very incompetent. I don't know how my appeal ended - or if it indeed has ended.

State Bar Court is also Predatory

Conclusion: Money from desperate people feeds both the traffic court and the bar.

1. Justice Brennan in U.S. v Calandra (1974) 38 L Ed 2d 561 recalled the prediction of James Madison in 1789:

"If they [the bill of rights] are incorporated into the constitution, independent tribunals of justice will consider themselves in a peculiar manner the guardian of those rights; they will be an impenetrable bulwark against every assumption of power in the legislative of executive; they will be naturally led to resist every encroachment upon right expressly stipulated for in the constitution by the declaration of rights."

- Annals of Congress 438 (1834)

This is my 6^th Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

1. I wrote a habeas petition on Sunday 16 May (my 3^rd day in jail). I have a record of the letters that I sent. I sent it to the local court by inter- departmental mail. It's been 31 days so far (today is 15 June 1999)and I have received no denial from the court but at my only meeting with public defender Dan Bute, I saw it in his file. Our meeting was brief (12 minutes). He asked if the problems had been resolved but did not wait for my answer.
2. On 29 May 1999 I wrote a habeas corpus petition for this supreme court of Illinois. Pursuant to jail rules the jailer refused to make a copy of that petition. I dispatched the original to public defender Dan Bute by interdepartmental jail mail. I received no copies - nor the original - nor any response.
3. On 5 June 1999 having received ludicrously defective forms from the federal court I mail a habeas corpus petition to them in Chicago. On 18 June 1999 I received a receipt from the federal court. On 21 June 1999 the federal court denied my petition without prejudice or comment.
4. On 18 June 1999 before I was temporarily released from jail, I submitted my 4^th habeas corpus petition to Deputy Karen. Instead of copying it, she returned it to me and released me from jail. Then, 20 minutes later, she invited me back to jail. I gave the petition back to here for copying. She copies it. By interdepartmental mail I dispatched the original to Judge Chris Ryan in the Circuit Court in this same building complex where the jail is located. I sent copies to the state's attorney and the public defender. I combined the habeas corpus petition with a motion for release pursuant to the uniform extradition act. I set the hearing date for 14 June. That date came and went. Nothing happened. This habeas corpus petition also contained a Faretta⁽¹⁾ Motion. I've heard nothing from anybody in response to this 4^th habeas corpus motion.
5. On 10 June I dispatched Petition #3422 to the local court with service on the sheriff. I received no response or acknowledgment.
6. On 15 June I began writing this Habeas Corpus Petition #3433, the petition that you now read.
7. I began on 15 June 1999 writing a 2^nd habeas corpus petition to the Federal Court in Chicago.
8. On 21 June 1999 I mailed a 28 page Complaint #3435 pursuant to 42 USC 1983 et seq to the Federal Court in Chicago seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.
9. Reserved.

21 June 1999. 5 pm:

Overview

1. This case is about a failure to by car insurance in 1998 which the Ventura prosecutor is attempting to parlay into a felony having failed twice before (in 1993 and 1992) to convict me of some felony.
2. This case is about competing constitutional goals.
3. This case is about reviewing the prerequisites to extradition.
4. This case is about due process, a probable cause hearing, and a bail hearing - and the absence thereof.
5. This case is about the right to petition for redress of grievances.
6. Reserved.
7. Reserved.
8. Reserved.

Background and History

1. Palaschak is a 4^th generation farmer. He farms with his brother, Jerry Palaschak and Greg Palaschak. Greg runs the family farm now upon the retirement of Palaschak's Father, Richard Palaschak. The farm 2000 acres but Douglas Palaschak received only $10,000 gross revenue in 1998 - and he spent half of that revenue on legal research material and farm supplies.
2. Douglas Palaschak farmed with his Grandfather 40 years ago. He farms that same farm now. His family has farmed that farm for 66 years.
3. Palaschak is need badly at corn and soybean harvest, generally September 1 to November 24, later in we years. Palaschak has for 2 years grown a garden - since he moved to his farm home. Jerry Palaschak now tends Palaschak's garden but will be gone after 25 June to return in September. Palaschak depends on his garden for food over the winter.
4. Palaschak's sell sweet corn in July and August. Douglas has for the past 3 years been the main help for sweet corn. Douglas Palaschak planted most of the sweet corn patches this year.
5. Having deprived Palaschak of his ability to earn a living in California (Palaschak's California state bar license was revoked (unconstitutionally) for traffic tickets) Ventura prosecutors no attempt to deprive Palaschak of his ability to earn a living in Illinois, but I digress.
6. Palaschak enjoyed an idyllic childhood starring in 4-H and FFA. He was 1^st in his high school class and an honors student at the University of Illinois where he earned a bachelor's degree in Engineering. Palaschak worked as a Registered professional Engineer designing machinery for Exxon, Mobil, The U.S. Navy and other oil-field manufacturers. He went to law school at night and received a doctor of jurisprudence from Ventura college of law. He passed the bar exam on the 1^st attempt. He immediately went in to private practice specializing in vindication of the right of victims of bureaucratic oppression such as a nudist resort owner. He handled drug and sex cases, a helicopter crash case, RICO cases, and represented other lawyers before the then new (created in 1990) unconstitutional state bar pseudo court. He sued the state bar in California federal court for his attorney clients.
7. Reserved.

End of page 4 in original handwritten petition #3433 written 21 June 1999 at 5 pm.

1. Palaschak has since 1984 been a zealous, courageous advocate of the oppressed. As a result of his fearless prosecution of bureaucratic instruments of oppression he has incurred the wrath of powerful bureaucracies, namely: the California state bar, Ventura traffic court, and the Ventura county district attorney, who appears to aspire to state office.
2. In years prior to the current Ventura arrest warrant signed by former Ventura prosecutor Barry Klopfer, Palaschak sued Klopfer in federal court.
3. The warrant upon which this extradition is founded is signed by Judge Klopfer. He recused himself from my cases when I asked him to do so. He should have recused himself here.
4. Although Commissioner Covarrubius had most of the allegedly incriminating evidence before him, he did not initiate prosecution.
5. Prosecution was initiated by Judge vin O'Neill who sits on the county appellate panel that reviews appeals of traffic cases such as Melvin Looser's traffic case. See exhibit F, lines 22-25.
6. Vince O'Neill is a former prosecutor who was in the Ventura district attorney office during prior unsuccessful attempts to convict Palaschak of a felony.
7. I have no idea how Melvin's appeal turned out, but O'Neill also has recused himself when I requested him to do so - - due to his bias. He should have recused himself from Melvin Looser's case.
8. Courageous lawyers often suffer attaches. Example: The late attorney William Kunstler was successful in his 1968 defense of the Chicago 7 but angry Judge Julius Hoffmann sentence the lawyer, William Kunstler to 4 years and 13 days in prison. Kunstler's lawyer friends rallied to his side and won Kunstler's freedom on appeal. See Kunstler's autobiography entitled My Life as a Radical Lawyer. (Added 16 June 2001: See also the website of famous trials: http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/Chicago7/contempt.html.)
9. Example #2: Attorney Steven Yagman of Santa Monica/ Venice, California was asked to critique the performance of federal court judges in Los Angeles. As a result of his candid criticism, a group of federal court judges revoked Yagman's federal license for 2 years. A group of Yagman's lawyer friends, including former U.S. Attorney General Ramsey Clark won Yagman's reinstatement on appeals. (Added 16 June 2001: See Standing Committee on Discipline of the United States District Court for the Central District of California v Stephen Yagman, defendant (9^th Circuit, 1995) 55 F.3d 1430 which is reprinted completely in Palaschak's brief #3596.)
10. In 1993 Ventura district attorney bureau of investigation Investigator Glen Kitzman (author of the deceptive declaration in exhibits F, G, H, and J) led a police raid on Palaschak's law office. He is actually a very nice guy and I think that he is not the malicious person behind the tortious malicious prosecution of me for writing a petition critical of traffic court. The district attorney office simultaneously in 1993 issued a defamatory press release. The Los Angeles Time printed in large headlines that I had been arrested on 7 counts of §6126 - the very same alleged crime that is the basis for this extradition request. The headlines screamed "Ventura Attorney arrested for 7 felonies" or something like that.
11. The were wrong.
12. I learned through that experience that these bureaucrats are not ry bright.
13. I also learned that bureaucrats can get away with lies with impunity and therefore. . . well, they sometimes lie.
14. Case in Point: in handcuffs in 1993 during the raid I quickly explained to Glen Kitzman that my state bar suspension was obtained by a lie. The state bar suspended me while my misdemeanor SD conviction was on appeal. They used a provision that permits interim suspension for felonies. They lied. They said that I had a felony conviction. They lie was convincing. Having accused me of 3 drug felonies they dismissed these 3 when the grand jury indicted me on 2 felonies and a misdemeanor. The petit jury acquitted me on the felonies an convicted me of the sole misdemeanor of eating one does of LSD, but before I could litigate their lie, they court of appeal overturned my misdemeanor conviction. Even then the bar continued to withhold the license from me for 2 months. They reinstated me in February 1994.
15. This raid in 1993 was at a time when, as now, I was honoring as invalid suspension while litigating it.
16. I explained then to Kitzman that I was doing only federal work for which I had a federal license.

Lie by Federal Clerk Izabell Katapodis

1. Having thoroughly researched the matter before I resumed federal work I reminded Kitzman that I had cleared the matter with then Chief Federal Judge Manuel Real. . . despite the "summary suspension" announced by Clerk Izabell Katapodis on February 1993. She was angry when I told her that In Re William R. Ming (1971)469 F 2d 1352 (CA 7 (Chicago) 1972), precluded summary suspension. She was apparently angry at me when Kitzman called her to inquire. She lied. She said that my federal license was suspended. Although it was not until December 1993 that the federal court clerk's office admitted its mistake in writing, the district attorney knew immediately that I was right. They declined to file a complaint against me - but . ...

Beginning of page 7 of original handwritten petition to Illinois Supreme Court:

. . .that did not undo the defamatory headlines.

1. I did not sue the Los Angeles Times. My policy is that they have been good o me and almost always get my side of the story - and they pay attention to my press releases also.
2. Now, returning to the day of the raid, although I explained my innocent immediately, the sheriff kept me in jail for 6 days without ever taking me to court.
3. Investigator Kitzman and his raiders seized my computers, laser printer, currency, checks, files, client files, completed bankruptcy petitions done with the requisite license (ready to drop in the mail box), and other items.
4. They kept these items for over year! I had to buy a new computer and laser printer.
5. Without any apparent reason they read my diaries going back to 1989 even though my suspension was not started until 1992.
6. They shared their files with the state bar.
7. At that time I had never been d9sciplined.
8. This current bar discipline is primarily for traffic ticket and is my 1^st disciplinary procedure by the bar.
9. My legal competence and honesty have never been questioned.
10. I have experience other police raids. Police abuse of intellectuals troubles me but is a pattern of history.
11. It is only in the past 8 year that I learned the history and current magnitude of anti-intellectualism.
12. Only courageous courts can protect minorities from majoritarian oppression. Outspoken intellectuals are a minority. Palaschak's theory: If the status quo were correct, we would not need leaders.
13. The complete story of Palaschak's suffering the dirty tricks of bureaucracies is not told here. Palaschak has been overwhelmed - as humans can indeed be overwhelmed by bureaucracies.
14. The story of Palaschak's 1991/92 LSD case is told incorrectly in a published opinion, People v Palaschak (1995) 9 C4th 1236, 40 Cal Rptr 2d 722, 893 P2d 717.
15. That opinion is neither the complete nor accurate story. My lawyer (who was appointed by the supreme court) failed inadvertently (an negligently) to include the transcript of the critical 1^st day of the suppression hearing. The 2^nd day was after a 4 day holiday. It was reported by a new reporter who was unaware that they was the 2^nd day of the hearing. It appeared to be the beginning of the hearing. (Retrospective note added 16 June 2001: While I was in jail in Ventura some weeks after mailing this petition #3433 to the Illinois Supreme court I saw on television that the officer Matz whose testimony alone was inconsistent (but who was nonetheless believed by slacker judge McNally) had just been arrested for shoplifting. Matz's lying testimony was the basis of the denial of my motion to suppress evidence. Of course at trial we are not permitted to question police about their backgrounds absent some grist. We now have grist. Incidentally, Matz, who had 25 years experience with the DEA was dispatched especially to my case - and the dispatcher resigned from the police after we subpoenaed her to the suppression hearing - and she failed to appear at the suppression hearing. There was another irregularity regarding this suspicious dispatcher: When the snitch/ temp drove to the police station and told her story, this dispatcher mentioned my name without being told. Apparently they have some information on me that they did not reveal. Later I discovered that a secretary had taken some of my files - innocent job applications - to the police.)

Beginning of page 8 of the original handwritten petition #3433:

1. Why haven't I resolved my problems? Answer: I have no money. I have a lifetime of litigation to do. I have been homeless for short periods. I slept in my car for 5 months - until it broke and the mechanic let me sleep at his shop.
2. Palaschak has suffered homelessness, and the seizure of 4 cars and a motorcycle over the years.
3. The seizure of Palaschak's diaries is similar to the seizure of the diaries of the McSurely family described by Caroline Kenned in her book entitled In Our Defense, and at 753 F2d 88 (D.C. 1985).
4. Palaschak's battle with Palaschak's appointed attorneys is like that of Harrison Cronic described by Caroline Kennedy at page 261 of In Our Defense and at U.S. v Cronic 466 U.S. 684 (1984).
5. The McSurely case took 14 years to resolve. Palaschak's case is more complicated. Palaschak is on year #11.

Written 22 June 1999. Tuesday 7 a.m. Ottawa, Illinois. In jail:

1. I too have experience the wrath of an angry Judge who vented at me for the acts of my client. In Ventura, Judge Bradley (who was recently forced to leave the bench due to 2 drunk driving convictions) cited me for being late for court. I had forgotten to write the date in my calendar. This was the only time that I failed to write a court date in my calendar. Bradley's antagonism in court flustered me. My client was a sex offender. The citation for contempt of court was inconsistent with what happens to other lawyers. Even a dog knows the difference between being kicked and being tripped over.
2. In Indiana, federal judge Allen Sharp unfairly dismissed my client's case when my quadriplegic client failed to fly from California to Indiana to testify at a hearing regarding my request for a temporary restraining order. I was unable to appeal the dismissal with client consent - or so I thought. In retrospect I should have appealed my own fine. Judge Sharp mistakenly read my silence as agreement. He wrote an inflammatory published rules decision.
3. Lesson: Statutes of repose can be the worst instrument of oppression for overwhelmed humans.
4. I don't mean to whine. I chose to be an advocate against tyranny . . . and my adversity was foreseeable.
5. I thought that it was about justice; sometimes it is merely about power.
6. I have ben frustrated by court of mass production . . . like traffic court.
7. My parents cannot understand why I suffer imprisonment in jail. . . but like most people, they don't want to take the time to even read my briefs.
8. Disbarment is always hardest on the father of the lawyer - whether it is a justifiable disbarment or not.
9. I have enjoyed some of the best that life has to offer. My mission remains the same.

Beginning of page 9 of the original petition.

1. In 1996 I became financially distressed and overwhelmed with my all-consuming battle to appeal the reposed cases, but hat is a bland summary. Here is a chronological detail of the vortex:

1988 I moved from my old apartment, where I lived during law school, into a bigger better brand new apartment in the new part of Ventura. I suffered a car crash; Cigarette delivery van rear-ended my Nissan Sentra.

1989. June. I met an 18 year old orphan who was an aspiring actress.

1990. The orphan and I moved into a bigger better brand new apartment near the court house.

How a mistaken license number on a police report leads to my disbarment.

1990. April 30 - May 1. I drove to a court appearance in Santa Monica for Attorney Judy Fogel. There was some rain. The entrance gate at the parking lot was stuck in the up position. Therefore I received no entrance ticket. I parked my car I want to court. The appearance was quick - maybe 20 minutes. The parking attendant wanted me to pay for the whole morning because he says that I lost my ticket. I explained that I did not lose my ticket. I asked him to call his supervisor. The supervisor refused to come out in the parking lot in the rain. Soon the police arrived. As I was explaining the story to Officer Hurt, he suddenly changed his attitude, began frisking me roughly, and arrested me for grand theft auto. I asked him to check the registration papers in my glove box but he refused. He took me to Santa Monica police station. I was the only prisoner there. Eight hours later they released me and told me that the police had made a clerical mistake filling out a theft report some time ago. I spent the rest of the night arguing with police officers at several police stations. I took a taxi across town to another division, maybe rampart division. Finally a police lieutenant drove me to the storage yard and told the attendant to release my car.

As I was driving home up the coast from Malibu I saw flashing orange lights on the side of the road. I cautiously shifted to the left lane to avoid any debris that might be at the scene of an accident. I was the only car on the road. A police officer was there early for a movie gig. He apparently thought I was drunk. I don't drink or smoke. Several miles later police pulled me over and tried to give me a ticket for crossing the yellow line. This is about 5 in the morning. I have not had sleep in 24 hours. I have spent the entire day in jail due to a police mistake and now the police are making another mistake and giving me a ticket for it. I did not find out until years later (in state bar discovery papers) that the police officer was on a movie gig. I refused to sign the ticket. They persisted and deceived me about it. The police officer who was writing the ticket was obviously not the one who saw me - and therefore they would have had problems arresting me - but they did not tell me that. They persisted and I eventually signed the ticket. The state bar used this event to say that I should be disbarred for not signing the ticket. I say that anybody can refuse to sign a ticket - and had I followed my instincts I might have discovered the police deceit years earlier and avoided paying a ticket. Eventually this ticket went to a warrant because a lawyer failed to appear for me.

1990. June. The orphan went her own way sadly. I met another wonderful woman.

1991. Wonderful woman #2 went her own way. I opened a new office in a gorgeous glass building across from the court house.

1991. May. Having thoroughly researched neurotransmitters for 2 years, I at a dose of LSD given to me by my secretary. It was my birthday party. Police came. Illegal search and seizure followed. (Added later: See my brief #1172 regarding the seizure of my computers.)

1991. November. Hard Copy and Inside Edition cover my LSD case on the same evening. The angle is that I have a contract mutually consenting to sex in the office. This contract was designed to prevent false accusations of sexual harassment after I became suspicious of police sending informants to my office. In retrospect I was correct in my suspicion. Although I enjoyed the publicity, my Mom was embarrassed.

1992, April 1. Judge Barry Klopfer in traffic court reneged on my traffic plea bargain. He sent me to jail before my LSD trial was finished despite the court's having promised not to do so in exchange for my plea. My superb trial lawyer and friend, Attorney Robert Schwartz of Ventura, won before a jury on the 2 felony counts. We suffered a conviction on the misdemeanor count of eating LSD.

Having filed my appeal 1 day late on the traffic case I now had to serve 11 months in jail. My friend Rusty Garvin and his friends, who he refused to name, cleaned out my law office and lost or stole 30% of my $10,000 law library.

Beginning of page 10 on the original handwritten petition #3433 from jail.

1. Because the district attorney's office mistakenly (or maliciously) persisted in calling my LSD case a "felony" conviction, I was put in with the bad boys in jail . . but at dinner time on my first day in the bad boy cell block, the guys were watching a rerun of Love Connection. To my delight the bad boys recognized me on The Love Connection. From that time on I had no problems there - and they called me "Senator".
2. In jail a kind senior deputy (and ex law student) named Cook got me a job cleaning and filing updates in the jail law library. The court of appeal appointed me to do my own appeal in my LSD case. I objected. They appointed another lawyer. My appointed lawyer won but it was frustrating for me. I sent him approximately 70 pages from jail detailing approximately 30 issues. He argued only 1 or 2 issues.

(Now here in an Illinois jail I experience deja vu as my public defender ignores my letters and fails to appear in court. Dan Bute is his name. Okay, Dan did not know that he was my lawyer yet on 17 May . . .but being the public defender he could easily have foreseen that on Tuesday there may be an arraignment of the guy who was brought to jail on Friday and that the defendant might need a public defender for all stages of the criminal proceeding.) I see myself in the words of Harrison Cronic:

"He was relentless in all respect - relentlessly polite, relentlessly upbeat ("Never once did I see him downcast" says Colston, "no matter how bad things got") and relentless about pursuing and perfecting his defense. He blanketed the court with his own motions and briefs." - Ellen Alderman and Caroline Kennedy, In Our Defense, 1991, Avon books. See U.S. v Cronic 839 F2d 1401 (10^th Cir 1988).

"I spent as much time writing my own briefs as I did battling my attorney . . . It was absolutely exasperating." - Harrison Cronic.

I peppered the court of appeal with copies of my evolving brief during and after my 11 month jail term. I also had an appeal going on in my traffic case. My appointed lawyer Jill Hatfield did not have a clue that our problem was the absence of a transcript. She wanted to agree in a statement for appeal; absence of a record is precisely the issue. Traffic court uses tape recorder that don't work well - but even if they worked well it would be a problem.

1993 February. Upon my release from jail I eventually go to live at Good Nite Inn. I carefully research the law and persuade Chief Federal Judge Manuel Real that my federal license must remain valid.

1993 August. My income source dried up when Ventura District Attorney Investigator Kitzman raided my office on Friday 27 August 1993 and took my computer, files, laser printer, currency, checks, etc. I began living in my car. I was now battling on 5 fronts:

#1 I was trying to find a new way to earn a living;

#2 I was litigating my LSD appeal;

#3 I was litigating my traffic appeal;

#4 I was litigating against the state bar regarding their illegal interim suspension. My brother Jerry shipped an old computer back to me. I use a printer at the office of Attorney Steve Pell.

#5 I was battling to get my computers and laser printer back so that I could battle effectively on the other fronts.

Beginning of page #11 in the original handwritten petition #3433.

1993 December 23. I drove my car to the court of appeal. My appointed lawyer had filed a pathetic 8 page brief 6 months ago. I was now there to file another version of my own evolving brief. I saw my name on the top page of one of the several court opinions on the table The court of appeal reversed my misdemeanor LSD conviction!

1994 Jan 25. Tuesday. This is my first night sleeping in a building since the August raid at Good Nite Inn. The engine broke on my car. I search the Yellow Pages and find Engines R Us. Frank and Brian at Engines R Us - now called Engine Place - invited me to sleep in the former mechanic's room until they can fix my car. There is a phone line back there and a fax machine up front at the office. Frank buys me a new laser printer.

1994 Feb 16 Finally the state bar says that I may practice again and owe no dues until 15 February 1995. I drive to the Los Angeles Times office for a 1.5 hour interview. The next day even the deputy district attorney congratulated me. KNX news radio had a story about me. Although the court of appeal ruled in my favor on 23 December, the state bar dragged its feet nearly 2 more months before licensing me.

1994 Nov 8. Tuesday. The LSD cop Dawson is the backup on a traffic stop for expired registration. They take my blue car and I never get it back.

1994 December. I sued the California Supreme Court and the state bar in federal for my client. See complaint #1875 in federal court.

1994 21 December. Client offers me a brand new car and an office in Chinatown and a home in his Mom's guest house. Downside: he wants me to do all his work while he is in trial for 2 wasted weeks. He gets less money from trial than I got offered at the settlement conference.

1995 March 16. Thursday. I buy a red Hyundai.

1995 Oct 12 Police arrest me and keep my red Hyundai. That is the 2^nd car taken from me in a year. Pursuant to a new unconstitutional statute they take the car accusing me falsely of driving on a suspended license. My license was at one time suspended unconstitutionally for failing to appear in Malibu but I cleared that up. I began litigation to get my car back. I continue to perfect my appeal to the California Supreme court. . . but before I can perfect my appeal, my appointed lawyer Durfee like the previous appointed lawyer Dolge . . . submitted a brief without my approval or review.(Added 17 June 2001: He forgot to submit half of the transcript of the critical suppression hearing. I eventually filed a class action case in federal court to challenge this statute. Click here to see a copy of my class action complaint #2557 filed 6 May 1996 in federal court.

1995 May 8. My birthday. He California Supreme court retaliated for having been sued. They overturn the court of appeal thereby reinstating my LSD misdemeanor conviction saying that I cannot eat LSD to thwart the police raid; the LSD was eaten 3 hours prior to the raid with no expectation of a raid. Also, they did not have the transcript of the suppression hearing. See the opinion People v Palaschak (May 1995) 9 C4th 1236, 40 Cal Rptr 2d 722, 893 P2d 717) reprinted at this link:

1995 August? I miss the short deadline to appeal to the U.S. Supreme court - but I can still do Habeas Corpus.

1995 Wed Dec 6. A guy from the fugitive department is in Port Hueneme looking for somebody else. I am walking because the police took my red Hyundai on October 12. I am walking back from the store where I spent some meager money for raw meatloaf. The fugitive guy amicably arrests me. I ask him to keep the meatloaf frozen until I get out of jail. I just now serve the 90 days for my LSD misdemeanor in 1991 - because I missed the short (90 day? ) appeal window. In mail they ship me to the new Todd Road jail which is only months old. There they deny me access to any law library. Actually they truck me back to 800 South Victoria one day to go to the library but then they announce to me that the trip was a waste of time and the library is unavailable.

The sheriff department bragged to visitors about the new "electronic" law library at Todd road but in the time I was there I never saw anybody use it - and I was not permitted to use it. I carefully hand wrote a petition for writ of habeas corpus and then carefully hand copied 9 copies (although Draconian hand copying is forbidden by a court case demanding access to copying equipment). I gave my finished copy to the jailers to mail to the California Supreme court. Apparently they thought that it was a big joke. When I was released February 1, 1996, after serving 60 days, they guard handed me my writs of habeas corpus saying "We thought that you could just mail them when you got out of jail". They had refused to mail the petition of habeas corpus to the California Supreme Court.

1996 Feb 1. I had saved $1 in my commissary account. I took the bus back to my shared apartment. I discover from Simon Chan that were are being evicted - even though the rent is paid in advance. Simon had stupidly accepted service process for me while I was in jail and did not tell me. I was due for a bankruptcy. I can do a bankruptcy in an hour. I filed. I notified the sheriff of the automatic stay. City of Port Hueneme is the landlord.

1996 Feb 12 On eviction day the sheriff deputy warns me not to return. I warn the deputy that he is violating the automatic stay order. Eventually Port Hueneme will be ordered to pay me $1000 for violating the order but the deputy will go unpunished despite my having taken him before a bankruptcy judge. Although I already have a storage place in Ventura, I store my 800 pounds of books and my computers in a steel storage building in Port Hueneme.

Beginning of page 12 of original handwritten petition #3433:

1. Severe change of status: My legal work suffers a setback because I have no home and no computerized law library. In the process of moving I lose my West cd roms with my law library on them - or maybe they were stolen from my pile of stuff which was stacked in Simon's truck for 4 days until I could find a storage place and a truck to take it there. I begin sleeping in Simon's broken Honda civic. My own car was taken by the police in October 1995 - 4 months prior.

1996 February. Now I am homeless without a car. I wash and shave at the police station - as did people in depressions and other situations - as I later discover by reading Upton Sinclair's The Jungle - or maybe Howard Zinn's A People's History of the United States.

1996 Feb 27. After 12 days of homelessness petition the bankruptcy court on a manilla folder ripped into 3 strips and written by hand.

1996 Feb 29. Thursday. Leap year day. My Mom wired me $300. I dressed in my suit and met with the rental agent for an office in a building abandoned by defense contractors. I move in. I move my stuff from the local storage room to the office. What a relief. It has been nearly 4 years since I had a place to call my own - and 5 years since I had an apartment. This is an office - not an apartment. Now I have an address and a telephone - but more important - my computer and laser printer.

I have little money. Each night at 3 a.m. I raid the dumpster behind the Taco Bell. I have no refrigerator or microwave or shower.

1996 March 7. I walk to the post office. Surprise! The bankruptcy judge acted on my petition handwritten on ripped manilla folder. She set a hearing for this afternoon. Simon drives me to court. Judge orders Port Hueneme to pay me $1000 for contempt of court for evicting me despite bankruptcy order.

1996 June. I am facing eviction from my office. Rescue comes like this: My Dad cautiously invites me to come to Illinois for the family reunion in July but he insists that I buy a round trip ticket. (Later he would make a scene by gathering my luggage and driving to my brother's house with a baseball bat to insist that I get in the van for a ride to the airport. I jumped out at the first stop sign.) Dad sends me $700. I pay my storage bill in Ventura. I am so relieved that they did not sell my possession including my 27 years of diaries and my old photographs.

1996 July. I have 2 weeks between when I am evicted from my office and when the airplane leaves for Illinois. I have a court date in Santa Barbara. I sleep on a cardboard at the freeway entrance in Ventura behind Arby's roast beef. I walk to my storage place each day and wash there. I took a 3 day hike from the ocean to the top of Meditation Mountain in Ojai. I ate the oranges, figs and avocados there.

1996 July. Melvin Looser drives me to the airport. I have not been home to Illinois since Christmas of 1990 - nearly 6 years ago. My Dad won't let me sleep in the house. He makes me sleep on the porch.

1996 August. Dad brings a baseball bat and my luggage and insists that I get in the van to go to the airport. Greg let me stay at his house and work the farm for him.

1996 September - November. Great fun as I harvest with my Brothers Jerry and Greg, and my Dad. I have never before actually harvested full time. I was always in school or living out of state during harvest.

1996 November. Jerry returns to New Orleans. Greg and I cannot live in that small house. We go to counseling. Greg refuses to pay me the $2300 that he admits owing me for harvest work. I fly to Florida to visit my sister Julia.

1997 January. Greg sends the $2300 that he owes me. I fly to California and eventually live at the Missile Motel. I buy a $650 car. I deliver veterinary supplies. I write legal papers for an attorney friend.

1997 August 18. I write a letter to Greg asking to work for him again this year.

1997 September 5. I telephone Greg at the bar but Jim Baudino answers and says that Greg has a house for me.

1997 September 8. Greg returns my call and leaves a message with Lois at Judy Fogel's office. He says that I need to get home right away to work.

1997 Sept 13. Sat. I arrive at Greg's farm at about 1 a.m. I moved into my own house the next day and lived there until about noon on 14 May 1999 when the FBI arrested me. I have not seen the inside of my house since that day because new people moved into my house.

1998 I am appointed to the Charter Allen Township Land Use Commission.

1999 May 3. Although I have done most farm jobs, I was never permitted to plant corn until this day when my nice brother Jerry said to me "Get up on that tractor and plant; otherwise you may never get a chance to do it."

Beginning of page 13 of original 44 page complaint - plus 20 pages of exhibits.

1. On 14 May, 1999, Brothers Douglas and Jerry Palaschak returned to their farm home in their pickup truck to find 3 Ford Crown Victoria Sedans in their driveway.
2. Douglas walked into his house and found 5 men wearing suits and guns.
3. FBI agent Eley amicably arrested Palaschak stating that the arrest was for "interstate flight to avoid prosecution for practicing law without a license."
4. FBI agent Eley told Jerry Palaschak in Douglas's presence: "Your brother is unique. I've never arrested anybody for practicing law without a license before."
5. Some weeks later Palaschak obtained a copy of the arrest warrant.
6. Palaschak was arrested on the basis of a 7 May 1999 warrant from federal magistrate McElwyn of Santa Barbara charged with 18 USCS §1073.
7. Despite numerous requests to the jail and to the public defender, Palaschak has been unable to obtain a copy of 18 USCS §1073.
8. This LaSalle County, Illinois, jail has no law library accessible to inmates. They allow no hardcover books.
9. Jail rules say that they will copy a particular section of law but Chief Jailer Preci told me that he relayed to the public defender my request for a copy of 18 USCS §1073.
10. Having mailed (by interdepartmental mail) my copy of the warrant to my public defender, I have been 4 times denied another copy. Illinois state provides for a monetary penalty to be paid to a prisoner whose request for a warrant of commitment is denied for more than 6 hours. 735 ILCS §5/10-105. Therefore I cannot provide a copy of the federal warrant to append as an exhibit to this complaint.

Tuesday 22 June 1999. 6 pm:

1. In the form here is a place for the bail amount. "Detention" is written there.
2. FBI agent Eley told me at my house that the FBI only gets involved if the underlying crime is a felony; at its best, even if all the allegations were true and the statute were constitutional this crime, being de minimis, would only be a misdemeanor. All defendants knew that the allegations constituted merely a misdemeanor - and Judge Clark had the courage to say so in court when he released me after I had served the misdemeanor sentence of 6 months. Eley circumvented FBI internal policy or the FBI conspired to deny Palaschak the benefit of internal policy. (This paragraph has been changed from the original. Everything after "at its best" was added during transcription on 20 June 2001.
3. The warrant directs a federal agent to take me immediately before a federal magistrate. It's been 40 days and I've not been taken before a federal magistrate.
4. FBI Agent Eley told me that "the federal case is usually dismissed."
5. Issue: This seems to be a pretextual arrest . . . and as I shall show, a pretextual detention. (Added June 21, 2001: When I finally did receive a copy of the Santa Barbara warrant, I noted that there was no bail set, only the words "detention" which indicates to me that the magistrate did not know that I have a right to bail. Illinois authorities set a bail amount so high that I could not pay.)
6. Upon arraignment on 17 May 1999 before Judge Lanuti, Prosecutor David Day presented a perjurious complaint that , even if it were true, nonetheless fails to meet the criteria of 725 ILCS §225/13 as explained in the annotations to 18 USCS §3182.

Beginning of page 14 of original 40 page petition #3433.

1. The exhibits, although self-exculpatory, nonetheless describe the alleged underlying crime.
2. Exhibit A-1 shows that the alleged crime is codified as §6126(b).
3. Palaschak knows that §6126(b) was amended circa 1996 rendering it unconstitutional, a denial of equal protection, to wit: the penalty for a 1^st time offense is a misdemeanor penalty unless the defendant is a former bar member, in which case the penalty is a felony.
4. This statute is new. I haven't a copy of annotated California statutes to see if it has been challenged.

More Issues

1. Suddenly we have some more issues:
2. On the evidence before us, the intention of FBI Agent Eley at the time of arrest was not to properly follow the direction of the warrant.

725 ILCS §225/14 does not authorize FBI arrest under Illinois uniform extradition law. Under Illinois statutes, an FBI agent is neither a peace officer nor a private person.

1. FBI Agent Eley put his hands up in frustration saying "I don't want to hear about the underlying offense" at my house.
2. The FBI had insufficient information to arrest without a warrant but this is a moot point because Eley has no authority to arrest under Illinois law. His only authority comes from the warrant - - and he did not comply with the warrant.

Written at 7 pm. Tuesday. 22 June 1999. An Illinois storm approaches at the jail:

1. 725 ILCS §5/107-4 defines "peace officer". An FBI agent is not included in this definition.
2. 725 ILCS §5/107-4 defines "law enforcement agency." The FBI is not included in this definition.
3. Also, any arrest under Illinois extradition law must be based on sufficient affidavits to meet the criteria of 725 ILCS §225/b and 31A Am Jur 2d.
4. This court must find that the initial arrest was pretextual.
5. This court must interpret 735 ILCS §5/10- 123(3) as not justifying continued detention unless the requirements of the above paragraphs are met. The more specific supersedes the more general statute.
6. This court must find that the 14^th amendment and bill of rights supersede the constitution and its extradition clause - just as they superseded the fugitive slave clause.

8 a.m. wed 23 June 1999:

Refocus: Pretextual arrest. No bail. No effective Assistance of Counsel.

1. Extradition being much less common than the ordinary criminal prosecution, its procedure has been less finely honed by case law through the years. In particular, the right to bail, and to a probable cause hearing - and to a consideration that some offenses are non-extraditable - are foreign to LaSalle county.
2. Subject to the qualification that petitioner has not had access to a copy of 18 USC §1073 and therefore knows not its authority, petitioner contends that FBI Agent Eley's arrest of Palaschak was pretextual.
3. Petitioner Palaschak contends that even if the procedure followed in his case "is the way it's always done" it is nonetheless unconstitutional.

Beginning of page 15 of the original 44 page handwritten petition to the Illinois Supreme court:

1. Due Process includes the right to a hearing before deprivation of life, liberty, or property. Authority: Bell v Burson (1971) 29 L Ed 2d 90, 402 US 535, 91 S Ct 1586 , Goldberg v Kelly (1970) 25 L Ed 2d 287, 90 S Ct 101, 397 US 254.
2. Due process is not a mere loophole for use by slick lawyers.
3. The concept of due process can be traced back nearly 800 years to the Magna Charta written in 1215 ans signed by King John in a field at Runnymede at the point of a sword.
4. Chapter 39 of the Magna Chart: "No Free man shall be captured or imprisoned. . . outlawed or exiled or in any way destroyed except by the lawful judgment of his peers and by the law of the land." - Magna Charta, Chapter 39.

1. In 1639 Maryland's act of the liberties of the people paraphrased chapter 39 of the Magna Charta.
2. The first American use of the term "Due Process of Law" was in 1787 in the amendments to the constitution proposed by New York state.
3. Before you can repossess a cheap gas stove you must give hearing to the possessor of the stove. Fuentes v Shevin (1971) 32 L Ed 2d, 92 S Ct 1983, 407 US 67.
4. Before you can suspend a federal bar license for conviction of a crime you must give the lawyer a hearing. In Re Ming.469 F 2d 1352 (1971) ( Added 23 June 2001: Here are the cases and statutes upon which the Ming decision was based: Ex parte Garland 4 Wall 333, 380, 18 L.Ed. 366; Ex Parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265, 2 S. Ct. 569, 27 L.Ed 552 (1882);Goldberg v Kelly 397 U.S. 254, 90 S.Ct. 1011,25 L.Ed2d 287 (1970); Grannis v Orlean, 234 U.S. 385, 394, 34 S.Ct. 779, 783, 58 L.Ed. 1363] (1914); In Re Crane, 23 Ill.2d 398, 400-401, 178 N.E.2d 349 (1961); In Re Echeles 430 F.2d 347, 349-350 (7th Cir. 1970); In re Fisher, 179 F.2d 361 (7th Cir. 1950), cert. denied sub nom. Kerner, et. al. v. Fisher, 340 U.S. 825, 71 S.Ct. 59, 95 L. Ed. 606 (1950); In Re Ruffalo 390 U.S. 544, 550, 88 S.Ct. 1222, 1226, 20 L.Ed.2nd 117 (1968); I n Re Sawyer, 256 F.2d 553 (9th Cir. 1956); Morrissey v. Brewer 408 U.S. 471, 92 S.Ct. 22593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972);Randall v Brigham, 74 U.S. (7 Wall) 523, 540; 19 L.Ed. 285 (1868); Selling v Radford 243 U.S. 46, 51; 37 S.Ct. 377, 379; 61 L.Ed. 585; Spevack v Klein 385 U.S. 511, 516, 87 S.Ct. 635, 629, 17 L.Ed.2d (1967); Will v Immigration and Naturalization Service 447 F.2d 539, 531 & 533 (7th Cir. 1971); Treatises: Black's Law Dictionary, 5th Edition 1; Reich, The New Property, 73 Yale L.J. 733 (1964); Statutes; 8 U.S.C. 1251(a)(11) - deportation; 526 U.S.C. 7203 3)
5. When a person gets into a car crash with the required car insurance, the department of motor vehicle may not suspend that person's right to drive until after a hearing. Bell v Burson (1971) 29 L Ed 2d 90.
6. Before you can suspend a student from public school you must give him a hearing. Goss v Lopez 419 US 165.
7. Even where a state statute gives a defendant a criminal preliminary hearing in 30 days, that is not good enough! It mus be before commitment. Gerstein v Pugh (1975) 45 L Ed 2d 54, 420 US 103, 95 S Ct 854. (The current state of the law seems to permit 0, 48, or 72 hours detention but a more progressive view would absolutely forbid any detention before the prelim except in cases of threat of violence. I contend that if the state can send police out to arrest people 24 hours a day, then they can provide magistrates 24 hours per day also.)
8. Palaschak's contention: Under the U.S. constitution, the Magna Charta, the Illinois constitution (to which Palaschak has unconstitutionally been denied access) and 725 ILCS §225/13 a meaningful hearing is required to ascertain that the statutory requirements are met before commitment to permit extradition.
9. The hearing in Palaschak's case was a sham, a farce, a fraud, and a violation of Palaschak's constitutional rights. It was not a meaningful hearing, to wit: Palaschak, having qualified as indigent and having been assigned to the public defender, was denied assistance of counsel. The public defender was not in court! Judge Lanuti should have immediately telephoned the public defender. Today's remedy: Release Palaschak immediately with prejudice. It's exemplary.

Beginning of page 16 in the original handwritten petition #3433. Written 1 pm Wed June 23 1999. Transcribed 23 June 2001. Coincidence? I think not:

1. Palaschak's only hearing was on 17 May 1999. His only other appearances were 2 continuances until July 2.
2. Even after Palaschak was released on 8 June and re-arrested there was no hearing.. . despite (or maybe because of) the federal warrant's already having been executed.
3. Query: Will Palaschak appear before a federal magistrate in California? (Retrospect: No.)
4. Answer: Irrelevant. He should have been taken before a federal magistrate on 14 May 1999 as directed in the warrant.
5. This Illinois Supreme Court suffers an additional burden because the sheriff (by his agents) has refused to give me another copy of the federal warrant. . .despite the clear language of 735 ILCS §5/10-105 which says:

"Any sheriff or other officer or person having custody of any prisoner committed on any civil or criminal process of any court who shall neglect to give such prisoner a copy of the process or order of commitment by which he or she is imprisoned within 6 hours after demand made by the prisoner, or anyone on behalf of the prisoner, shall forfeit to the prisoner or party affect not exceeding $500." - 735 ILCS §5/10-105.

1. I either filed the federal warrant in a previous habeas or I sent it to my public defender.
2. Only 2 pieces of paper were presented at the hearing:
1. A perjured pretextual complaint written that day by persecutor David Day's computer or staff - who are incompetent in the area of extradition.
2. I don't remember the 2^nd piece of paper.
3. Case law collected at Volume 31A Am Jur 2d supports Palaschak's contention that David Day's case was insufficient to merit a warrant of commitment.
4. Judge Lanuti did not issue a warrant of commitment. Proving the negative is difficult. I asked for warrants in the past 41 days and received only 2, namely: #1 the federal warrant from Santa Barbara; and #2 the California state court warrant. (Added 23 June 2001: Enforcement by Illinois of the California warrant is a violation of the 14^th amendment which says that no state shall enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges and immunities of any citizen.)

2 pm Wed 23 June 1999:

1. It's been very load during the writing of this complaint. We are at 200% capacity in this jail. Therefore 18 of us sit in the 30' x 15' day room. Most of these guys have high testosterone levels and low social compatibility skills. They shout to be heard over the television. They pound on the table. They shout like aggressive animals. They posture. They exert as much dominance as possible. Therefore, my focus requires my effort.
2. Prosecutor Day's complaint was an affidavit notarized, as if the oath were talismanic.
3. David Day said nothing about the underlying crime. Obviously this was Monday morning. Palaschak arrived at the jail on the previous Friday afternoon. The actions of the prosecutor Day and Judge Lanuti are telling.
4. Day could have asked for a day continuance. See exhibit K. Lanuti (the court) moved for continuance to effect the appropriate remedy, re-arraignment.
5. At re-arraignment on 21 May appointed counsel did not have a clue that this was re-arraignment. Note that the 21^st was the Friday following the arraignment at which the public defender failed to appear. Any event except re-arraignment would not have been set so soon. This was obviously a re-arraignment - although it was not so obvious to the new different judge Chris Ryan and the public defender Dan Bute who I just met at this re-arraignment on the 21^st. Bute did not even have the courtesy to identify himself to me until my case was called. When we were called to the bench I asked who he was.

Beginning of page 17 of the petition handwritten 23 June 1999 at 3:44 pm in jail in Illinois. Transcribed 23 June 2001 at the library in Ventura:

1. On 21 May 1999 my appointed counsel Dan But said that he did not have time. He did no arraignment. He dropped the ball,
2. The public defender yesterday (22 June 1999) resumed work on my case at the beginning - a point Zero after weeks of vacation with no stand-in public defender to assist me, which is denial of assistance of counsel, but I digress.
3. Back to due process: Aside from the illegality of the arrest, which is discussed at paragraphs 108-120 herein) the procedure of 725 ILCS §13, 14, and 15 should have been followed. These sections are entitled "arrest without a warrant," "arrest prior to requisition," and "commitment to await requisition."
4. We can see from exhibit B that as late as 26 May 1999 - nearly 2 weeks after my arrest - the original underlying complaint was being signed in Ventura County court.
5. On 17 May and on 21 May, Prosecutor Day could not have met his burden of proof.
6. Arrest without a warrant mandates a hearing specified in 725 ILCS §225/13.
7. Section 13 is authorized by 18 USC 3182 and may not enlarge the scope of authority beyond that of the cases defining §3182.
8. 18 USC §3182 in turn is authorized by the extradition clause of the U.S. constitution.
9. Section 3182 may not enlarge authority behind that limited by the 14^th and 1^st amendments; These subsequent amendments supersede, abridge, limit, and change the meaning of the extradition clause so that it is not as strong as it says.
10. This bears upon the meaning of the words "felony" and"crime" but I digress.
11. The bill of rights and its numerous interpretations supersede the extradition clause.
12. Of course there are competing societal goals. . . and every court must eventually balance them against the constitutional rights of the defendant.
13. Example: Illinois extradition law denies bail for crimes punishable by death or life imprisonment.
14. Nonetheless Gerstein V Pugh (1975( 43 L Ed 2d 54, 420 US 103, 95 S Ct 854 clearly spells out pertinent guidelines that apply in the case of extradition also, although extradition is not mentioned.

6 pm 23 June 1999:

1. "The standards and procedures for arrest and detention have been derived from the 4^th amendment and its common-law antecedents . . . The standard for arrest is probable cause [is] defined in terms of facts and circumstances "sufficient to warrant a prudent main in believing that the [suspect] had committed or was committing an offense." - Beck v Ohio (1964) 379 US 89, 91 as cited in "The standards and procedures for arrest and detention have been derived from the 4^th amendment and its common-law antecedents . . . The standard for arrest is probable cause [is] defined in terms of facts and circumstances "sufficient to warrant a prudent main in believing that the [suspect] had committed or was committing an offense." - Beck v Ohio (1964) 379 US 89, 91 as cited in Gerstein v Pugh (1975) 43 L Ed 2d 54.

1. ( Added 23 June 2001: Palaschak should have been released by the above standard because writing a petition cannot possibly be a crime - and the 14^th amendment forbids Illinois to help California enforce any law that abridges Palaschak's privileges and immunities.) Having been denied access to a law library, to my own hardcover books, and to copies of requested documents, I now contend that the "detention" of the 7 May federal 18 USC §1073 warrant means "less than 72 hours for purposes of ascertaining probable cause at an adversarial hearing"!
2. At the 17 May hearing, Judge Lanuti declined to issue a warrant. Palaschak should then have been released! At least he should have been release at the 21 May re-arraignment which did not happen.

Beginning of page 18 of the original handwritten petition:

1. Recall that the only warrants shown to Palaschak after his approximately 8 statutory demands are:
1. The federal warrant of 7 May 1999 alleging 18 USC 1073 but that charge went away and the detainer should have been brief to determine the validity of the charge which federal prosecutors obviously have declined to pursue; and
2. The warrant of Ventura county court - which has interstate validity only by virtue of action taken in Illinois - by the governor or local judge - and neither have acted to warrant commitment in this case.
2. Palaschak should be freed immediately! That is the result of Lanuti's have failed to commit Palaschak!
3. Is there an effective post deprivation remedy? Yes! The remedy is discharge of Palaschak with prejudice.
4. However, Gerstein also holds that "Illegal detention does not void a subsequent conviction: Frisbie v Collins (1952) 342 US 519 but that is old law - before Miranda or even Gideon. (Retrospect: What is the effect of subsequent acquittal? Palaschak was extradited and acquitted.)
5. The callous treatment of an innocent or at best de minimis criminal says to us that we need some remedy. A case on point is Frisbie v Shirley Collins (1952) 96 L Ed 541, 72 S Ct 509, 342 US 519 which is likely out of date. Shirley Collins was a murder suspect in pro per in U.S. district court. Shirley had been kidnaped in Chicago and hauled to Michigan where he was convicted. (A man named Shirley is destined to have legal problems.)
6. It is time to limit the ancient case of Ker v Illinois (1886) 119 US 436 to its precise factual situation and to free Palaschak . . . but we can free Palaschak without cutting into Ker v Illinois . . . but the righteous vindication of human rights by the U.S. Supreme court in the ensuing years since 1886 points to a dire need to re-evaluate extradition law in view of the enhanced recognition of our inalienable rights - like Palaschak's right to speak and petition. The Ker case is 10 years older than Plessy v Fergeson (1996) 421 L ed 256, 163 US 537, 16 S Ct 1138 which held that Negroes are not entitled to equal protection under the laws.
7. Had there been an effective deterrent to illegal detention, Palaschak would not have been detained in violation of the 14^th amendment as he was in Illinois and California.

_:45 pm 23 June 1999. Wed.:

1. In dissent in Gerstein, Justices Stewart, Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall say:

"I see no need in this case for the court to say that the constitution extends less procedural protection to an imprisoned human being than is required to test the propriety of garnishing a commercial bank account, North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601; the custody of a refrigerator, Mitchell v W. T. Grant Co.. 416 US 600; the temporary suspension of a public school student, Goss v Lopez, 419 US 565; or the suspension of a driver license, Bell v Burson, 402 US 535. Although it may be true that the 4^th amendment's 'balance between individual and public interest always has been thought to define the [magnitude of the ] process that is due for seizures of person or property in criminal cases' [answering the concurring opinion note #27] this case does not involve an initial arrest, but rather the continuing incarceration of a presumptively innocent person." - Dissenting Justices Stewart, Douglas Brennan, and Marshall in Gerstein v Pugh (1975) 43 L Ed 2d 54.

1. I do not know the current state of the law pertaining to the rights to an adversary hearing. I have been denied access to annotated Illinois statues. Also, §59 of Volume 31A of Am Jur 2d at note 50 indicates that the following case may shed some light: State v Hughes (RI) 494 A2d 85 Cert Den 474 US 1009, 88 L Ed 2d 466, 106 S Ct. 536.
2. I do know that Professor Lawrence Friedman in his History of American Law, 2^nd Edition, says that the best supreme court decisions rely on persuasive logic rather than nitpicking case law - and I agree. Also, I have given some thought to the subject, especially during these past 40 days - and in 1993 when I was illegally detained without a warrant and released after 6 days while my computers remained in jail for over a year - at the behest of the same investigator who is behind the current extradition.. I thought about it while I was detained 8 hours on a police scrivener's error resulting in my false arrest for grand theft auto.

The prior false arrest and the paper record or lack thereof rebut the presumption of regularity.

1. Here's the logic: Palaschak's case is almost all on paper. The paper is self-exculpating! Palaschak has previously been falsely arrested by this same detective Glen Kitzman for the same crime! The comity extended to California is predicated on the presumption of regularity - the presumption that California's paperwork is credible. That prior false arrest rebuts this presumption of regularity!
1. There is no doubt that Palaschak is entitled to a hearing. He has been her 40 days without a hearing.
2. If ever there were a case for release after 30 days, this de minimis non crime is it.
3. Palaschak now asks this Supreme Court of Illinois to rule that as a matter of law Palaschak was denied due process. He should have been permitted to cross examine prosecutor Day . . . but Lanuti did not reward Day with commitment. So why am I still here?

Beginning of page 20 of original handwritten #3433, written 10 pm 23 June 1000.

1. Defendant Pugh in Gerstein v Pugh faced a life sentence; Palaschak faces whatever punishment there is for writing a petition - which is a much less severe crime, unless, of course, you subscribe to the 1^st amendment, in which case it is no crime.
2. Therefore a weighing of the constitutional issued would be more in Palaschak's favor that it was in Gerstein's.
3. In none of the cases did I find a detainee's contention that a hearing would exculpate him. I contend that a hearing will exculpate me as a matter lf law.
4. The mere act of extradition carries risk of injury to defendant Palaschak which risk is not justified by his alleged crime - writing a petition. Indeed the mere threat chills speech. The first amendment needs breathing room.
5. Palaschak has in the past experienced wrist pain and numbness from car journeys in handcuffs.
6. When a crime is do de minimis, or course, there will be many issues that come to surface by virtue of the weighing of constitutional issues.
7. Misdemeanors were not crimes at the time the constitution was written. Proof: Blackstone in his 1765-1769 Commentaries use the term "crimes and misdemeanors."
8. A related concept is "malum in se" compared to "malum prohibitum." The former means "inherently bad" and the latter means "merely prohibited." There is a strong correlation between the two concepts. Mere malum prohibitum offenses do not carry a felony stigma. They are generally misdemeanors - as was Palaschak's alleged crime, B&P §6126 (advertising that one is entitled to practice law while one is suspended) prior to the 1996 amendment which made it a possible felony for bar members - but not for others.
9. "Malum in se" crimes need not be legislated nor taught. They trigger empathy. The perpetrator, if he were sensitive would hear his conscience reprimanding him. Indeed it is the absence of adequate empathy and conscience that cause criminals to offend. "Malum in se" crimes are considered morally wrong and have been crimes for centuries. They include the 7 dangerous felonies and other felonies.
10. By comparison "malum Prohibitum" crimes do not offend (in Blackstone's view) the laws of god and nature.
11. At page 7-9 of Volume 4 of Blackstone's commentaries (Chapter 1: On the nature of crimes and their punishment) Blackstone struggles to justify "malum prohibitum" laws. He says that they are "part of the original contract into which they entered when they first engaged in society." - page 8. California breached its societal contract with me by violating my right to free speech.
12. Palaschak's alleged crime is really only a misdemeanor at best. In 1789 terms and in 1994 terms. It was no felony (and therefore non-extraditable) until the 1996 amendment - and then only for those persons formerly associated with the California bar. Discrimination on the basis of former association is unconstitutional In Schware v Board of Bar examiners (1957) 1 L Ed 2d 796, 3553 US 232, 77 S Ct 752 64 ALR 2d 288 "[the U.S. Supreme Court] held it not permissible to bar a lawyer from practice because he had once been a member of the communist party." - Griswold v Connecticut (1965) 14 L Ed 2d 510, 381 US 479, 85 S Ct 1678.
13. How much more unfair in Palaschak's case where the law required him to join and organization and now punishes him with a extraditable felony whereas if his had never joined this organization his crime would only be a misdemeanor at best and not extraditable!

Beginning of page 21 of original handwritten petition #3433. 9:42 a.m. 24 Jun 1999. Thursday. Illinois:

1. This court may rule on the validity or constitutionality of California's laws. Younger abstention is inappropriate here because there are extraordinary circumstances obvious to anyone who knows Palaschak's story. Official bad faith and harassment involved in the enforcement of state laws here justify an exception to Younger v Harris (1971) 401 US 37, 53. (Added 23 June 2001: Although Younger applies federal courts, the principle is somewhat applicable. The 14^th amendment requires that no state enforce a law that abridges my privileges and immunities. By extraditing me, Illinois violates this proscription.)
2. As society evolves we see a trend toward increased respect for the individual and human rights. The heartless dominance of the corporation and state are diminishing.
3. Almost everything about this crime is strange. The district attorney was alerted to the crime by my nemesis, ex prosecutor Vince O'Neill. Although alerted on 10 May 1997 the prosecution waited nearly a year before filing a criminal complaint and obtaining a warrant. See exhibit F, line 22.
4. Blackstone says that malum prohibitum crimes cannot justify punishment on the same basis as malum in se crimes. Malum in se crimes are punished, says Blackstone, because God commands it in the Bible. By comparison, malum prohibitum offenses are punished to deter future offenses.
5. In Palaschak's case, he has been gone for 2 years having established himself in a new career, namely, farming in Illinois. To deter Palaschak from calling himself a lawyer (which he is) and helping the helpless in California, they want to bring Palaschak back to California and put him in a cage with helpless people who need a lawyer. They will ask Palaschak "Why are you here." Palaschak will tell them. They will ask for help on their cases. Obviously if deterrence were the only goal (and Blackstone deems this so: deterrence is the sole reason for malum prohibitum crimes) then leaving Palaschak on his farm in Illinois would meet California's legitimate needs, assuming arguendo that California has any need to prevent the helpless from obtaining assistance of counsel and assuming arguendo that California has any need to prevent Palaschak from truthfully calling himself a lawyer.

11:15 a.m. Thursday 24 June 1999:

Refocus: Due Process Re: Gerstein hearing

1. Question of fact: Did Judge Lanuti permit Palaschak t prevail at the May 178^th event - the only Illinois event (so far) that was not a mere continuance? Answer: Obviously Yes! - unless the omission of a warrant of Commitment was inadvertent - and even then the burden would be on the prosecution to prove the mistake.
2. The issue is not essential to Palaschak's argument. Now there are 2 invalid warrants and neither of the is valid to detain:
1. #1 is the California state warrant which is invalid except as a basis for an Illinois warrant which was denied by Lanuti on May 17;
2. #2 is the stale detention warrant from Santa Barbara which was ignored by agent Eley who violated its command to take me before a federal magistrate.
3. Palaschak may at some time be given a hearing. An adversarial hearing is required. That is my contention. This is a fleeting issue. The detainee is usually distracted by the underlying criminal prosecution and the journey to a distant forum. This issue repeatedly arises by evades resolution . . . except as a last ditch desperate ploy of those serving a long sentence - which tends to result in decisions that favor the prosecution even if legal fiction is required. This explains why Shirley Collins and Mr. Pugh came out with less than total victory when the court weighed such factors as public safety, competing societal goals, irreparable harm, harmless error, etc. It made no difference in their case; it makes a difference in Palaschak's case were the alleged harm is only harm in the eyes of the prosecution who harass Palaschak he is an outspoken advocate of victims of predatory courts (like traffic court) and prosecution.

Beginning of page 22 of original handwritten petition #3433. 12 noon 24 June 1999:

Interjection of an exculpatory thought (or several)

1. Superior Court Judge O'Neill is the one who reported the crime. How do you suppose he discovered this crime? Does he peruse court records looking for people calling themselves lawyers? See line 22 , exhibit F.
2. Why didn't Kitzman's affidavit tell us the answer to this question?
3. When I was last at the traffic appeal court, Vince O'Neill was one of the judges there. He recused himself in my case as indeed he should have.
4. Obviously O'Neill was sitting in traffic appeal court when Melvin Looser's case came along.
5. Did O'Neill recuse himself in Looser's case. If not, then who will check with Melvin Looser to contest bias in his case at the court of O'Neill? Likely Looser had no lawyer or transcript in his case.
6. One of the issues in Melvin Looser's appeal is that the Ventura bench is way too disproportionately staffed with ex prosecutors such as Vince O'Neill who was likely offended when I chastised him indirectly.
7. Vince O'Neill is an ex prosecutor who litigated cases when I was an active Ventura defense attorney.
8. Maybe all ex prosecutors should have recused themselves. Who guards the guardians of justice if we punish that lawyer who speak out against injustice?
9. Why didn't Kitzman and the Ventura district attorney office include the entire 12 pages of Melvin Looser's notice of appeal? The omission was an omission of exculpatory evidence. Now maybe you can see why we need an adversary hearing. This is old news. A grand jury is not an adversary forum and that is why people say that a grand jury does whatever the district attorney requests. (Added 23 June 2001: I wonder if the prosecution attempted to get a grand jury indictment in the case against me?)

Previous Dirty tricks against Palaschak by the Ventura District Attorney

1. Vince O'Neill was in the district attorney's employ during the prosecution and dirty tricks against Palaschak.
2. Continued.

Beginning of page 23 of original handwritten petition #3433:

1. In 1993 Investigator Kitzman, the same guy on whose word you are asked forcibly remove Palaschak from the corn that must soon (July) be harvested, lied this same lie previously!
1. In 1993 I thought long and hard about an adversary hearing. In 1993 Kitzman presented a false affidavit to Judge Joe Hadden of Ventura Superior court. Then, as now, the lie could quickly and neatly been exposed by the truth engine of cross examination.
2. I contend that in the future, search warrants will be executed in 2 steps:
1. Step 1 will consist in obtaining a warrant to secure the premises;
2. Step 2 will be an adversary hearing - instead of the current ex parte hearing.
3. Only if the prosecution prevails will there be a search - and the adversarial process will better limit the scope of the search and accommodate the interest of both sides.
3. In Palaschak's 1993 case Palaschak could easily have proven that his license was valid . . . as he did immediately upon arrest.
4. Irreparable harm: Despite Palaschak's innocence in 1993 the Los Angeles Times carried a nearly half page story with headlines that said something like "Local attorney charged with 7 felonies". Although the district attorney never did file a criminal complaint against Palaschak in 1993, they issued a press release about the arrest.
5. The prosecution in 1993 asked Palaschak to plead guilty even though they had charged him with no crime! They offered to return Palaschak's laser printer if he would plead guilty to a crime - even though they accused him of no crime!
6. Palaschak was held in jail for 6 days. The prosecution kept his computers, diaries, cash, checks, files, answering machine, laser printer, and work product for over a year.
7. Having previously (in 1992/93) served nearly a year in jail for having failed to purchase car insurance in 1988 when he was the victim of a rear-ender car crash where he was not at fault, Palaschak in 1993 had just hooked up an 800 number expensive advertising in the Los Angeles times and was doing 1 hour bankruptcies. After the unjustified raid, Good Nite Inn would not let Palaschak stay in their Motel - even though he was innocent. They read the headlines that were the result of the district attorneys untruthful press release.
8. Palaschak not could recover access to his 800 line - and had no computers or printer to use anyway. Therefore the advertising was going to waste.
9. Palaschak was now deprived of his income stream and the money that he had already earned (which was seized by the investigators) but continued to incur the cost of advertising and the 800 number.
10. Palaschak had little or no money but he did have his car (which police would take the next year). Upon release from jail Palaschak for the first time began sleeping in his car to avoid motel expenses.
11. Now Palaschak was battling on 5 fronts:
1. He was battling to overturn his misdemeanor LSD conviction at the court of appeal - and ultimately prevailed there.
2. The district attorney interfered with Palaschak's appeal process by seizing the computers on which he had written his brief for the appeal.
3. He was battling to overturn his traffic tickets at the traffic appeal court without a transcript - and to this day does not know what was the outcome.
4. He was battling with the state bar to persuade them to undo the interim suspension which they applied in the mistaken belief that Palaschak's LSD case was not a misdemeanor.
5. Palaschak was simultaneously trying to find some way to earn a living.
6. Palaschak was now litigating in state court to get his computers back.
7. About this same time the state bar initiated a proceeding before Ventura Judge Hunter to assume control over Palaschak's practice which was not a matter for the state bar because Palaschak's practice was only in federal court. Palaschak had several bankruptcies in envelopes ready to be mailed to court. Judge Hunter delayed these bankruptcies by authorizing the state bar to give the cases to other lawyers.
12. The district attorney was now reading Palaschak's personal diaries in his computer and indeed read back to 1989 even though they had no probable cause. Their pretext was Palaschak's licensure problem which only went back to 1992, the year of the LSD trial.
13. Palaschak's brother, Jerry, returned an old computer to Palaschak so that he would have some computer to replace the ones that the district attorney office seized in August 1993.

Beginning of page 24 of original handwritten brief #3433. Subject: Habeas petition, Mandamus petition, dirty trick, virtue of the adversarial process:

1. Palaschak eventually developed a 100 page brief that should have been used in his LSD appeal but the first appointed lawyer discussed only 2 of the 50 issues. The 2^nd appointed lawyer only discussed approximately 2 issues and did not submit a complete transcript.
2. Issue: Investigator Kitzman, the investigator who instigated this fraudulent extradition, is the same investigator whose blunder caused delay on my LSD case; my brief was on my computer that he kept for a year! The court of appeal ruled on my case before the district attorney relinquished my computers and my brief.
3. Kitzman was also the investigator in the very LSD case that I was attempting to appeal; he took the computers on which I was writing my brief -and then attempted to read everything on the computer. That is dirty tricks, a violation of my constitutional right to privacy, and a cause of action under 42 USC 1983 and directly under the constitution.
4. One of the questions that we did not answer during my LSD suppression hearing we this: How did the police dispatcher already know my name when the temp went to the police station to tell them that I had said that I ate some LSD? Had they already been investigating me? Why? The dispatched refused to appear at my suppression hearing despite being subpoenaed to appear - and then she resigned from the police department. Was I being investigated without probable cause?
5. I discovered the answer in a stack of discovery papers from the state bar. One of my former secretaries had taken some application forms from my file - filled out forms containing data about job applicants - so she mistakenly presumed - as did the police perhaps. Her concern was that the forms contained more information on physical attributes than she considered appropriate. She did not know that the data pertained to aspiring actors - which is why the physical attributes were important. One does not always get the whole story by spying.
6. The police should have returned the stolen files to me. There was no crime to justify keeping the files. Not even close. The 4^th amendment is a blessing. Privacy is the insulation that keeps society from shorting out. The first amendment needs breathing space.
7. People get angry about what I write sometimes. On my most recent birthday, my angry brother Greg broke into my house and stole copies of my emails and brought them to my Mom's house and ruined our Mother's Day party. Local police declined to pursue the matter of his having broken into my house.

Offer of Proof

1. We see 2 trends:
1. Punishing Palaschak for speaking up when that speech does not please the court, for example:
1. The action of the California Supreme court in overturning my appellate victory after my client sued the California Supreme court.
2. The action of the California bar in suspending my license after my client sued the California bar.
3. The action of Ventura traffic Judge Hunter in giving me a disproportionately high sentence in minor traffic cases.
2. Raids based on falsehoods presented at a non-adversarial one-sided hearing, for example;
1. The current arrest by the FBI May 14, 1999.
2. The previous raid instigated by Kitzman in August 1993 based on an identical false allegation of practicing law while unlicensed.
3. The LSD raid in May 1991 based in part upon papers illegally taken from my office.
2. An element of B&P §6126(b) would appear to be "advertising" although Palaschak's public defender has failed in 42 days to obtain a copy of the amended statute; Ventura offers no factual basis to prove this element. (In retrospect this element and others were missing; I interviewed the jury afterwards. They said that the facts simply did not support the prosecution's allegations.
3. An element of the alleged crime is deception, to wit: "holding oneself out to be entitled to practice law at a time when one is not licensed" - although that must be qualified lest we run into the same problem as in 1993 when Kitzman was mistaken as to jurisdiction and license. (Added 24 June 2001: Ultimately the first amendment to the U.S. constitution is the only license needed to speak, write, and petition - and practice law!)
4. See Exhibit H, lines 20-21. Palaschak certainly did not tell Melvin Looser that he was licensed by the state of California. Quoting Kitzman's statement of what Melvin said as he was secretly taped by Kitzman: "He {Melvin] said that Douglas Palaschak told him [that] he [Palaschak] was a disbarred attorney." There is no deception by Palaschak there.
5. To whom did Palaschak hold himself out to be licensed? Kitzman says at Exhibit G, line 12: "the first paragraph of the motion began with the words 'This motion was written by Attorney Douglas Palaschak'."
6. Kitzman loses credibility by his deceitful ploy here. In fact the 1^st page speaks for itself at Exhibit E which is labeled Exhibit #3 at the top.
7. In fact, as you can see, the 1^st paragraph begins with "to District Attorney Michael Bradbury . . ."; Kitzman is lying or mistaken about what the first paragraph says.
8. Kitzman mistake footnote #1 for the first paragraph, He is an example and a product of the Peter Principle. He has risen to his level of incompetence.

3:15 pm. Thursday 24 June 1999:

1. I am reminded of a quote from perhaps Boyd v U.S. (1886) or some other case pertaining to searches: Without the intervention of a neutral and detached magistrate, our security and privacy in our homes is in the hands of every petty officer.
2. Barry Klopfer is not a neutral and detached magistrate!
3. See Exhibit A-1. Klopfer signed the arrest warrant. I sued Klopfer in about 1993.
4. Klopfer is an ex prosecutor and would be expected to be angry about my complaint in petition 2871 about too many ex prosecutors becoming judges.
5. Klopfer has always recused himself in my cases due to bias. He should have recused himself from my case herein!
6. Incidentally on of my specialties was sex crimes. Klopfer was a prosecutor in the sex crimes unit before becoming a judge.
7. Independent exculpatory fact: State of mind: Men Re: Belief that my act was legal.
8. Having practiced in state bar court and having thoroughly research this particular issue in 1992, I have some expertise consistent with law as old as Blackstone's commentaries: Mistake of law is indeed mistake of fact and exculpating!
9. Kitzman violated ethical principles by not showing the reminder of Melvin Looser's motion #2871. Only one page (namely Exhibit E herein) was shown to the court (based on discovery that I just received from the public defender Dan But on 22 June at 2:30 pm). My state of mind is obvious from footnote #1 on petition 2871 for Melvin Looser. The footnote continues on page 2. The entire 12 page motion is exculpating to a degree. There is a public policy against using only part of a document while withholding the remainder of the document where doing so would be less that truthful.
10. Reserved.

Beginning of page 26 of original 44 page petition #3433:

Issues to be Considered at an Extradition Hearing or Gerstein pre-Detention Hearing

1. Public Defender Dan Bute repeated to me the conventional wisdom that the court in Illinois should not weigh guilt or innocence, but he is wrong. ( Added June 24 2001: Where the alleged crime is an act such as speech or petition, that is clearly protected by the constitution, and where the 14^th amendment says that no state shall enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges and immunities of citizenship, then the court is not considering guilt or innocence so much as they are considering whether they are permitted to enforce the extradition law when to do so would chill the right to free speech.) A correct statement would be more along these lines: The Illinois court is obligated to determine if California's demand is within the purview of the extradition Clause, its enabling statute (18 USC 3182), Illinois law, and not offensive to the detainee's rights when weighed against societal goals considering the severity of the alleged crime and other circumstances including, in this case, whether the alleged act is protected speech or press.
2. One of the requirements is the commission of a felony.
3. If a failure to allege a felony is obvious from the facts proven by the prosecutors affidavit and supplementary papers then extradition is not permitted and obviously defendant's innocence remains intact.
4. As a matter of law for future cases, Palaschak contends that Gerstein and its progeny imply the following:
1. Detainee may cross examine the proponent of the evidence.
2. Detainee may introduce evidence
3. Detainee may command and argue the evidence
4. Detainee is entitle do a court reporter's transcript to use on appeal.
5. Detainee is entitled to testify.
6. Detainee is entitled of effective assistance of counsel.
7. Detainee and prosecutor are entitled to use rules of evidence including the prohibition of hearsay.
8. Evidence obtained in violation of the constitution shall not be used.
9. Detainee's persona rights me be weighed against societal rights.
10. The standard of proof must be that the evidence shows that a jury of 12 peers would unanimously convict using the standard of beyond a reasonable doubt.
11. The judge must make specific findings and record them as request by both sides and sua sponte.

Originally written at 5 pm Thursday 24 June 1999:

Offer of Proof - Continued from ¶234 above

1. Kitzman's deletion of all but the 1^st page of petition #2871 is imputable to the prosecution in California and Illinois.
2. To whom did Palaschak hold himself out as authorized to practice in Ventura court? To Commissioner Covarrubias? Palaschak is accused of waving his hand. Exhibit H, Line 1. Kitzman says "waiving" which is pertinent to the standard of care in preparation of the affidavit for the warrant. At that same paragraph we have Illinois Prosecutor Day (theoretically) presenting the affidavit (un-notarized and therefore not presumed signed) of Kitzman pass hearsay from the Deputy Vido retelling hearsay from Melvin Looser. Video did not say exactly what Looser's words were but (at line 3, exhibit H) "something to the effect of: he wrote it and he's representing me." If Melvin did say that then Palaschak may have been waving to correct that misstatement. If Covarrubias had thought that Palaschak was representing Melvin, Covarrubius would be committing misprision of a felony by failing to raise the hue and cry then and there. Furthermore if Palaschak had been speaking for Melvin Looser that day then the record would not reveal the browbeating that Covarrubias gave Melvin Looser who did not have a lawyer speaking for him.
3. At Exhibit G, page 28, Vido recalls that Palaschak was "in the audience area of the courtroom"! No lawyer represents a client by sitting in the audience! No jury will convict Palaschak of speaking for Melvin Looser on this evidence. (Retrospect: Vido was proven a liar by the tape recording that the prosecution withheld until the preliminary examination. Vido admitted being mistaken in his testimony. The jury took only 2 hours to deliberate. The jury of 12 unanimously acquitted Palaschak of the sole charge.)
4. Also, the pleadings (primarily petition 2871) are in Melvin's name at the top left corner and signed by him - not me.
5. I heard from my attorney friend Judy Fogel that Ventura got a conviction on a non-licensed lawyer who signed a proof of service. There is no doubt in my mind that such a conviction could not sustain appeal. Anybody over age 18 and not a party to the action may sign a proof of service.
6. I asked Illinois Public Defender Dan Bute a month ago to provide California jury instructions for B&P §6126(b). I received no response.
7. Melvin's pleading (Exhibit E) contains in the title block a request for the court to appoint Palaschak or Attorney Fried Rogers to assist Melvin. The court in Ventura appoints (non lawyer) small claims advisors to help litigants. Regardless, had the court attempted to appoint Palaschak to help Melvin Looser, Palaschak would have had standing to challenge an aspect of the lawyer monopoly . . .but is this advertising? Read the whole page! Line 21.5 explains that Palaschak . . ."would be in court representing defendant today but for the unconstitutional oppression of the state bar. . ." Palaschak is not obligated to repeat defamation of himself by saying "suspension" or "disbarment." That might be construed as acquiescence.
8. One need not be licensed to advertise if one contemplates obtaining a license. Furthermore, the court could have appointed Palaschak to work under the supervision of Attorney Fred Rogers of the incompetent slacker who is normally appointed in traffic cases. Also, at that time a multitude of argument could have been made to the bar. Regardless, this was not advertisement. Also, it's from Melvin and not from Palaschak!
9. The last theory of "advertisement" (consistent with the facts of this case) is the cover letter, exhibit C. Near the top, the words "Attorney at Law" appear below my name. This letter delivered Melvin's 2^nd notice of appeal (Exhibit D - Exhibit #1 (at top)) - allegedly.
10. When Palaschak practiced law, he advertised with a full page or nearly full page ad in The Yellow Pages - or an ad in the Los Angeles Times.
11. Palaschak has never worked for the government - as a lawyer. (He worked for the Navy and Air Force as a Registered Professional Engineer.)
12. Calling oneself a lawyer is neither advertising nor alleging a license in any particular jurisdiction.
13. When Jerry Spence (whom I assume to be unlicensed in California) writes to a court doing something that does not require a license, is he advertising? No! Is he nonetheless a lawyer? Of course he is a lawyer!
14. Lawyers often appear pro hac vice in states where they are not licensed. They are not holding themselves out as licensed.
15. As to the request for appointment, it was by Melvin - not Palaschak! It brings this issue before the court: Hey, you have denied effective assistance to this guy and he needs help. He asks for someone who he knows. The court can appoint anybody or nobody.
16. Property the prosecutor might allege that Palaschak asked Melvin to ask the court to appoint Palaschak . . . but even if you disregard the advertising element . . . we are faced with the absence of the other essential element, to wit: (from exhibit A-2) "hold himself out as a practicing or otherwise entitled to practice." Taken as a whole, the documents (especially if shown in their entirety - the entire petition #2871 - not just page #1 - let's see all the footnotes too) make it abundantly clear that Palaschak is not licensed and blames it on the traffic court.
17. Reserved
18. Reserved
19. Reserved

Beginning of page 29 of original handwritten petition #3433:

Testing the warrant at a hearing:

1. What do published decisions tell us about due process for extradition?
2. Fugitivity must be proven. Vol 31A Am Jur §102, 91 ALR 1246.
3. I have a right to counsel. People ex rel Harris v Ogilvie 35 All 2d 512, 221 NE 2d 265; Ex Parte Terner (Texas Criminal) 410 SW 2d 639.
4. "A warrant issue under an invalid state statute is void and unenforceable" Vol 31A Am Jur Extradition §115 citing Hyatt v People 188 U.S. 691, 47 L Ed 657, 23 S Ct. 456.
5. I contend that an Illinois court may declare the unconstitutionality of a newly amended California state. Although a state supreme court is generally held to be the supreme arbiter of its own statutes, that is only with respect to its own constitution . . . not the U.S. Constitution. (Retrospect: The 14^th amendment implies that Illinois must declare the unconstitutionality of a California statute, like §6126 that abridges speech - because no state may enforce any statute that abridges my privileges and immunities.)
6. Regarding the dirty tricks and malice described above . . . and the previous (1993) false arrest for the same alleged crime by the same investigator Kitzman . . ."A governor, in his discretion, may also refuse to issue a rendition warrant where there is a showing that the requisition was made with an ulterior motive or in bad faith . . . or to gratify personal malice" Vol 31A Am Jur 2d Extradition §96.
7. "A Governor's decision not to extradite is not subject to judicial review" Am Jur 2d Vol 31A Extradition §96. However, a decision to extradite is subject to judicial review.
8. Palaschak asks this Supreme Court of Illinois for a stay of extradition pending review to prevent irreparable harm pending judicial review and to permit Palaschak to harvest sweet corn in July, and corn and soybeans from September 1 to approximately November 24, later in a wet year.
9. "[The] governor of a state has discretion in determining whether an extradition case presented for his attention is within the contemplation of the constitution and the laws of the United States." Hyatt v People, above; Ex Parte Reggel 114 US 642, 29 L Ed 250, 5 S Ct. 1148; Ex Parte Cohen, 23 NJ Super. 209, 92 A 2d 837, Affirmed 12 NJ 362, 96 A 2d 794; Milwaukee County v Van Den Berg, 215 Wis 519, 255 NW 65, 94 ALR 352 as cited in Am Jur 2d Vol 31A Extradition §96.
10. Palaschak has already written a 1^st letter to the Governor (of Illinois).

Beginning of page 30 of original 44 page handwritten petition #3433 to the Illinois Supreme Court:

1. It is not enough that §6126 have been committed. The offense must have been a felony . . . and I contend that if a 1^st offense is a misdemeanor for non bar members who were never bar members then it must likewise be a misdemeanor for ex bar members.
2. The disparate treatment of defendant based on past bar affiliation violates the equal protection clause of the 14^th amendment.
3. What is the remedy? Can the statute be adjusted? May the court simply deem that all first offenders are misdemeanants? If so, then extradition is prohibited as shown below:
4. The extradition clause of the U.S. Constitution (Article IV, Clause 2) says:

"A person charged in any state with treason, felony, or other crime, who shall flee from justice, and be found in another state, shall, on demand of the executive authority of the state from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the state having jurisdiction of the crime." - Art. IV, clause 2: extradition clause - next to fugitive slave clause.

1. U.S. statute 18 USC §3182 was enacted to implement the extradition clause. §3182 is a revision of a previous statute.
2. 18 USC §3182:

"Whenever the executive authority of any state or territory demands any person as a fugitive from justice, of the executive authority of any state, district, or territory to which such person has fled, and produces a copy of an indictment found or any affidavit made before a magistrate [U.S. magistrate judge] of any state or territory, charging the person demanded with having committed treason, felony, or other crime, certified as authentic by the governor or chief magistrate [U.S. magistrate judge] of the state or territory from whence the person so charged has fled, the executive authority of the state, district, or territory to which such person has fled shall cause him to be arrested and secured, and notify the executive authority making such demand, or the agent of such authority appointed to receive the fugitive, and shall cause the fugitive to be delivered to such agent when he shall appear. If no such agent appears within 30 days from the time of the arrest, the prisoner may be discharged." - 18 USC §3182

1. This statute 18 USC §3182 was passed in 1948 to replace 18 USC §662. In this 1948 revision, 30 days replaced the previous 6 months "in view of modern conditions." - Annotations to18 USC §3182, notes, page 99.
2. Palaschak contends that 18 USC §3182 must yield to the Civil Rights provisions of the U.S. Constitution. By virtue of the privileges and immunities clause of the 14^th amendment, the states may not violate my privileges and immunities by their acts even though they be consistent with 18

USC §3182.

1. The constitution is a dynamic document. Thirty days may have been okay in 1948 when the statute was written but it is too long now as a matter of law.

Beginning of page 31 of the original handwritten petition #3433 to the Illinois Supreme Court:

California B&P §6126 is not without purview of the Extradition Clause

1. The Illinois version of the Uniform Extradition Act is 725 ILCS §225/1 et seq.
2. By enacting 725 ILCS §225/1 et seq., Illinois gave to its residents certain substantive and procedural rights which may not be administered in violation of the equal protection clause.
3. Palaschak's allegation of denial of equal protection is contained in this and the following paragraphs: If a person who had never been a member of the California bar had been accused of the same act as that of which Palaschak is now accused, the act would by operation of the offending statute, be chargeable only as a misdemeanor - not a felony.
4. As I shall show more fully below, a non-felony is non-extraditable! I admit that the abundant cases in Am Jur 2d Volume 31A Extradition do not support my contention - but they are outmoded bad law from a more oppressive era. More at paragraph ___.
5. In Schware v Board of Bar examiners (1957) 1 L Ed 2d 796, 64 ALR 2d 288 the U.S. Supreme court held that the bar may not bar a lawyer from practice because he had once been a member of the communist party. (Retrospect: Although this case is ostensibly not about communists, precisely the same class struggle underlies this case. Palaschak is a member of the working class which today struggles against the oppression of the predator class who use corporate ficta such as the state bar to give them eternal life and illegal control of the legislature and courts.)
6. Because Palaschak's alleged crime is at bottom political speech, strict scrutiny analysis applies. Any state purporting to curtail speech (as §6126 does) must be presumed invalid absent compelling state interest. (Retrospect: Overbreadth theory mandates that the first amendment needs breathing space.)

25 June 1999. Friday. 12 noon. Jail. Illinois:

1. Pages 14-28 of this petition have not ben returned to me since I gave them to Deputy Karen at 10:30 last night at lock down. This has been the procedure that we use to obtain copies. Generally they return the original and copy in an hour or at the 12:30 midnight tour. Chief Jailer Preci is here today. He sometimes forwards my requests for literature to the public defender who has honored only 2 of my approximately 50 specific requests. For example, despite my written requests, the public defender has not provided a copy of 18 USC§1073 nor California Business and Professions code §6126. Both of these statutes are listed on a warrant.

12:25 noon. 25 June 1999. Now I have made another inquiry to Deputy Julie.

1. I feel nervous and anxious about pages 14-28. These are the product of 1.5 days of work. As a matter of law, the jailer should not hold on to my legal papers . .. at least not for 36 hours without comment. I submitted a written inquiry this morning and have not yet received any response. This written inquiry was to Deputy Tina. Here she is now. She has no response. (Written 2 hours later: The documents were copies and returned to me in 38 hours.)

Penumbra Theory. Magna Chart proscription against haling to distant court.

1. Palaschak's rights in this case arise under a multitude of specific lines of cases. The most specific and pertinent (and ancient) provision is that provision of the magna Charta that proscribes hauling a person to a distant court for trial. My rights under the Magna Charta are enforceable by this court under the 9^th and 14^th amendments. I demand enforcement of my right to petition for redress, my associational rights, and my magna charta right not to be hauled away (which I now assert as a privilege and immunity of citizenship as a matter of law).

Beginning of page #32 of original handwritten petition #3433. Handwritten at 1 pm Friday 25 June 1999 in jail at Ottawa, Illinois. Transcribed at 10:45 a.m. Sunday, 1 July, 2001, at an old service station in Ventura California.

1. "The sacred rights of mankind are not to be rummage for among old parchments, or musty records. They are written, as with a sunbeam, in the whole volume of human nature by the hand of the divinity itself; and can never be erased or obscured by mortal power." - Alexander Hamilton
2. B&P §6126 is not the California state bar's first attack on People's Lawyers like Palaschak.
3. When I departed California in 1996 and 1997, federal court litigation was then pending which challenged another statutory denial of equal protection. The bar instituted an MCLE (mandatory continuing legal education) program that granted an automatic waiver to government employees. This, private lawyers like Palaschak - who generally litigate against government lawyers, face additional harassing burdens and intrusion into their intellectual privacy and freedom from indoctrination. By comparison, state's attorneys and the very lawyers who enforce the MCLE provisions for the bar - - these lawyers are not required to participate in MCLE. What can be the rational basis for this discrimination? (Retrospect: Lou Warden is the lawyers who was the plaintiff in this case of denial of equal protection. He lost on appeal by a divided court. His case is reprinted at this page:

http://www.lawyerdude.50megs.com/lew.html .

1. Having demonstrated that §6126 is part of a pattern of government harassment of sole practitioners and having shown that Investigator Kitzman of the Ventura District Attorney office has caused irreparable harm to Palaschak in 1992 in the LSD case and against in 1992 in the false arrest for B&P §6126, Palaschak now asks this Illinois Supreme Court to rule that extraordinary circumstances pertain her and that the status quo ante should be preserved pending resolution of this dispute . . . or in the alternative, that Palaschak's petition and actions amount to a misdemeanor at best and therefore extradition is not permitted.

Testing Sufficiency of the Affidavit that supported the federal and state warrants.

1. Recall that Palaschak was arrested on 14 May 1999 by FBI special agent Timothy Eley on the basis of a federal warrant issued 7 May 1999 from Santa Barbara part time magistrate McElwyn alleging 18 USC §1073 (interstate flight to avoid prosecution - a pretextual charge for which a complaint was never filed) with California Business and Professions code §6126 being the underlying crime.
2. FBI agent Timothy Eley said at the scene of the arrest on the farm in Illinois: "The underlying crime must be a felony."
3. Palaschak appeared thrice in court in Ottawa, Illinois. The last 2 of these 3 appearances were continuances.
4. The only appearance at which anything substantive happened was the 17 May arraignment at which the public defender was assigned but was not present. Palaschak was arraigned albeit defectively. Prosecutory David Day presented a perjurious complaint but Judge Lanuti did not issue a warrant of commitment.
5. Having been denied a copy of 18 USC §1073, Palaschak contends that the detention being under color of state law (Palaschak having not been taken before a federal magistrate) and Lanuti having failed to sign a warrant of commitment, he (Palaschak) is now entitled to be released there being no warrant of commitment.

Beginning of page 33 of the original handwritten petition #3433. 3:17 pm Friday June 25, 1999:

1. Two groups of Illinois statutes are pertinent here: 725 ILCS §225/13 describes the statutory requirements that were absent at the 17 May 1999 arraignment in Ottawa, Illinois, county court. Statutes 735 ILCS §5/10-123, 24 list causes to discharge and not to discharge under habeas corpus.

1. In particular, Prosecutor David Day's perjurious affidavit lf 17 May was not the "oath of any credible person" which is an essential element to preclude discharge of a defendant.

3:51 pm Friday 25 June 1999:

1. Incidentally, the words "any crime" in 725 ILCS §225/13 must be interpreted consistent with the word "crime" in the U.S. constitution which does not include misdemeanors - or at any rate does not include a petition for redress or any other speech. See William Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England, 1765-69. Blackstone in Volume IV talks about "crimes and misdemeanors" as though one is not the other.
2. California is on the forefront of escalation of crimes. In 1968 California invented the infraction, a low grade misdemeanor (usually a traffic offense or similar act - like crossing the yellow line - which contributed to Palaschak's demise and that of Melvin Looser - but I digress) that carries a penalty of a fine only. No jail sentence is permitted for an infraction. The purpose of this invention is to permit the courts to circumvent the opinions of the U.S. Supreme Court and the deny us our rights and oppress us. Gideon v Wainwright (1963) 372 US 335 and Argersinger (1974) 32 L Ed 2d 530, 407 US 25, 92 S Ct 2006 guarantee our right to appointed counsel wherever jail may be imposed, and therefore the police lobby persuaded the legislature to create this new class of non-jail crimes. The courts cheat in this way: they jail us despite the ostensible prohibition. They jail us for failure to pay the fine - which failure constitutes a misdemeanor and not an infraction. Palaschak's theory: the penalty for failure to pay the penalty must never be more serious than the original penalty!! Now we have come full circle. Palaschak was challenging this cheating by the traffic court in Melvin Looser's petition #2871 for which Palaschak was arrested by the FBI. Palaschak was grieving the stealthy encroachment of government via escalation in penalties. Palaschak was via #2871 speaking to his form legal adversary in the district attorney office, now a judge, Vince O'Neill. O'Neill sent the petition back to his former employer, the district attorney to punish Palaschak for criticizing the judiciary. See exhibit F, line 23.
3. Escalation over the years:

1765 Felonies, crimes, misdemeanors.

1950 Capital murder, dangerous felonies, felonies, misdemeanors.

1995 Felonies, misdemeanors, infractions.

1. The criminal justice system needs business. They invent crimes - and even perpetrate crimes to prime the pump. See, for example, U.S. v Russell (1973) 36 L Ed 2d 366, 411 US 423, 93 S Ct 1637 wherein a federal agent supplied the missing critical ingredient to a methamphetamine lab and supervised the manufacturing, and even permitted the finished product to be sold in order to generate business.
2. Palaschak contends that a misdemeanor should never become a felony by virtue of being a 2^nd offense - but that issue does not arise in his case because this alleged crime would be his first such offense if it were a crime, but it is no crime to petition.

Beginning of page 34 of the original handwritten petition to the Illinois Supreme Court. 5 pm Friday 25 June 1999.

Independent basis for denying extradition

1. Keeping in mind that:
1. (#1) "crime" as it appears in the Illinois extradition law must be deemed to mean "felony", consistent with the extradition clause of the 1789 constitution, as explained in paragraph #297 above; and
2. for every 1^st offender, B&P §6126 must be deemed a misdemeanor to avoid offending the equal protection clause of the 14^th amendment,

we have an independent basis for denying extradition because extradition would constitute Illinois enforcement of a California law that abridges Palaschak privileges and immunities. Such interstate cooperation to abridge my rights violates the 14^th amendment. We fought the civil war to vindicate this right.

1. I have been denied access to annotated Illinois statutes. Therefore to get an idea of what has been litigated regarding due process I examined the approximately 100 pages of annotations to 18 USC §3182, which is the federal extradition statute, and Am Jur 2d Volume 31A regarding Extradition.
2. As to the "affidavit of a credible person":

"Affidavit called for was one stating facts of affiant's own knowledge which would warrant finding of probable cause; and affidavit and complaint had to be read together." - Rafferty ex rel Huie Fong v Bligh (1932 CA1 Mass) 55 F2d 189, as cited in Bancroft Whitney's annotated 18 USCS §3182, note 55, page 117.

1. Prosecutor David Day's fraudulent perjurious affidavit is insufficient because David Day had no personal knowledge - and perhaps that is why Judge Lanuti did not sign a warrant of commitment. David Day did not even know the name of the crime!! He knew only the number and had not the resources or intellectual wherewithal to find out the name of the crime. He did not know the elements of the crime and most importantly he had no personal knowledge of the alleged acts.
2. Why did Illinois Prosecutor Day to through the trouble of writing a perjurious complaint?
3. One explanation: He agrees that the "detention" designated on the federal warrant was temporary - only long enough to enable the arrest of Palaschak and the delivery to a federal magistrate. The arrest was premature and the FBI declined to take Palaschak to a federal magistrate.

How a good arrest goes bad

1. The FBI arrest was pretextual - and therefore illegal! Statute 735 ILCS §5/10-124 says that Palaschak may be discharged:

"2. Where, though the original imprisonment was lawful, nevertheless, by some act, omission, or event which has subsequently taken place, the party has become entitled to be discharged." - 735 ILCS §5/10-124.

1. The FBI temporary detention became unlawful when the FBI failed to take Palaschak before a federal magistrate! Now there is a gap before the credible affidavit can reach Illinois. In fact there was no credible certified affidavit even in California until 26 May 1999 - 2 weeks after Palaschak was arrested! See exhibit B attached.
2. Palaschak was released on 8 June 1999 only to be arrested minutes later informally by an apologetic deputy Karen who explained the procedure of the LaSalle County sheriff, a defective procedure: "On detentions we just set bail." They should have immediately re-arraigned Palaschak, but they failed to do so. Setting bail is inadequate. Arraignment is more than merely setting bail.

Illinois law mandates discharge if warrant was obtained, as here, by false pretenses.

1. Statute 735 ILCS §5/10-124 also lists another reason for discharge:

"6. Where the process appears to have been obtained by false pretenses . . ." - 735 ILCS §5/10-124

The 7 May 1999 federal warrant was obtained under false pretenses, to wit: the false pretense that a crime had committed when in fact the alleged act was privileged speech, a petition protected by the 1^st amendment - and the procurers of the warrant knew or should have known of the exculpatory tape recording showing that their main witness, Bailiff Vido, was a liar. The warrant was used to effectuate a pretextual arrest. A pretextual arrest is per se false pretenses!! There was no credible affidavit of affiant's personal knowledge justifying the federal warrant - nor the state warrant upon which it was predicated!

Beginning of page 35 of original handwritten petition #3433:

Denial of Bail. $250,000 is unreasonable.

1. See Exhibit K attached herewith. Bail was set at $150,000 on 17 may 1999. This is excessive.
2. Incidentally, I inquired in writing of the jailers as to my bail recently, approximately 18 June 1999. Now they say that it is $250,000.00 plus $5,000.00 plus $500.00. Hmm. Maybe they have added the amount designated in the California warrant. See exhibit A-1, which is the $5000 California warrant signed by my nemesis, Barry Klopfer, who should have recused himself.
3. The jail apparently does not know that an out of state warrant only obtains merit in Illinois vicariously through a warrant of commitment issue by an Illinois judge - but Judge Lanuti rightfully declined to issue a warrant of commitment - although he did set bail - which apparently triggered the misconception that there was a warrant of commitment when, in fact, there was none.
4. To what does the $250,000.00 listed on Exhibit K pertain?
5. It would pertain to a warrant of commitment had he issued one, which he did not - - and it will pertain to bail pending extradition if and when extradition papers arrive. It does not pertain to the federal warrant because the federal charges have obviously been dropped - or more correctly, because there never was any federal complain - just an arrest warrant. Palaschak's theory #2: The prosecution should be willing to prosecute the federal flight charges - and prove it by filing a complaint - before obtaining an arrest warrant; otherwise it is obvious pretext.
6. The $250,000.00 bail was due to 2 factors:
1. The mere fact of FBI involvement; and
2. Prosecutor Day's perjurious statement that I am a transient.

In fact I have never been a transient.

1. On 25 May 1999 I wrote a 12 page detailed summary of bail information listing the 44 factors listed in 725 ILCS §5/110-5 regarding bail. I have attached this bail motion #3396 as exhibit L. No court has ever seen this bail motion. I handed it to public defender Dan Bute on 26 May 1999 at our only meeting. At that meeting Dan But said to me: "You are not going to get O.R." (O.R. means release without posting money, release on one's "own recognizance"). Two days later, on Friday 28 May 1999, at my 3^rd court appearance, Dan But again continued the event - this time until 2 July, 1999. In other words, on the Friday before Memorial Day, he continued my defective arraignment to the Friday before the next major holiday. Illinois extradition statutes provide for bail. July 2 is too late a date for a continuation of arraignment according to the pertinent cases. Bute does not even know that it is a continued arraignment.
2. Now 35 hours after I handed pages 14-28 to Deputy Karen, I ask Deputy Julie if she will look into the matter. She says "I saw them yesterday." She told me that same thing 24 hours ago. At 10:30 pm last night I presented Karen with a written inquiry regarding these 14 pages that I had handed to her in a manilla envelope exactly 24 hours earlier - at lockdown time on Thursday. Now Karen says "That's why I don't like to take that stuff. Give it to John Kneffert when he comes on duty at 12:30 [midnight]." She then handed my note back to me preferring to not get involved. At 1:30 a.m. Deputy Kneffert hade his rounds. I heard the steel doors roll open. I arose from my bunk. I presented the written inquiry to him. I explained that I had submitted 14 pages 27 hours earlier and that Deputy Karen told me to ask him about it. He became defensive and then said that he would look into it. I heard nothing back from him. (Retrospect: Documents were returned to me 38 hours after I submitted them for copying.)
3. Query: What's an in mate to do? Karen is a named defendant in a 42 USC §1983 action arising from the false arrest. I wonder if her action are retaliatory or are intended to obstruct my progress. It is frustrating because we have no access to a law library. I don't know if there is a legal remedy. There should be a process for copying. It is not in the rules. History reveals that only litigation will put it on a work schedule.

What is the remedy for denial of effective assistance of counsel?

1. The 6^th amendment and the Illinois constitution provide for assistance of counsel - although I am speculating with regard to the Illinois constitution because I am denied access to a copy of the Illinois constitution.

"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his defence." - 6^th amendment to the U.S. constitution.

1. The test for effective assistance of counsel is set forth in Strickland v Washington (1948) 466 US 668 in which the Supreme Court prescribe a 2 part test:
1. The defendant must identify specific acts or omissions by counsel that were outside of the wide range of professionally competent assistance; and
2. The defendant must show that counsel's errors prejudiced the defense to the point where he was denied a fair trial.

(Added 1 July 2001: The hypocrisy and legal fiction employed here by the 1948 court is that all appointed counsel within the range provide effective assistance. There are many flaws in this logic. What is the range? In fact public defenders are per se ineffective. What is entirely in the middle of the range of current practice may be incompetent and ineffective and downright negligent and malicious.)

1. Query: What is the pre-trial remedy for ineffective assistance in Palaschak's case? Palaschak contend that but for Dan Bute's negligence, Palaschak would be free . . . or at least out on bail or O.R.

Specific acts or omissions by Dan Bute: Part 1 of the Strickland test:

1. Specific acts or omissions:
1. Dan Bute failed to appear at my arraignment on 17 May 1999.
2. Dan Bute failed to apprize himself of my situation prior to my 2^nd appearance - on 21 may 1999. Then he failed to discuss bail, the defective David Day complaint, the absence of a warrant of commitment. . . or any issue. He did noting except obtain a continuance. He failed to note that this was a new judge for a re-arraignment and that this new judge may not have known that the arraignment was continued for lack of counsel at the prior arraignment - or maybe he did know and wanted to avoid embarrassment.
3. Dan Bute failed to do anything with the 12 page bail motion that I wrote and handed to him on 26 May 1999 at our one and only meeting.
4. Dan Bute failed on 28 May at my 3^rd attempted arraignment to even know that it was an arraignment. He failed to present my bail information that I gave him two days earlier in my 12 page bail motion #3396 which is attached here as exhibit L.
5. Dan Bute's having failed to copy and return my bail motion prevented me from filing it.
6. On 8 June, after being released from jail and then re-arrested, I filed motion #3420 a Faretta motion and omnibus motion set for 14 June 1999. I also sent a letter to Dan Bute asking him about the release. He failed to help me put the motion on calendar. In fact, the Chief Jailer told me that Dan Bute was on vacation. He went on vacation without telling any of us. Justice delayed is justice denied.
7. Dan But was now apparently overwhelmed. Having copied my letter of 26 May 1999 and having mailed it back to me, he failed to do that to any later letters from me to him.
8. Bute failed to copy, return, or answer the following letters and research memos:
1. 3402 27 May
2. 3412 3 June .
3. 3413 3 June
4. 3417 7 June
5. 3423 10 June
6. 3461 23 June
9. Had Dan Bute done some work on my case, he could have reduced my bail with some effort. Bute had merely to parrot what I told him back to the judge - or hire somebody to type up the handwritten motions that I sent him. He was less than helpful; he was not even at work those weeks! He was on vacation!! He should have prevented my extradition but he told me that it was impossible. He should have told Judge Ryan or the Court of Appeal, or this Supreme Court of Illinois about the absence of a warrant of commitment from Judge Lanuti - but Dan Bute missed my arraignment - so he did not really know how it turned out.

Beginning of page 37 of the original handwritten complaint #3433:

1. I am repeatedly amazed at how much more meaningful the bill of rights seems when I personally experience incarceration with excessive bail.
2. ". . . To be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation." - 6^th amendment. David Day's bald accusation that I committed a violation of B&P §6126 does not suffice to permit me to contest the allegation, and as of today (Saturday 26 June 1999, 2:32 pm) I have received no discovery from the prosecution. This, in conjunction with non-speedy process is unconstitutional as a matter of Illinois and U.S. constitutional law.
3. Prosecutor David Day's affidavit was notarized. That adds absolutely nothing to the his veracity. It merely creates a presumption in court that Day's signature is authentic. David Day knows nothing about the case.
4. The proffer of this worthless document simply proves that Prosecutor Day and the court knew that some proof is required. Judge Lanuti should have ordered my release . . . but then, he did not order commitment. The sheriff should have released me after Judge Lanuti refused to issue an order of commitment. (Retrospect: I know that Lanuti did not because I exercised my statutory demand to see the warrant of commitment and received only the federal warrant and the California state warrant. I received nothing signed by Lanuti.) The detention in the 7 May 1999 federal warrant must be brief. Authority: The stop and frisk case: Terry v Ohio (1968) 20 L Ed 2d 889, 392 US 1, 88 S Ct 1868.
5. Sheriff Tom Templeton should have looked to the court of independent counsel for advice.
6. Chief Jailer Preci and Deputy Karen both told me that after they released me on 8 June 1999 and then re-arrested me, they had extensive conversation with the prosecutor, this same prosecutor who cannot even write an adequate complaint and has not the integrity to follow the law and order my release.
7. The court should have heard me. I made my case to Deputy Karen but was never permitted to see a judge to be arraigned. This denial of arraignment is outrageous. The public defender should have been called to the jail. The jailers had counsel but denied me a judge and counsel. They substituted their own jail tribunal for proper arraignment. I was entitled to be heard by a neutral and detached magistrate - not a petty officer.
8. Returning now to the standard for testing prosecutor Day's defective paper: 725 ILCS §225/13 says:

"a certified copy of the sworn charge or complaint and affidavit upon which the warrant is issued shall be attached to the warrant."

1. "Affidavit referred to in 18 USCS §3182 is affidavit which must be made before [in front of] magistrate who issues warrant of arrest; affidavit simply relating to guilt of accused [as prosecutor David Day's 17 May 1999 perjurious affidavit did] and made before notary is surplusage." - Ex Parte Rubens (1951)

Authority: Ex Parte Rubens (1951) 73 Arizona 101, 238 P 2d 402, cert. denied (1952) 344 U.S. 480, 97 L Ed 653, 73 S Ct 50 as cited in the very first note in this group at page 117 of Bancroft Whitney's annotations to 18 USC §3182.

1. On 17 May 1999 and at every one of the 3 court appearances prosecutor Day presented no paper except his own worthless affidavit.
2. Sheriff Templeton of LaSalle County, Illinois, has a copy of the California county warrant in addition to the federal warrant. The staff told me that I must post both bails. They obviously haven't a clue that the California court warrant is invalid in Illinois except as evidence to obtain an Illinois warrant of commitment (which was denied by Judge Lanuti on 17 May) to await requisition. The federal warrant has expired and no federal case was ever instigated.

Beginning of page #38 of original 44 page handwritten petition #3433:

1. Statute 725 ILCS §225/15:

"Commitment to await requisition - bail. If, from the examination before the judge, it appears that the person held is the person charged with having committed the crime alleged . . .and that he has fled from justice, the judge must, by a warrant reciting the accusation, commit him to the county jail for such time not exceeding 30 days and specified in the warrant, as will enable the arrest of the accused to me made under a warrant of the governor [of California] . . . or until he shall be discharged." - 725 ILCS §225/15

1. No "warrant reciting" anything was issued. End of story. Release me!
2. Even had there been a warrant, it would have expired on Saturday 12 June 1999.
3. Query: Was Palaschak's 2^nd arrest (the one on June 8?) on a requisition from California?
4. Answer: No. Palaschak inquired pursuant to 735 ILCS §5/10-105 in writing and was told nothing about a requisition.
5. Palaschak has written to the Governor of Illinois an to the Governor of California to inquire.

Illinois Extradition Law is unconstitutional

1. In 1948, 18 USC §3182 was written to change, among other things, the duration of the detention. It was shortened from 6 months to 30 days.
2. That was half a century ago! Then most folks in LaSalle county did not even have televisions. Transistors had not been invented. Crude computers were monstrous room-filling devices run by vacuum tubes. The best fastest commercial aircraft ran on propellers. School segregation was the law, and there were special restroom for "colored."
3. As a matter of Illinois and U.S. constitutional law, the 30 days in §3182 and 725 ILCS §225/15 is too long. The law is invalid! If they can't send the stuff by email in a case as trivial as mine, then they have acted prematurely. They waited 2 years! They've harassed me before.
4. I ask this court to rule as a matter of law that 725 ILCS §225/15 is unconstitutional as violative of due process, the 4^th amendment, Gerstein v Pugh (1975) 420 U.S. 103, 95 S Ct. 854, 43 L Ed 2d 54, and other authorities cited herein - except in cases where the punishment is death or life imprisonment (which is nearly consistent with §16).
5. 1948 was before the age of due process. Please review paragraphs 120-133 above.
6. Illinois's speedy trial act 725 ILCS §5/103-5 requiring trial in 120 days is unconstitutional. I have observed that all court events even in my case of extradition seem to follow the same schedule: in easy cases you'll get a deal in 60 days. In tough cases, 90 days. In California the same work is done in 30 or 45 days. That is 45 days to 60 days faster than here.
7. LaSalle county has excessive bail - at least in my case and those drug cases in my cell block initiated on Interstate 80 by profiling out of state cars. I have jus tertii standing if not personal standing.
8. The result is a full overcrowded jail and people who lose jobs and homes and are softened up for the deal that they cannot refuse.

Beginning of page 39 of my original handwritten petition #3433:

Clear and Present Danger Test

1. Palaschak's alleged "advertising" (by instrument of Melvin's pro se motion #2871 to the county court in California in conjunction with Palaschak's cover letter calling Palaschak at "attorney at law") is a non-extraditable act - indeed a non-crime - because B&P §6126(b) (a portion of the state bar act)as applied to Palaschak abridges his speech and is not justified by the "clear and present danger" test enunciated by the U.S. Supreme Court in Brandenburg v Ohio (1969) 23 L Ed 2d 430, 395 US 444, 89 S Ct 1827 and its predecessor cases such as Schenk and Debs. Go to paragraph 424 below for more on this subject.
2. Can the Illinois Supreme Court declare the unconstitutionality of a foreign statute? Logically it must in order to protect and defend the constitution. At least Illinois should preserve the status quo ant pending resolution of the issue.
3. Ventura's argument is that Melvin's request to have Palaschak appointed counsel constitutes "advertising and holding oneself out to be licensed." This argument is tenuous. The first amendment needs room to breath. The statute fails because it chills speech. There is no "clear and present danger" presented by petition #2871. More on this at Paragraph #___
4. Reserved.

8:30 a.m Sunday 27 June 1999. Jail. Ottawa, Illinois:

Corporate Law v the Sole Practitioner

The Big Picture: Robber Barons run rampant.

1. The Big Picture: J. P. Morgan, a paradigm robber baron, bought 5000 defective rifles from an army arsenal. The rifles would shoot off the thumbs of the soldiers who used them. He resold these maiming rifles to a General in the field for $22.00 each. A federal judge upheld the deal as valid fulfillment of a legal contract. This was the beginning of the age of the robber barons. Three legal devices thrived, namely;
1. Trusts;
2. Monopolies; and. . .
3. Corporations.

See Howard Zinn's book entitled A People's History of the United States, page 249. See also House of Morgan by Ron Chernow. See also The Robber Barons by Matthew Josephson.

1. The U.S. Government attempted to settle Illinois and the West by giving away land to homesteaders and railroads. Corporations run by robber barons sold watered down stock and bought up land from homesteaders and speculators.
2. Charles Francis Adams said the following in his essay entitled A Chapter of Erie:

"[Modern society had] created a class of artificial beings who bed fair soon to be the masters of their creator . . .establishing despotisms which no spasmodic popular effort will be able to shake off. . . corporations have no souls." - - Charles Francis Adams, A Chapter of Erie.

1. We in Illinois are blessed with individual human farmers as distinguished from the heartless corporate megafarms scooped up the robber barons in the San Joaquin Valley of California.
2. I was born a "planter" and I have come full circle. This year I personally planted 100 acres of corn and a magnificent garden. My 2 brothers planted the remaining 1900 acres.

Beginning of page 40 of the original handwritten petition #3433:

1. "In 17^th century Maryland, most lawyers were planters who spent part of their time on the practice." - Stanford Professor Lawrence Friedman, History of American Law, 2^nd edition, 1985, page 99, line 26.

1. The product of corporate farming in California is gang violence, poverty, crime, and urban blight.
2. The farms are owned by corporations like Dole, who under their previous name, utilized the CIA and its predecessors to commit imperialistic atrocities in Banana Republics.
3. California farming is like the patroonship system of the 1600s to 1839. The workers are held in quasi-slavery by faceless landholders who evolved into corporation in the age of the robber baron. See Chrisman's Tin Horns and Calico.
4. I've seen both systems. Independent, individual farms are better. Children grown up with self-esteem and a knowledge of the value of work and re-investment.
5. By comparison, the children of the farm workers in California often resent their station in life. What incentive is there in a future of quasi-slavery and poverty?
6. There are other factors, but agrarian reform continues to be needed in California. It's a difficult problem now.
7. At page 634 of Lawrence Friedman's History of American Law he writes:

"After 1870, there was another line of defense against the competition: the lawyers' unions (never called that by name) which fought vigorously to protect the boundaries of the calling. The organized profession raised (or tried to raise) its "standard"; tried to limit entry into the field; and (above all) tried to resist conversion of the profession into a "mere" business or trade. In fact, lawyers did not incorporate and corporate practice of law . . . for the time being, at least, the private lawyer kept his independent status as a middle class craftsman and entrepreneur." - History of American Law, page 634.

1. In the past 15 years I have observed the rise of the corporate ownership of law firms. Non-lawyers continue to be barred from ownership but corporate values have been permitted to quash independence.
2. Although the California bar does not mandate malpractice insurance, it now mandates disclosure of non-insurance.
3. Legal referral agencies may (by state bar rule) non refer cases to uninsured lawyers.
4. As of 1996, California drivers must not carry proof of insurance or face immediate impoundment of their car. Palaschak has challenged the validity of this statute in a federal class action lawsuit complaint #2557.
5. Although Illinois's climate (political and meteorological) favors independent farms (with the exception of the creeping influx of absentee-owned hog factories) the climate has been bad for independent lawyers even since Abraham Lincoln - and I am thinking that his practice was not that successful.

Beginning of page 41 of the original handwritten petition #3433:

1. Palaschak's alleged offences that caused the bar to unconstitutionally deny his current license could not have been committed by a corporation.
2. Indeed, Palaschak has learned the Diane Ye, the bar's in house general counsel (as I recall) is the antithesis of the independent sole practitioner. She is a weak human with strong herd instinct who worships power and wealth. Diane Yu and others like her at the bar have waged war against independent sole practitioners by, for example, creating an unconstitutional state bar court of paid prosecutors as faux judges to replace the former panels of fellow practitioners in judgment of their peers. Yu and her conspirators have created a multitude of new petty rules that are designed to harass non-conformist individual but more significantly these rules have very little pertaining to the social destruction cause by corporations and corporate laws.
3. Example: A corporation cannot get a speeding ticket. A corporation is generally capable of opting out of car insurance by posting a bond or by being self-insured by virtue of size.
4. Although judges are public employees as distinguished from Palaschak who is in the private sector, rules pertaining to judges are contained in just 3 pages in the 1994 California rules of court book. By comparison, rules pertaining to lawyers occupy 280 pages. That is 100 pages of lawyer rules for each page of judge rules.
5. As I saw in the case of Motorcycle Lawyer John Riley, Incl, when the humans working for a corporation get suspended, their income stream does not stop. John Riley, Inc., continued to pay John Riley, human. John Riley, Inc., shifts court appearances to other lawyers, in theory.
6. Palaschak in his practice before the state bar faux court has observed a multitude of sole practitioners facing petty charges. Example: Client X filed her probation report by email. Of court she could not send a signature by email. Therefore the bar punished her as though she had not filed a report!
7. The state bar and Ventura prosecutors attempt to portray Palaschak as a scofflaw. In fact, Palaschak continues to get caught up in new statues but his attempt to appeal traffic cases are portrayed by prosecutors as elitism or obstructionism. Traffic appeals are difficult because the system is designed to extract money. Justice Heiple on the Illinois Supreme Court explains the predatory nature of traffic court in his dissent to rule 526.
8. I have learned that the engineering concept of systems analysis can be applied to legal systems also. Indeed the concept of "the science of law" was discussed by Harvard Law School Dean Christopher Langdell circa 1870's

"[The common law] considered as a science, consists of certain principles or doctrines. Moreover, the number of fundamental legal doctrines is much less than commonly supposed." - page 613, History of American Law by Lawrence Friedman.

Beginning of page 42 of original handwritten petition. Sunday June __, 1999. 1 pm:

1. Palaschak has through the years written and collected these fundamental doctrines. One principle observed by Palaschak is: "Law follows emotion." Example: A judge makes a decision in a case ad then asks his clerks to make a logical argument - or his adopts the winning brief. Authority: The Brethren, by Woodward and Bernstein. The subconscious knows that answer . . . and that is what a conscience is all about. Logic is not what gives us the answer. Neural networks give us the anser. Logic simply fits the anser into the classification system that some call a belief system.
2. Constitutional law is the most fundamental and logical of the law school courses.
3. Palaschak, Professor Harrell, who taught constitutional law to Palaschak, and Professor Orthuber who taught constitutional law to Professor Harrell are all dual professionals. All three persons are both Engineers and Lawyers. Coincidence? I think not.
4. Fifteen years ago Palaschak read the essays of Engineer Schak from Hawaii. Schak's fundamental them was that traffic laws are designed to prevent car crashes - not to provide an income stream for municipal court. Engineers establish standards and design things. By comparison, predators obtain copyrights, patents, licenses, etc. Bill Gates, for example, is not an engineer. He is a college drop out. He is a predator. He is driven by greed. He is a business type.
5. Palaschak sees patters of failures in legal systems. Abuse by predatory parasitic corporations (including the California bar, traffic courts, the drug enforcement industry, and the military industrial complex) diminish our collective efficiency and threaten our freedom. Authority: The Power Elite.
6. Some very prosperous segments of society are parasitic - - most notably lawyers.
7. Evry basic industry becomes more efficient with the passing of time. Example: Oil prices generally decrease as time goes on. Corn prices decrease too. My Dad supported a family of six children farming 240 acres. My two brothers and I have no children. We enjoy a lower standard of living farming 2000 acres than did my Dad farming only 240 acres.
8. My point is that a farmer produces 2 to 8 times what he did 30 years ago. Other industries enjoy the same escalated efficiency - due, I think, to progress in engineering - and certainly not due to progress in the law, for there has been very little progress in the law.
9. Why do we continue to have a 40 hour work week? Here is why:
10. Some segments of society are not efficient. Lawyers, courts, and doctors and any other segment that enjoys a predatory or monopolistic advantage will not be efficient.
11. Reserved
12. Reserved
13. Reserved
14. Reserved
15. Reserved
16. Reserved
17. Reserved
18. Reserved
19. Reserved

Beginning of page 43 of original petition #3433:

1. Monopolistic or predatory industries can survive an increase in general efficiency because they have control over their prices.
2. By comparison, individual farmers, for example, must run faster and faster to stay in place.
3. The problem with America is not drugs; the problem is monopolies; the problem is insurance.
4. We are entering the age of leisure. Unemployment is the wave of the future.
5. The law is way behind. Human rights peaked out in 1971 with Bell v Burson (1971) 26 L Ed 90, 401 US 535 saying that a driver has a right to a fair hearing before license deprivation. The department of motor vehicles ignores Bell v Burson with impunity.
6. Only the Supreme Court of California may disbar. I have never appeared before them nor have I been notified of any petition before them in this regard.
7. I know now that works, I think. Years ago when I watched the California Supreme court, I watched a smug young woman appear before the California Supreme court and request the disbarment of several specific lawyers. Nobody appeared to speak for the lawyers who were about to be disbarred. I thought that rather queer. I wondered why somebody would not show up to defend himself. Now I see why. By the time that a human has endured years of bar suspension, he often suffers many changes of address. He must find new income. Sometimes he is homeless.
8. In my case my well-intentioned friends at Engine Place (then Engines R Us) kept my mail for month and then threw it away. . . including registered mail that they signed for me - mistakenly thinking (or not) that it was the right thing to do.

4:15 pm Sunday __ June 1999:

Summary of the past several pages:

1. Summary of the past several pages: I may or may not ever practice law again but as long as my brain, mouth, and hands work I shall continue to speak out for what is right.
2. It's a said day in American when 2 states conspire to haul a lawyer across country because he told the court that they could not lawfully imprison a poor person (in this case Melvin Looser) for inability to pay a $100 traffic fine. I wrote petition 2871 for Melvin Looser which told about William v Illinois (1970) 26 L Ed 2d 586, 399 US 235, 90 S Ct 2018 and other cases. In Williams v Illinois, this Illinois Supreme court gave no justice to petitioner Williams, but the U.S. Supreme Court said that equal protection forbids a scheme where only the poor are forced to go to jail.
3. I am weary of writing. I have written several petitions by hand in the dim light of this jail cell. I plan to mail this petition Monday morning 28 June, 1999, which will be my 46^th day in jail. I have more issues that what I have written here.

Ages of Man. Ages of the Supreme Court

1. When I began to study engineering, I used a slide rule. I used the main frame computer at the University of Illinois by submitting a deck of punched cards that controlled the computer. Using those punched cards I began building engineering models of steel things in order to design them and make sure that they would withstand their anticipated design loads. We have made good progress in engineering in the past 40 years - but the only progress in law has been the incidental technical increase in speed and efficiency due to progress in engineering - not progress in law! Miranda was decided in 196.

U am an optimist and a realist. I continue to search for an enlightened court - or to read about one.

Beginning of page 44 of original petition #3433 written in June 1999:

1. I would not like myself if I wasted my talent. I have learned that I am almost always right. I learned that judges have often been appointed for some reason other than that they were the best and brightest.
2. I am thankful to be able to earn a living driving a tractor over the hallowed ground where I once walked beans with my Grandfather. I would like to be and planter and a lawyer, as I mentioned at paragraph #358.
3. I have learned that wherever I go I will usually be the brightest and most courageously outspoken. To those who are instruments of oppression, outspoken people are a threat.
4. Anti-intellectuals dislike me.
5. I care very much about being misunderstood.
6. A enjoy the luxury of having time to write about the law and I have the cyberworld as my audience.
7. History is the court of last resort.
8. We had a guy in our law school who did not do a single day of college. He spent 17 years as an insurance investigator. He is a commissioner in traffic court now...so I know how judges are selected and I know what they are made of. They are instruments of oppression! J I am sorry to sound antagonistic but "petition" implies subordination which is antithetic to freedom.
9. Most lawyers are mere technicians hoping to eke out a living playing by the rigged rules. "He has sent hither swarms of Officers to harass our people, and eat out their substance" - Declaration of Independence.
10. Some of us are not afraid to say that the emperor wears no clothes.
11. My point: My mission is to shine the light on oppressive bureaucracies. Traffic court, the organized bar, insurance companies, and other predatory establishments are my enemy. My bar problems come from trying to get my day in court on a speeding ticket. I have spent time in mean jails where the court by virtue of the pressure of jail can usually make a deal. Then I had fat rent and employees to fee and monthly yellow pages cost. I could not afford to spend time in jail.

(This is the end of what Bernard xeroxed for me in 1999. Hmm. This ends abruptly. Maybe I have some more written somewhere. Aha! The jail changed their copy policy in retaliation for my helping other inmates. The jail refused to copy any more copies for me. They refused to copy pages 43-53 (the end), page #1 of the prayer, page #2 of the prayer, Exhibit M. I asked them to obtain a faxed copy from the Supreme Court of Illinois but the jail refused.)

Thursday, July 26, 2001.12:37 PM. Aha. Yesterday, 25 July 2001 I received pursuant to my request to the Illinois Supreme court, the missing pages! Here I now begin to transcribe them.

Beginning of Page 45 of the original handwritten Petition #3433 to the Illinois Supreme Court:

Monday 28 June 1999. 8:30 a.m.

Fugitive Lawyer Law. Chilling Effect. Clear and Present Danger. Seditious Libel. Facial Invalidity.

Overbreadth. Licensing of speech.

1. There was no paragraph 422.
2. There was no paragraph 423.
3. The work of Palaschak and every lawyer consists of reading, writing, listening, speaking, and most important: Thinking.
4. We create anthropomorphic computers. They also read, write, speak, listen, and think . . . and we'll soon have computers with sexually attractive bodies, but I digress.
5. My point is that in our quest to reproduce ourselves mechanically we have demonstrated our priorities: Free speech is even more important to us than sex! Otherwise we would have sexy droids by now.

Clear and Present Danger Test

1. The Clear and Present Danger Test was devised by Supreme Court Justices Oliver Wendell Holmes and Louis Brandeis during World War I. Eugene Debs⁽²⁾ should have been protected by the Clear and Present Danger Test. Eugene Debs was portrayed by Actor Warren Beatty in the Circa 1984 movie entitled "Reds". (Retrospective note: Whoops. The movie was about a labor leader named John ___, not Eugene Debs.) Debs opposed the draft. In Chicago on a Sunday in June 1918Debs said:

"You need to know you are fit for something better than slavery and cannon fodder . . . I have been accused of obstructing the war. I admit it. Gentlemen, I abhor war. I would oppose the war if I stood alone." - Debs, Eugene v U.S. (1919) 63 L Ed 566, 249 US 211, 39 S Ct 252. Application of the clear and present danger test.

Eugene McGovern said nearly the same ting to a group of us at the auditorium at the University of Illinois in 1972. Both Eugenes ran for President. Debs went to prison. McGovern did not.

1. The statute underlying Palaschak's alleged crime comes from the same emotion, to wit: We must control what people say when that speech threat4ens the established power and status quo. I say more about this at ¶477.
2. The California bar indeed screened for communists as late as 1983 and may indeed continue to this day to screen for communists.

Dred Scot Revisited. Fugitive Lawyer Law.

1. May a state refuse to extradite a person accused of a speech protected by the1st amendment? Isn't this similar to the Dred Scot issue? Dred Scot was John Marshall's bad decision in 1857.
2. The U.S. Supreme Court ruined the Missouri Compromise in 1857 by striking down a federal law, only the 2^nd time that it had struck down a federal law, the first time having been in the case of Marbury v Madison.
3. The bigger issue is logistics. Will this court halt extradition pending review?
4. I contend that this Illinois court can no doubt rule on the validity of a California statute. If, as here, the alleged crime comprises protected speech, then this court in so finding, would by logical extension be obligated to find that Palaschak, having committed no crime, is not describe in the extradition clause, and therefore is not subject to extradition.
5. Palaschak's speech was political speech . . . or was it commercial speech? As the billboard case showed, both are entitled to 1^st amendment protection.
6. But first, a more compelling moral issue: Was Palaschak being deceptive by virtue of Melvin's having asked to have Palaschak appointed? Was this advertising? If so, was it false advertising?
7. Had Palaschak been asked by the court to accept an appointment, Palaschak could have declined. Palaschak bar problems were obvious from the footnote on that same page (of petition #2871).
8. One author wrote that Bill Gates considers all the permutations. Let's try some permutations. What if Palaschak had accepted appointment conditionally. Two conditions would satisfy the bar:
1. Palaschak could work under the supervision of a bar licensee; or
2. Palaschak could ask the court to rule that Palaschak's license deprivation was unconstitutional and therefore invalid.
9. Palaschak's license deprival was indeed unconstitutional. This Illinois court could indeed rule so. It was based on traffic tickets and (as Palaschak recently discovered in jail) a 1^st offense eating of LSD which a reasonable lawyer would believe is legal in California. The court of appeal ruled that it was legal on 23 December 1993. The California Supreme Court the overturned the court of appeal, but the California Supreme Court did not know that it was missing the transcript of he most important day of my trial. This mistake is imputable to the Supreme Court due to their having negligently appointed lawyer Glenn Durfee916-757-1060 whose negligence rises to the standard enunciated in the two part test of Strickland v Washington⁽³⁾, to wit:
1. Failure to include the entire transcript is outside the range of acceptable practices; and
2. The client suffered adverse consequences as a result of the negligence.

Neither the bar nor the California Supreme court gave Palaschak Notice and opportunity to be heard, in violation of the Due Process Clause as enunciated in Ming, In Re⁽⁴⁾.

The California Bar's action was predicated on traffic tickets. This amounts to double jeopardy. It is actually triple jeopardy because Palaschak suffered a suspended license plus jail time for the tickets. The tickets were founded on an illegal deprivation of driver license in violation of Bell v Burson⁽⁵⁾.

Beginning of page 47 of original handwritten petition #3433 to Illinois Supreme Court:

1. What was the clear and present danger in Palaschak's alleged advertising? (Of course, there was no advertising, but that was the allegation.) The ostensible danger is that Palaschak would have written Melvin Looser's appeal, but that is neither dangerous, nor clear, nor present.
2. Having spent 1/ 4 century fighting the instrument of oppression called traffic court, Palaschak more than any other Ventura lawyer is qualified to write Melvin Looser's traffic appeal. There is no danger - except to the forces of oppression.
3. Palaschak could have declined or conditionally accepted, as see in ¶438. Therefore the danger is not clear.
4. The big picture is one of irony. Palaschak's complaint for years has been the incompetence of Ventura attorneys appointed to traffic cases.
5. The danger is not present because it is some steps away. Traffic appeal work for some years has been allocated to a certain attorney named ___ Hatfield who has a law office with her sister and her Dad.
6. I would not have accepted the offer, but that is hypothetical one might say.
7. So too is the offer hypothetical - and therefore the imagined harm is too remote to permit suppression of the speech, had there been any speech.

Summary of Allegations regarding the Underlying Crime

1. Summary: The allegation as implied from the exhibit of the prosecution is that Palaschak used the title "Attorney at Law" in a cover letter carrying a petition and notice of appeal or a pro se litigant, Melvin Looser. The petition states that Palaschak cannot be court counsel for the litigant because of Palaschak's bar problems.
2. The current litigation comes from the same oppressive emotional source as in 2 veins of cases, namely: #1 the licensing of speech 100 years prior to the 1^st amendment; and #2 the extradition of Dred Scott.
3. California permits unlicensed, non-graduate law students appear in criminal court for the state. California permits unlicensed, non-graduate law students to handle immigration cases. California permits unlicensed non-student non-lawyers handle immigration cases. California permits unlicensed non-graduate students to write orders and opinions for federal judges. California permits unlicensed non-graduate students to work as analysts at the court of appeal.

The California bar and the California attorney general extradition office both receive too much undeserved deference.

We must stop ignoring the plain meaning of the Extradition Clause.

1. The extradition clause is printed in its entirety at ¶271 and reads in its entirety as follows: extradition clause of the U.S. Constitution (Article IV, Clause 2):

"A person charged in any state with treason, felony, or other crime, who shall flee from justice, and be found in another state, shall, on demand of the executive authority of the state from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the state having jurisdiction of the crime." - Art. IV, clause 2: extradition clause - next to fugitive slave clause.

1. In jail here in Ottawa, Illinois, I do not have access to a law dictionary or any dictionary but the words in the extradition clause are not difficult words. "Fugitive", "flee", and "crime" are simple words. The only word that needs some interpretation is "crime" because that word has a different meaning now than it did in 1791 when this clause was enacted. The word "crime" has been diluted in meaning by prosecutors who lobby the legislature to pass stricter crime bill so that now there are many more felonies than there were in 1791. Today some felonies actually misdemeanors in 1791 terms.

Interpretation using 1781 language was used by the courts to interpret the 7^th amendment and

now similarly it should be used to interpret the word "crime" in the extradition clause.

1. First we need to allay the fear that truthful interpretation will prevent us from bringing fugitives to justice.
1. Most fugitives fall within the legitimate honest meaning of the clause.
2. When convenient the government kidnaps people in violation of the extradition clause, and the U.S. Supreme Court says that kidnapping both inside and outside the U.S. is okay for a serious crime. In Frisbie v Shirley Collins (1952) 96 L Ed. 541, 342 US 519, 72 S Ct 509 Michigan police drove to Chicago, whacked Shirley Collins on the head and drove Shirley back to Michigan. The U.S. Supreme court upheld the conviction.
2. If the U.S. Supreme Court permits local police to simply kidnap accused murderers, as they did in Frisbie v Collins then why do we even care about the extradition clause? Answer: Kidnapping has only been approved by the court in serious cases. The extradition clause is ready and waiting to use to weigh competing societal interests. Palaschak's case is the extraordinary case of a drug lawyer/ civil rights lawyer being harassed by prosecutors who would to otherwise attempt extradition but for their mistaken malice toward Palaschak. Palaschak's 1^st amendment rights and his penumbra of rights being preferred rights, Palaschak is entitled to have competing statutes (such as the state bar and extradition acts) weighed using strict scrutiny analysis. Palaschak is entitled to that weighing here and now - not in California. Justice delayed is justice denied. Strict scrutiny analysis mandates a presumption that the statute that abridges Palaschak's speech, press, petition, and association rights is invalid absent compelling state interest. There is no compelling state interest in prosecuting Palaschak for writing a petition.
3. The U.S. government continues to enforce its will by breaking the law - by kidnapping. At the 1000 update to volume 31A of Am Jur 2^nd at page 174 there are approximately 20 law review articles protesting the kidnapping to revenge the killing of drug agent Kiki Camarena who was in Mexico attempting to foist Republican drug policy on Mexico. The case is Alvarez-Machain (1992) 112 US 2188. The 2^nd well know kidnapping is that of Manuel Noriega. His case is discussed in either Am Jur or in the annotations to 18 USCS 3182.

Handwritten on Monday 28 June 1999. 5 pm at the jail in Ottawa, Illinois.

Ross v Berhhard: Precedent to Defining Transient Meanings

1. The 7^th amendment says: "In suits at common law . . . the right of trial by jury shall be preserved."
2. Ross v Bernhard (1970) 3965 US 531 hold that "common law" has a special meaning, namely" It means what "common law" meant in 1791. Between 1791 and 1970 (in 1938) the courts of equity and the courts of common law were combined.
3. Similarly due to oppressive "law and order" legislation promoted by government-employed demagogues attempting to generate more revenue for their police state, some misdemeanors have become felonies, to wit: 1^st offense of California B&P code §6126(b) - but only for defendants who have previously been members of the California bar. B&P §6126(b) is a bill of attainder, a bill of pains and penalties - and therefore unconstitutional. See Blackstone's Commentaries on the Law of England, 1765-69, volume 4, now available in paperback at Barnes and Noble. Punishment for being a former member of an organization is unconstitutional being violative of the Equal Protection Clause. Authority: Schware v Board of Bar Examiners 353 US 232. Schware held that the bar cannot discriminate on the basis of former association with the Communist Party (which is not an association as much as a deeply held belief which is entitled to the same protection as any belief religious or not). By logical extension, the legislature may not constitutionally discriminate on the basis of past membership in the bar.

1. This just in: At 5:15 pm on Monday 28 June 1999 I was finally handed a copy of the text of 18 USC 1073 which is the statute that I was accused of violating in the search warrant which was the basis for my arrest on 14 May 1999 and my detention at this jail in Illinois. I have appended this copy of to this petition 3433 as Exhibit M.

Aha! Exhibit M proves that Eley knowingly made a false arrest. Intent is an Element of 18 USC . I could have had no intent. The (false) accusation of advertising was not made until long after I left California.

(Added 8 August 2001:Please note that 18 USC 1073 for which Palaschak was arrested at his farm on May 14, 1999 by FBI agent Eley pertains to serious crimes punishable by death - or which is a felony. Use of this section to arrest a person committing the non-crime of writing a petition is abuse of power and abuse of discretion.)

(Added 8 August 2001: Also, Palaschak had not been properly served with a notice to appear and therefore section 3 is applicable requiring" formal approval in writing by the Attorney General, the Deputy Attorney General, the Associate Attorney General, or an Assistant Attorney General of the United States, which function of approving prosecutions may not be delegated." There was no prosecution anticipated in this case. I wonder how FBI Agent Eley was so convinced of that? He made no attempt to take me to a federal magistrate as commanded in the arrest warrant.)

I did not flee to avoid prosecution! 18 USC §1073 is unambiguous in its mandate of intent! Likewise 18 USC 3182 is unambiguous; the ambiguity comes from years of judicial fraud in permitting suppression of the plain meaning of the words at the behest of the police state. Absence of intent to flee precludes violation of 18 USC §1073. Intent is an element of the crime! To wit:

"Whoever moves. . . in interstate . . . commerce with intent . . . to avoid prosecution [under state law][for having committed a felony] . . ."

1. The public defender's failure to even be present at my arraignment and to present my self-exculpatory documents has caused irreparable harm . . . again.
2. The federal warrant on its face states that the underlying crime was committed on 10 may 1997 - 2 years ago. I was last in California in August 1997. The California warrant on which extradition is predicated also lists the date of the offense as 10 May 1997. See Exhibit A-1 attached hereto. (Retrospective note added upon transcription on Wednesday 8 August 2001: Attorney Judy Fogel told me once that the Ventura D.A. convicted a suspended lawyer who merely filed a proof of service. 10 May is the date that I signed the proof of service. Apparently they tried the same trick again. The California jury did not buy it this time. My experts explained that anybody over age 18 can sign a proof of service; no permission from the bar is required. That, of course, is a matter of California law. I did not have California statutes with me in jail in Illinois. To further complicate matters, Prosecutor Eric Bond argued that I called myself "Attorney at Law" on the cover letter carrying the petition #2871 to court - and apparently he considered that "advertising" despite my having explained in an entire page of text in petition #2871 that I was not currently licensed by the California bar. I remain an attorney regardless of licensure status.) The complaint was (apparently) filed on the basis of an affidavit signed 23 January 1998 - 5 months after Palaschak departed California to farm in Illinois while his licensure problem resolved. The California county warrant from Ventura county first issued 21 April 1998 - nearly a year after the alleged crime. My point is this: I am entitled as a matter of law under Gerstein v Pugh⁽⁶⁾ (1975) to be given a chance to show that as a matter of law that extradition is not authorized here.
3. What is the remedy now? Every wrong has a remedy. Deny extradition! That is the remedy! Balancing of equities is in my favor. I have already suffered 45 days of false imprisonment. In California the speedy trial law would have given me a trial in 45 days.

1. Newly invented class of quasi-crimes: Infractions. Palaschak was battling crime escalation when the alleged crime was committed. Melvin Looser had been accused of an infraction. California invented the infraction in 1969 or 1972 by amendment to California Penal Code §17 to define a new type of less-than-a-misdemeanor that is not even a crime. California invented the infraction to deny the Melvin Loosers their right to counsel as enunciated in Argersinger V Hamlin⁽⁷⁾(1972) and Douglas v California⁽⁸⁾(1963) and their ancestors and progeny such as Gideon v Wainwright ⁽⁹⁾(963). The infraction carries a punishment of fine only - no jail time. The right to counsel is predicated on possible jail time.
2. By appearing to remove the possibility of jail time, California attempts to avoid the expense of providing a public defender for trials on infractions.
3. In Melvin Looser's case the court threatened jail unless Melvin looser paid the $104 fine that he was unable to pay. Palaschak is accuse of having helped Melvin Looser by writing brief #2871 and by having served the notice of appeal signed by Melvin Looser in pro per arguing that Williams v Illinois ⁽¹⁰⁾(1970) forbids jail in his case as violative of the Equal Protection Clause being invidious discrimination on the basis of wealth.

Subject: Shameful Judicial Distortion of the Plain Meaning of the Extradition Clause

1. My point is that criminal penalties escalate at the behest of the police state. It has escalated so much that we have invented a new name for what was formerly misdemeanors. Therefore the word "crime" as used in the 1791 extradition clause has not the same meaning as the word "crime" today.

Beginning of page 50 of the original handwritten petition 3433:

1. Am I to be admitting something when I say that I have found no decisions supporting the plain meaning rule regarding the extradition, or am I to be announcing something? Am I not raising the hue and cry? Hark, something is amuck in our law! The police state oppresseth us. Let us arise and cast aside these shackles. Let's speak the truth! Let's enjoy the freedom that our forefathers gave to us!
2. The extradition clause is sloppily drafted. We can speculate, but its proximity in purpose and location to the fugitive slave law give it bad karma. Pragmatism demands that one ignore the plain meaning; otherwise we lose slaves and we lose criminals. Some serious crimes would theoretically be unprosecuteable by virtue of the criminal having fled before discovery of the crime . . . but can't flight be presumed from the nature of the crime? Well then there is not good reason to avoid the plain meaning. Well, see the cases. There are many variations.
3. I have long observe that Am Jur and other treatises are collections of cases and, being so, tend to be primarily older cases in areas of disuse such as extradition. Am Jur and other treatises, especially those by the paradigm predatory systemic parasitic monopolist West Publishing tend o favor the state and other cousin corporate ficta at the expense of those short lived problematic humans. Comes it as a surprise then that Volume 31A of Am Jur at §23 says:

"For purposes of extradition, a fugitive from justice has been broadly defined as one who commits a crime within a state and then withdraws from its jurisdiction" Authority: Hyatt v People (1903) 188 U.S. 691, 47 L Ed 657, 23 S Ct. 456. However, Hyatt also says that a Warrant issued under an invalid state statute is void and unenforceable. Contemplation of the constitution.

1. Group action is controlled by group emotion which is made up of individual emotions. The actions of the prosecutor in this case (and in previous failed attempt to convect me of a felony) and the action of the bar come from the same emotion as the following events:
1. Licensing of printing presses in England and the colonies 300 years ago.
2. The prosecution of Peter Zenger for sedition. See, for example, the account in The First Freedom by Nat Hentoff, 1980, Namar Productions, page 64. There are better accounts in many books.
3. The imprisonment of Ben Franklin's brother for not having a printing license.
4. The Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798 which were upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court.
5. The imprisonment of Eugene Debs⁽¹¹⁾ for correctly advising young men to avoid being cannon fodder in World War I, a useless war.
6. The sentencing in Chicago of Attorney William Kunstler to 4 years in prison for his successful defense of the Chicago 7 in 1968. Kunstler's sentence was overturned on appeal.
7. The Supreme court's approval of the return of Dred Scot.
8. The seizure of McSurely's papers in Kentucky in 1867 for organizing mine workers. See ¶ ___ herein.
9. McCarthyism - where Ronald Reagan betrayed his fellow actors after making lying propaganda movies for the government.

Apropos to the necessity of a "bar ticket" to permit me to counsel Melvin Looser, John Milton said in 1644 in Areopagitica - a Speech for the Liberty of Unlicensed Printing, 1644:

1. Palaschak requests that this Illinois Supreme Court order Sheriff Templeton to Immediately release Palaschak pending resolution of the issues presented both in this court and in federal court.
2. Palaschak asks this court to temporarily enjoin the governor from extraditing Palaschak pending resolution of the issues in the following courts and tribunals:
1. This Illinois Supreme Court;
2. The U.S. District Court in Chicago;
3. The California Court of Appeal in Ventura;
4. The U.S. Court of Appeal for the 7^th Circuit;
5. The 9^th Circuit court of appeal;
6. The U.S. District Court in Los Angeles;
7. The state court in Ventura, California;
8. The state bar court;
9. The California Supreme Court;
10. The Illinois Governor's office including the attorney general;
11. The California Governor's office including the attorney general.
3. Palaschak asks the court to order this local circuit court for the 13^th circuit here in Ottawa, Illinois to:
1. Conduct a probable cause hearing as required by the Illinois extradition act and cases and constitutions as I have set forth in this petition #3433 herein.
2. Provide me with effective assistance of counsel.
3. Conduct a bail hearing using the information that I provided the local court upon my arrival and which I have appended as exhibit L (formerly labeled Motion #3396 in Ottawa case 99-mr79).
4. Devise a procedure for extradition cases. What you have now does not work.
4. Palaschak requests declaratory relief to effectuate the constitutional rights asserted herein, including a declaration that;
1. The words "flee" and "fugitive" in the extradition clause of the U.S. constitution have a plain meaning and exclude Palaschak as a matter of law by virtue of the complaint and warrant dates being facially nearly 6 months and 11 months respectively, later than the date of the crime and months after Palaschak's departure from California.
2. The meaning of "flee" and "fugitive" given in Hyatt v People 188 US 691 is obsolete and legal fiction.
3. Palaschak's papers shown in the exhibits are the basis for the extradition request and are exculpatory as a matter of law due to the 1^st and 6^th amendments. Therefore no crime has been demonstrated and Palaschak may not be extradited.
4. The arrest of Palaschak on 14 May 1999 by FBI agent Eley was false and pretextual.
5. The arrest of Palaschak on 8 June 1999 by Deputy Karen was without probable cause or warrant and was unjustified and a violation of Palaschak's liberty.
6. Palaschak's arrest by the FBI was a false arrest by virtue of the missing element of intent required by 18 USC 1073 the crime for which Palaschak was arrested. As a matter of law the absence of intent was proven as a matter of law by the prosecutions own papers and Palaschak petition herein. Specifically, the complaint and warrant were filed after Palaschak left California and therefore Palaschak could not possibly have fled to avoid prosecution and was not a fugitive. He must therefore be freed.
7. By their reckless disregard for the truth and the law, the following parties conspired to violate Palaschak's civil rights: Sheriff Templeton (nobody else was served).
8. Gerstein v Pugh and the due process clause require a preliminary examination prior to detention in Palaschak's situation where Palaschak's home is here and he is known in the county where Palaschak is a township planning commissioner and where the alleged crime is de minimis and where Palaschak is immune from prosecution by the 1^st amendment.
9. The clear and present danger test as a matter of law exculpates Palaschak and therefore precludes extradition were it not already precluded.
10. Strict scrutiny analysis pertains. The underlying statute, California B&P 6126 (b) being an abridgment of speech fails constitutional muster and may not serve as a basis for extradition because to extradite for exercising a 1^st amendment right is to enforce a law that abridges a privilege or immunity of a citizen - and that is forbidden by the 14^th amendment
11. Palaschak should have been released or recommitted after 30 days even if there had been a warrant of commitment. Palaschak was entitled to a hearing. Remedy: immediate discharge with prejudice.
12. Palaschak was never arraigned with counsel. Remedy: immediate discharge.
13. Bail of $250,000.00 is excessive. Remedy: Reduce bail to O.R.
14. Palaschak was denied effective assistance of counsel.
15. The Illinois extradition act is unconstitutional in that it permits 30 to 90 days detention pending extradition in violation of the 4^th amendment.

Douglas Palaschak 28 June 1999