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3435illi
Lawyerdude’s 1999 Section 1983 complaint in chicago federal court.
This page is http://www.lawyerdude.8m.com/3435illi.html
Related pages:
Related pages:
My brief that I wrote originally in longhand awaiting trial: http://www.lawyerdude.8m.com/3789.html
Table of Authorities written while awaiting trial in jail: http://www.lawyerdude.8m.com/3789authorities.html
My brief that I wrote while awaiting trial: http://www.lawyerdude.8m.com/3789.pdf
My federal lawsuit arising from this false accusation: http://lawyerdude.8m.com/4055v3.html
Bridges case: is www.lawyerdude.netfirms.com/bridges.html
Yagman case: http://www.circuitlawyer.8m.com/yagman.html
Kunstler case: Here is where the Federal court of appeal absolved Attorney Kunstler and reversed the lower court opinion http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/Chicago7/InReDellinger.htm
Here is where Judge Hoffman sentenced Hoffman: http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/Chicago7/kunstler.html
The background story: In 1993 they raided my office. This is the "Raid at the Good Nite Inn" story at this link: http://www.circuitlawyer.8m.com/5460.html
and this link: http://www.circuitlawyer.8m.com/5453.html
They did NOT file a criminal complaint. They did file in the newspaper an accusation of 7 felonies - practicing law without a license. And the paper did not report it that the prosecution never did file a complaint. Now fast forward 6 years to May 14, 1999. They raided my farm in Illinois and put me in jail. the FBI agent Eley told me that it was for practicing law without a license - but he was wrong. Thus started my personal extradition case, a case where the extradition should have been refused but the lawyers and judges involved were all weak idiots. I suffered an extradition. After being extradited I faced a jury trial and won. It was a week long trial and the jury took less than 2 hours for all 12 of them to vote me NOT GUILTY.
The sole charge from the beginning was advertising - California Business and Professions code section 6126 - although they told my Mom that it was “some kinda fraud” - and my Mom disinherited me 2 months before my trial and 2 months after the raid at my farm house. The charge was 6126 which is stated verbatim here: http://www.lawyerdude.netfirms.com/6125.html
Here are the links to that story: http://www.lawyerdude.netfirms.com/5918.html which is this page. http://www.lawyerdude.netfirms.com/4055v31pt1.html is the California federal section 1983 case.
http://www.lawyerdude.8m.com/3435illi.html is the Illinois section 1983 case.
http://www.lawyerdude.8m.com/3433.html is my petition to Illinois Supreme court http://www.lawyerdude.8m.com/3789history.html is the background.
I have NEVER been convicted of a criminal bar related offense - such as practicing law without a license. My disbarment story is here: http://www.circuitlawyer.8m.com/5453.html
General navigational links:
Lawyerdude’s most important page. His top 10 lists: http://www.lawyerdude.8m.com/5459.html
Back to www.lawyerdude.8m.com Or my mirror site: www.lawyerdude.netfirms.com
Telephone Lawyerdude: 805 652 0334
Back to Lawyerdude's discussion group: www.groups.yahoo.com/group/lawyerdude
Email lawyerdude: dlawyerdude@hotmail.com
Back to lawyerdude's briefs: www.circuitlawyer.8m.com
Back to Lawyerdude's Contemporary Constitutional Issues:
http://www.circuitlawyer.8m.com/5693.html
The Steve 762 program to fight traffic tickets: http://www.circuitlawyer.8m.com/5695.html
Lawyerdude's links page: www.lawyerdude.8m.com/links.html
Attorney Douglas Palaschak Filed estimated 23 June 1999 by mail.
In Jail at 707 Etna Road
Ottawa IL 61350
(As of May 2001: Address: Box 23465 Ventura CA 93002)
Website: http://us.geocities.com/dlawyerdude/index.html
This is a computerized version of the original complaint which was 28 handwritten pages. I began to transcribe this into the computer on 18 May 2001. Original paragraph numbering has been preserved although I have made some editorial changes for clarification.
United States District Court
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division
Attorney Douglas Palaschak
v
1. Sheriff Tom Templeton
2. FBI Agent Eley
3. LaSalle County
4. Deputy Karen
5. Tom Connors of Ventura
6. David Day
7. Judge Ryan of Circuit Court
8. Ventura District Attorney ,
Defendants
Case #99 cv4148
Complain #3435
Complaint pursuant to 42 USC §1983 et seq for monetary damages, injunctive relief, declaratory relief.
Complaint for defamation.
Jury is hereby demanded.
Request for Appointment of Counsel.
Request to Interpret Extradition Clause.
See also: Palaschak's analyses especially omnibus brief #3789: The Free Speech Rights of Lawyers. http://www.lawyerdude.8m.com/3789.html A list of briefs and motions appears in that brief and in Palaschak's letter index.
Jurisdiction
1. This court has jurisdiction under 42 USC §1983,(See Bivens v Six Unknown Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics (1971) 29 L Ed 2d, 403 US 388, 91 S Ct 1999), and the U.S. constitution which is, after all, self-enabling. Defamation jurisdiction is pendant jurisdiction.
2. Plaintiff Palaschak is a U.S. citizen and a resident of this judicial district.
3. Plaintiff was born in this judicial district and has farmed her for the past 2 years.
4. Plaintiff is a 4th generation farmer. He farmed with his grandfather 40 years ago and farms on the same farm now. He family has farmed this farm for 66 years.
5. Defendants are all residents of this judicial district except for Connors and the Ventura district attorney.
1st Cause of Action: False arrest, malicious prosecution (prologue)
6. Plaintiff is a zealous courageous advocate of the oppressed. As a result of his zealous prosecution of bureaucratic instruments of oppression he has incurred the wrath of powerful bureaucracies, namely The state bar of California, Ventura traffic court, and the Ventura district attorney.
7. In year prior to the arrest warrant by Ventura Judge Klopfer, Palaschak sued Judge Klopfer for a civil rights violation.
8. Palaschak has battled with the state bar. He represented his fellow California sole practitioners in this new (1990) unconstitutional pseudo-court. Palaschak sued the state bar court in federal court for violation of the civil rights of is client lawyers.
9. Just as the late William Kunstler suffered the imposition of a 4 year prison sentence by Judge Julius __for his zealous advocacy in the case of the Chicago 7, so Palaschak also suffers baseless attacks. (Kunstler's sentence was overturned on appeal.)
10. In 1993 the Ventura district attorney's investigators raided Palaschak's office using a very general warrant that can only be described as a writ of assistance.
11. Then, as now, they accused Palaschak of practicing law without a license.
12. Ventura district attorney delivered a press release to the Los Angeles time which then reported in a large headline that I was in jail accuse of 7 felonies. In fact the district attorney was mistaken. Palaschak was indeed licensed. No criminal complaint was ever filed. Palaschak was released after 6 days in jail. The district attorney kept Palaschak's computer, money client files, files, and other property for one year. They read 3 years of Palaschak's diaries.
13. In 1996 Palaschak became overwhelmed by attacks by the aforementioned bureaucracies.
14. In 1996 Palaschak returned to his first love, farming.
15. In 1997 Palaschak moved into a farm house in Illinois.
16. He has lived there since August 1997 leaving the state only twice to attended family functions in Wisconsin.
17. He has not been in California since August 1997.
18. Palaschak's parents cannot understand why Palaschak suffers imprisonment in jail. [Retrospective note: Palaschak’s Mom disinherited him 2 months after he went to jail on this and 2 months before he was found NOT GUILTY. She died 2 years later at which time Palaschak discovered the he had been disinherited. Ventura county’s employee had told her that Palaschak was accused of “some kind of fraud.” In fact it was not fraud but 6126 - advertising as explained at this link: http://www.lawyerdude.netfirms.com/6125.html
19. The violation of Palaschak's diaries was similar to the violation of the McSurelys as told by Caroline Kennedy in "in our Defense" Avon books, 1991. See also McSurely v McClellan 753 F 2d 88 (D.C. Cir 1985).
20. The McSurelys required 14 years to resolve their violation.
21. Palaschak has not listed all of the outrageous abuses by the bar and the Ventura prosecutor and bench.
1st Cause of Action: The Arrest
22. On 14 May 1999 Brothers Jerry and Douglas Palaschak returned to their farm to find 3 Crown Victoria Sedans in their driveway.
23. Having been alerted by telephone of FBI inquiries, and having received discovery in the Ventura case in 1998, Douglas Palaschak was not surprised.
24. Douglas Palaschak walked int his house and found 5 men wearing suits and guns.
25. FBI Agent Eley amicably arrested Palaschak for "interstate flight to avoid prosecution for practicing law without a license." (Added 18 May 2001 in retrospect: Palaschak was not accused of practicing law without a license; he was accused rather of advertising to be entitled to practice law at a time when his license was suspended.)
26. FBI agent Eley told Jerry Palaschak: "Your brother is unique. I've never arrested anybody for practicing law without a license before."
27. Weeks later Palaschak obtained a copy of the warrant.
28. Although Illinois statute provides a monetary penalty for violation of a statutory demand for a copy of the prisoner's warrant of arrest, this jail has 4 times denied my request. To their credit they eventually complied once on each of two warrants.
29. Illinois statute 735 ILCS §10-105 provides a monetary award to be paid to a prisoner who suffers a denial of a request for a copy of a warrant of process for more than 6 hours.
30. Reserved
31. Reserved
32. Reserved
33. The warrant purported to be written 7 May 1999 at Santa Barbara, California and signed by a U.S. magistrate McElwyn.
34. As I recall McElwyn is apart time magistrate whose office was newly created. 14.In the bail line there is not amount listed - just the word "detention".
35. The underlying crime is one single act of writing "attorney at law" on my letterhead on a cover letter delivering a pro per notice of appeal to Ventura court . . while not licensed in state court.
36. The warrant merely states that the crime is 18 USC §1073.
37. Despite 34 days of request to public defender Dan Bute and chief jailer Sgt. Preci, I have yet to see a copy of §1073. (Continuing update: 9:30 pm 16 June. Written request #3436 to Deputy Kneppert. Denied. This is my 5th denial of a request for my federal warrant. 10:30 a.m. 17 June. Written request #3436 to Deputy Kneppert. This is my 6th request for a copy of my federal warrant.)
38. Nonetheless, FBI agent Eley told me that the FBI only gets involved if the underlying crime is a felony.
39. California Business and Professions code §6126 was modified circa 1996 to make it violative of the equal protection clause and thereby unconstitutional. 20.§6126 prescribes a misdemeanor punishment for 1st time offenders except for former bar members; their penalty is felony punishment.
40. FBI agent Eley refused to permit me to read his I.D. card.
41. FBI agent Eley said "These federal cases usually go away". He said that the FBI provides a locator service for local police.
42. The federal warrant directed that I be taken before a federal magistrate forthwith. It has been 35 days and I have not been taken before a federal magistrate. (Added 18 May 2001: My research reading Am Jur regarding extradition shows that extradition law is much like criminal law was 100 years ago. In other words, extradition law is 100 years behind the times.)
43. Reserved
44. Reserved
45. Reserved
46. On the basis of all that transpired I conclude that FBI agent Eley had no intention of executing the arrest warrant. At first I thought that I would wait at La Salle county jail to be arraigned in Chicago.
47. FBI agent Eley is not authorized under Illinois statute (725 ILCS §225/14) to arrest. 725 ILCS §5/107-4 defines "peace officer." FBI agent Eley is not a peace officer. FBI agent Eley is not a "law enforcement agency" as defined in 725 ILCS §5/107-4. Therefore the FBI could not lawfully arrest Palaschak under the Illinois uniform extradition act which is 725 ILCS §224/14 which limits arrest to peace officers and private persons. FBI agent Eley is not a private person for this purpose and the FBI had no probable cause regarding the underlying crime which probable cause is a prerequisite to arrest and continued detention.
48. When I attempted to explain that the 1st amendment protects speech and press and may not be abridged, FBI agent Eley raised his hand and said "I don't want to hear about the underlying crime."
49. FBI agent Eley and Palaschak chatted amicably at the LaSalle county jail immediately after arrest. FBI agent Eley wanted to collect information about the underlying crime. Palaschak declined. Palaschak wanted to discuss what would happen. FBI agent Eley seemed reluctant to discuss his role - as though the arrest completed his task. He assured Palaschak that "the federal case is usually dismissed."
50. Inescapable conclusion: FBI agent Eley made a pretextual arrest! He knew that there was no federal case and he knew that nobody could arrest for extradition without probable cause which requires evidentiary facts and circumstances to sustain arraignment. See 725 ILCS §225/13 and 31A Am Jur 20.
51. Conclusion: 1st cause of action: false pretextual arrest by FBI agent Eley in violation of U.S. constitution. See Bivens v Six Unknown Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics (1971) 29 L Ed 2d, 403 US 388, 91 S Ct 1999.
2nd cause of action - false imprisonment
52. Sheriff Tom Templeton of LaSalle county has held Palaschak for 35 days (as of 17 June 1999) under false pretenses.
53. Illinois state's attorney David Day presented a perjured complaint at a pseudo-arraignment on May 17. It was pathetically transparent.
54. Judge Lanuti declined to issue a warrant based on Day's perjury.
55. Plaintiff hereby incorporates all paragraphs of all cause of action in every other cause of action. (Why do we always say that?)
56. Having filed approximately 8 (as of 17 June 10 a.m.) requests to examine a copy of my arrest warrant pursuant to 75 ILCS §5/10-1-5 Palaschak has received only 2 warrants, namely: the aforementioned federal warrant alleging violation of 18 USC 1073; and the Ventura county warrant copied in Exhibit A. An out of state warrant only gains validity if supported by facts from credible (i.e. personally knowledgeable) sources.
57. Conclusion: Defendant Sheriff Tom Templeton and LaSalle imprison Palaschak without due process in violation of the constitution.
58. Palaschak is entitle to monetary, declaratory, and injunctive relief authorized by 42 USC §1983 and the constitution which is, after all, self-enabling as we learned in See Bivens v Six Unknown Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics (1971) 29 L Ed 2d, 403 US 388, 91 S Ct 1999. 8.Reserved 9.Reserved
3rd Cause of Action: Defamation
59. Tom Connors of the Ventura D.A.'s office told my public defender that I was once city attorney of Ventura and thrown out of office for sexual harassment.
60. LaSalle county deputies repeated the same falsehood to my wonderful neighbor Jean Swanson whose land is farmed by me and my brothers.
61. I have suffered obloquy and loss of credibility as a result of this defamation.
62. In face I have never been city attorney of Ventura or any city.
63. I have always practiced law as a sole practitioner.
64. I am entitled to monetary relief.
65. I have never been thrown out of office.
66. Reserved.
4th Cause of Action: 2nd False Arrest
67. On June 8, 1999 at 8:15 pm Deputy Schroeder called me out of my cell and told me that "Ventura recalled the warrant." He freed me. I telephone home and waited for a ride.
68. At approximately 9m on June 8 Deputy Karen asked me to come back to jail. She then locked me up. "We are waiting for a governor's warrant from California" said Karen.
69. Reserved
70. Reserved
42 USC §1983. 4th Cause of Action
71. In fact an Illinois governor's warrant has not yet been issued to my knowledge. I have asked in writing as provided by Illinois law.
72. In fact Deputy Karen was not authorized to arrest under the federal warrant.
73. In fact had defendant Deputy Karen arrested Palaschak without a warrant she would be obligated to so some paperwork to send Palaschak on the way to arraignment.
74. In fact in all the time Palaschak has been here (written 17 June at 1:25 pm) Palaschak has never been arraigned with counsel and has not waived counsel.
75. Chief jailer Preci told Palaschak on June 9 that "We have spent all day trying to figure this thing out." Preci said that the sheriff department had the state's attorney on the telephone during my June 89 half hour of freedom.
76. Reserved
77. Reserved
78. The action of Deputy Karen constituted a warrantless, baseless arrest in violation of the U.S. constitution.
79. The arrest was under color of law. 1
80. Palaschak is entitled of redress under 42 USC §1983 et seq. 1
81. Reserved.
5th cause of action: violation of Privileges and Immunities Clause.
82. The right to travel in interstate commerce is a privilege and immunity of U.S. citizenship. See Edwards v California __U.S.___ 2.Plaintiff is a U.S. citizen.
83. The extradition clause of the U.S. constitution says:
"A person charged in any state with treason, felony, or other crime, who shall flee from justice, and be found in another state, shall on demand of the executive authority of the state from which he fled, be delivered up. To be removed to the state having jurisdiction of the crime." - Extradition Clause (Next to the Fugitive slave clause)
84. Palaschak is not within the group described in the extradition clause.
The Fugitive Lawyer Clause
85. Ironically practicing law without a license is only a felony if you are a lawyer. Because extradition generally only happens for felonies, the combination of the state bar act and the extradition clause combine to create a fugitive lawyer clause. The due process clause and bill of rights supersede the extradition clause - and they supersede the fugitive lawyer clause.
Plain Meaning of the Extradition Clause
86. Despite a plethora of hard cases (regarding hard crimes) to the contrary, when Palaschak left California in August 1997 not yet having been charged with a crime he could not possibly have been fleeing because fleeing implies something from which one is fleeing and there was nothing from which to flee because writing a petition is not a crime.
87. The history of constitutional law reveals that many gravely wrong interpretations were pronounced by the U.S. Supreme Court (and other courts) primarily to protect the moneyed interests who put them in power and to permit police to control the citizenry who, in the case of the Dred Scotdecision were deemed property of the moneyed class.
88. Anybody with a grasp of English can understand the elements prescribed by the extradition clause:
a. Element #1: Flight. (You can't flee if there is nothing from which to flee.)
b. Element #2: Pending charge at the time of flight.
c. Element #3: "Crime" as defined in 1789 - which does not include practicing law without a license.
89. Palaschak’s situation fails to meet any element.
90. Palaschak has read Am Jur on extradition (including the latest update) and the annotations to 18 USC §3182 (the federal extradition statute). Not one case therein pertains to practice of law without a license.
91. Issues of law requiring resolution by this court:
92. Issue: Does the plain meaning rule (subject to 1789 meaning) apply to the extradition clause? Answer: Yes.
93. Issue: May Illinois use the extradition clause to enforce a statute that discriminates against a class of people (lawyers) thereby invidiously violating the equal protection clause? Answer: no.
94. California Business and Professions code §6126 is newly amended (1996?). It prescribes felony punishment for 1st offense for ex bar members but misdemeanor punishment for non lawyer 1stoffenders.
95. This issue seems to be one of first impression.
96. Issue: Must a court (and/or governor) use a balancing test to evaluate competing societal goals and competing constitutional rights of the state viz a viz the individual? Answer: Yes, but it is more complicated than a simple yes.
97. Issue: Does "practice of law" include the act allegedly committed by Palaschak, namely : writing "attorney-at-law" on his letterhead while performing a non-monopolized function, a secretarial function (namely: filing a petition for a pro per litigant)? Answer: no. (May 2001 note in retrospect: In fact, Palaschak was accused not of practicing law without a license (as announced by the arresting officer) but "advertising or holding oneself out to be entitled to practice law when one is not so entitled” - which is B&P section 6126 http://www.lawyerdude.netfirms.com/6125.html )
98. Plaintiff is an expert in the history and constitutionality of bar licensing - and driver licensing - and predatory bureaucracies.
99. The purported withdrawal of Palaschak's California state bar license is invalid suffering a multitude of infirmities including but not limited to:
a. A. Traffic tickets are the primary basis for the deprivation of the bar license thereby presenting the issue of the absence of the requisite nexus.
b. B. Palaschak is innocent of the underlying traffic tickets - or at least most of them. They are for driving on a licence invalidly suspended without the due process enunciated in Bell v Burson (1971) 402 U.S. 535. http://www.circuitlawyer.8m.com/Burson.html (Note added May 2001 in retrospect: There is a growing Patriot movement whose dominant theme is that the government may not license our fundamental rights. Regular folks are not blind to stealthy encroachment of government and are righteously angry about government intrusion. As an example they proffer Stork167 Cal 294, the 1914 case wherein the court draws the distinction between a chauffeur and a mere operator saying that a chauffeur needs a license but a mere operator does not.)
c. C. The action by the California bar is retaliation for Palaschak's having been counsel for another lawyer who sued the bar in federal court.
d. D. Palaschak was ordered excluded from his own bar hearing by an angry imitation judge as Palaschak attempted to plug in his notebook computer upon late arrival at court. E. Only he supreme court of California can revoke a bar license.
100. Reserved
101. Reserved
102. Issue: Does the phrase "treason, felony, or other crimes: include "practicing law without a license"? (May 2001 Comment in retrospect: The actual accusal was for "advertising" which is certainly not of the magnitude of treason or felony and in fact is protected speech which may not be abridged even by the state bar act. In Bates v Arizona http://www.lawyerdude.8m.com/5428.html (1977) 53 L Ed 2d 810, the U.S. Supreme court finally recognized that lawyer advertising is protected by the first amendment but they nonetheless in another case permitted my hero Attorney Melvin Belli to be suspended for his having endorsed his favorite liquor on television. This is established law and therefore various defendants may not argue qualified immunity.)
103. A reading of History of American Law by Stanford Professor Lawrence Friedman shows that there was no such crime in 1789.
104. Indeed the monopoly of the organized bar is a product of the age of monopolies and robber barons. Proper and police were favored over labor and individual freedom.
105. Lawyers were on the forefront of monopolistic abuse long before J. Pierpont Morgan created the railroad trusts before Morgan packed the Interstate Commerce Commission establishing the paradigm corrupt regulatory agency. 7.Lawyer are the lightning rods that draw rage during storms of polity.
106. In 1731 the New York City Charter gave a monopoly to 7 named attorney to handle all the practice in New York. Source: History of American Law, 1984, Professor Lawrence Friedman.
107. "Technical difficulty is the sole social excuse for the lawyers' monopoly" - Stanford Professor Lawrence Friedman in History of American Law, 2nd edition, 1984, page 24. 1
108. Between 1855 and 1870 several state gave the "diploma privilege" to graduates of law schools. Source: History of American Law, 2nd edition, 1984, page 620. (May 2001Retrospective note: At my trial I learned from my expert witness that Virginia and perhaps some other states continue to grant the right to practice law without further examination to graduates of their own state schools.
109. The ABA and American Association of law schools were formed for monopolistic purposes.
110. Residency requirements were held unconstitutional in New Hampshire v Piper (1985) 84 L Ed 2d 205.
111. The bar exam evolved.
112. The multistate bar exam now constitutes 2 half days of the bar exam in most of not all states. It is identical in every state. 15.The trend is clear:
a. A. The laws of the 50 states are becoming more uniform.
b. B. Test are more uniform.
c. C. Monopolistic barriers to multistate practice continue to fall. Example: The residency requirement fell.
d. D. Non-comity in the form of failure of some states to mutually remove barriers to bar licensing remain. They are fueled by the organized state bar protecting its turf. E. The federal bar does no testing. Only states test. F. ABA and AALS (American Association of Law Schools) continue to dominate some state bars. With California in the lead by virtue of having established its own school licensing outside the ABA, these monopolies are losing power. G. "The practice of law" consists of a number of tasks. An increasing percentage of these tasks are being performed by paralegals, title companies, and other specialists. 1.The California bar, the proponent of §6126, the unconstitutional amendment of 6126, and a plethora of bad (unconstitutional) law was well aware that the spectrum of activities in the grey area overlaps what might arguably constitute holding oneself out as an attorney - but the California bar chose not to deal with this overlap which could lead to just the sort of confusion that resulted in Palaschak's having been arrested. (May 2001 retrospective note: It was not until I got to California that I had access to the new rule 1-311 which lists a multitude of tasks that can be performed by any ninny at the direction of a lawyer. This list includes writing briefs and petitions - like the petition that I wrote for Melvin Looser, but we are quibbling over how many angels can dance on the head of a pin because free speech is free for everybody - not just those persons supervised by a licensed lawyer.) 2.As a result of the bar's negligence which is imputable to the legislature who rubber-stamped the bar's ludicrous unconstitutional proposals, section 6126 is void for vagueness. 3.The legitimate purview of the bar monopoly is easily seen by examination of its historical antecedent: it is a judicial function. Each court determines who steps in front of the rail - subject to the provision that the supreme court exercises control over the inferior courts and delegates testing to an agency of the bar. 4.Paralegals and unlicensed attorneys often write the court pleadings - but the person whose name is at the top left corner must be licensed in that court - or pro se (speaking for himself (orally)) as was Melvin Looser. (May 2001 retrospective note: My case should have been dismissed at arraignment in Ottawa on my 3rd day of incarceration for lack of evidence. The smoking gun did not arrive for weeks. I could not prove my innocence because I could not obtain a copy of that petition 2871, the smoking gun - but in all criminal prosecutions, the burden is on the prosecution - not the defense. Petition #2871 which I wrote for Melvin Looser shows Melvin's name at the top left corner. A jury of 12 plus 2 alternates unanimously understood this simple concept - and Judge Chris Ryan should have upheld the constitution and taken time to give me due process which is required by the constitution that he swore to uphold. Also, there is a separate function of oratory which is distinct from the function of decision making. Melvin should be able to have anybody speak for him orally. It is obvious now that anybody may write his pleading for him.) 5.Calling oneself an attorney on a letterhead absent more is not within the proscription of "holding oneself out to be at attorney" because that statute (section 6126) is facially invalid. 6.In fact the statue mus be interpreted to mean "holding oneself out to be licensed" - but even that is a little murky as the following example demonstrates. 7.When famous attorney Jerry Spence writes a letter to a California court does he delete the words "Attorney at law" from his letterhead? (This example presumes that Jerry Spence is not licensed in California state courts.) 8.An attorney licensed nowhere is nonetheless an attorney. 9.Jurisdictions overlap geographically. One may be licensed in the federal courts serving Ventura while unlicensed in the state court - or vice versa. 10.Federal bar membership may not be withdrawn summarily. Authority: In Re Ming (1972, CA7 as I recall.) 11.California invented the infraction in 1969 or 1972 to diminish the right to counsel recognized in the line of right-to-counsel cases including Gideon v Wainwright (1963) 372 U.S. 335; and Argersinger v Hamlin (1972) 407 U.S. 25, 32 L Ed 2d 530, 92 S Ct 2006. In California many traffic offenses are infractions which by definition are punishable by fine only - no jail. California refuses to provide counsel for indigents accused of an infraction - and they get away with it because of the wording of Gideon and Gideon's progeny. 12.Palaschak's alleged underlying crime pertains to an infraction case in Ventura court. Melvin Looser was ordered to pay a fine of $100. The court refused to appoint counsel for Melvin Looser who is a disabled veteran on welfare who had then suffered a recent abdominal surgery and a foot surgery. 13.The court told Melvin Looser that he would have to serve time in jail if he could not pay. 14.Palaschak visited Melvin looser one evening and heard his story. Palaschak told Melvin that the court could not lawfully imprison Melvin for inability to pay this fine. 15.Palaschak woke up from his sleep that night and dug though his constitutional law book and found the case of Williams v Illinois (1970) 399 U.S. 235, 26 L Ed 2d 586 and some companion cases. 16.The next day Palaschak wrote down the case citations and give them to Melvin. 17.The Palaschak thought about his oath to do his best and his statutory duty to:"Never to reject, for any consideration personal to himself or herself, the cause of the defenseless or the oppressed" - California business and professions code §6068-h). 1.Palaschak at the time was honoring a bar license deprivation even though it was unconstitutional. 2.Palaschak being an expert in the limitation of the bar's monopoly concluded that as long as Melvin was in pro per and put his own name at the top left corner and signed his own name, Palaschak could write a brief for him. 3.The court may not both refuse to provide counsel to a criminal defendant and at the same time prevent others from helping him. They cannot prevent Palaschak from helping Melvin Looser. 4.Without compromising my 5th amendment rights I will say that a superb brief was written petitioning the municipal court for redress of grievances and reminding the court that imprisonment would be unlawful. 5.The petition contained a half page foot note explaining that Palaschak wrote the petition but could not represent Melvin due to Palaschak's own constitutional infringement at the hands of that very traffic court which infringes parlayed into a bar suspension albeit an unconstitutional one. 6.Reserved. 7.Melvin's name appeared in the top left corner and Melvin signed the brief which evolved int a notice of appeal with the appeal brief already written and contained therein. 8.Prior to appeal stage, Palaschak sat in the audience and watched the travesty of justice as commission Covarru8bius brow beat Melvin and ignored the message of the brief. Covarrubius address Palaschak who was the sole person in the audience. Palaschak said that he could not represent Melvin. 9.Poor Melvin Looked like a puppy dog in trouble. He kept looking back at Palaschak pleading with his eyes for Palaschak to walk up past the railing and speak for him. 10.Melvin is not a lawyer and cannot argue legal points. Melvin writes at about an 8th grade level. 11.The Ventura Prosecutor bases his felony complaint on the cover letter. It contain the words "attorney at law" and was addressed to the court. 12.In California a disinterested part must sign the proof of service. It is ludicrous and a real problem in jail or anywhere where people don't want to get involved but it is not an attorney function. 13.Palaschak has filed numerous complaint as private attorney general That concept alone should protect his alleged assistance of Melvin Looser. 14."Congress [and the states, by amendment 14] shall make no law. . .abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press,. . .[or] to petition the government for a redress of grievances" - 1st amendment to the U.S. Constitution. 1."In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy. . .the assistance of counsel for his defense" - 6th amendment to the U.S. Constitution. 1.The Magna Charta forbids taking a person to a distant place for trial. (Sorry that I can't quote the exact clause by I have asked for a copy of the magna charta and my request has been denied by jailers here in LaSalle county.) 2."Specific guarantees in the bill of rights have penumbras formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and substance." - Justice douglas in Griswold v Connecticut (1965) 14 L Ed 2d 510, 381 U.S. 479, 85 S Ct. 1678. 1.Until Palaschak's current discipline he had never before faced bar discipline. He was admitted to the California bar in 1984. He has handled cases in Indiana, Ohio, Louisiana, Florida, Nevada, and, or course, California. Palaschak's brilliance and competence have never been questioned. 2.Palaschak has appeared on Hard Copy, Inside Edition, and The Love Connection. Summary of the 5th Cause of Action 1.There are a multitude of independent reasons why Palaschak deserves the protection of this court against extradition. A. The plaint meaning of "a person charged in any state. . . who shall flee" is perfectly clear. It is time to quite the legal fiction. Palaschak was not charged until nearly a year after he left California. B. Palaschak's crime is not within the meaning of the word as it was defined in 1789. The bar monopoly came later and is on its way out. C. Palaschak's act in using the title "attorney at law" is not different than that of any licensed profession a in a jurisdiction where he is not licensed. D. Palaschak's license will eventually be retroactively reinstated if there is justice. E. The statute defining the underlying crime is newly amended and unconstitutional. 1. It is void for vagueness. 2. It discriminates against the formerly licensed. F. Palaschak's "crime" is protected in a penumbra of: 1. Free speech; 2. Free press; 3. Right to petition; 4. Right to travel; 5. Magna Charta ban on dragging defendant to a trial in a distant forum; 6. Double jeopardy (already served time for traffic tickets for which the bar is now punishing him. 7. 6th amendment right to counsel; (Jus tertii permits Palaschak's 3rd party standing.) 8. Monopolies must be limited lest they cause the very harm before us. 1.The attempted extradition is an attempt by state officials acting under color of state law to violate Palaschak's constitutional rights. 2.Palaschak is entitled to the full panoply of rights under §1983. 3.The 14th amendment and the bill of rights supersedes the fugitive slave clause and the fugitive lawyer clause (the extradition clause) being latter in time and more specific. 42 USC §1983 conflicts with 18 USC §3182 (the extradition act) but the constitutional clauses resolve the conflict. The Illinois Extradition act must yield to the Bill of Rights. 4.The 9th amendment by its language incorporates the Magna Charta into the bill of rights. 5.Reserved 6.Reserved 7.Reserved 6th Cause of Action: Excessive of Bail 1.LaSalle county state's attorney David Day defamed me by stating in writing under penalty of perjury that I am a transient. 2.If fact I was born in LaSalle county. I was valedictorian. I was an honors student t the university of Illinois. I had a wonderful career as a registered professional engineer having designed machinery for Exxon and the U.S. Nave. I practiced law living in Ventura. I have been farming for 1.9 years and have lived at the same farm house for 1.9 years. I and my family have farmed the same farm for the past 66 years. 3.My public defender failed to appear at my arraignment. 4.I wrote an 11 page bail affidavit and sent it to my public defender. He ignored it. 5.As you can see from my Exhibit, my California bail is $5,000. It should be O.R. (Own recognizance) but the Ventura district attorney deceived the court. The court thinks that I wilfully failed to appear. The Ventura Judge is my enemy, a named defendant in a 1993 (approximately) civil rights suit. 6.My bail here in Illinois is $250,000 plus $5000 plus $5000. It should be O.R. I should have a bail hearing. 7.This excessive bail which is $ ¼ million for writing 2 words - attorney at law) violates the 8thamendment.Change of subject: 1.Incidentally the word "crime" in 1789 meant what "felony" means today due to stealthy escalation in the penalty for new crimes. "Felony" in 1789 meant one of the 7 dangerous felonies, namely: rape, murder, arson, mayhem, robbery, burglary and manslaughter. That is why the FBI agent Eley said that the crime must be a felony before he gets involved. Despite the constitutional authorization to extradite for "other crimes". The word "crime" in 1789 is somewhat equivalent to our word "felony" today due to escalation in penalties by government agencies intent on controlling the behavior of citizens. See page 1 of Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England, 176501769 Volume 4: Crimes. The 1789 phrase "crimes and misdemeanors" proves that misdemeanors, being non-crimes, were outside the purview of the extradition clause in 1789 and now - although case law today mistakenly holds otherwise.Written Friday 18 June 1999: 1.This is not the first or 2nd time that the Ventura district attorney has treated Palaschak more severely than regular folks. In 1991 Palaschak ate one dose of LSD that he received in a birthday card from his secretary. In illegal search followed. Being under the influence of LSD is not a crime in California. Police illegally seized more LSD from the secretary's purse and then pleas bargained with her to obtain her testimony that Palaschak held the LSD in his hand before he at it. On that basis they charged Palaschak with 3 felonies. They dismissed them when a grand jury indicted on 2 felonies. And a misdemeanor. A jury acquitted on the felonies. A court of appeal overturned the sole misdemeanor conviction - but then the California Supreme Court reversed the court of appeal and reaffirmed the misdemeanor conviction. See People v Palaschak (May 1995) 9 C4th 1236, 40 Cal Rptr 2d 722, 893 P2d 717. Generally police give immunity to the end user to obtain a conviction of the distributor in Palaschak's case they did not ask his secretary where she got the LSD in exchange for immunity. Instead they asked her if Palaschak held it in his hand - but I digress. Back to the 8th amendment. 1.Palaschak I entitle of redress under §1983 and the constitution. 2.The denial of counsel at arraignment , the denial of reasonable bail, the denial of a prompt bail hearing, are all under color of law and state action. 3.The "detention"provision on the Santa Barbara federal warrant is unconstitutional (at least for my non-crime) and may and should be declared so by this court. 4.Reserved. 5.ReservedFarming regarding the Accompanying Request #3454 for TRO and OSC 1.The California bar has disabled Palaschak from earning a livelihood in California - and not they seek to prevent him from earning a livelihood in Illinois. 2.For 4 generation Palaschak's family have been farmers. 3.We have farmed the current home farm for 66 years - and other farms before that. 4.Plaintiff's brother Greg Palaschak now operates the family farm. 5.Palaschak brothers Douglas, Jerry, and Greg farm approximately 2000 acres. 6.Last year Douglas received only $10,000 gross income from farming and spent nearly half of that money on farm supplies and legal research materials. 7.Douglas is need most at harvest which lasts from September 1 to November 24th generally, later in a wet year. If Douglas misses harvest this year (21999) then Greg will have little justification for paying Douglas money to last over the winter. 8.Douglas has a substantial garden now being tended by his brother Jerry who departs on 25 June 1999 to return at harvest. Palaschak's garden include sweet corn which Palaschak sell during July and August. 9.In summary, Palaschak income comes in July through November. 10.Douglas is also need at planting, but not as urgently as at harvest. 11.Reserved 12.Reserved 13.ReservedWritten June 19, 1999. 8:30 a.m.:8th cause of action: Denial of Hearing to Test sufficiency of Allegations 1.Palaschak having been arrested without an Illinois governor's warrant and prior to the issuance of a California requisition, is entitled to at least the process described in 725 ILCS §225/ 13 which requires: A. The oath of a "credible person"; B. A complaint alleging facts warranting extradition including: "a certified copy of the sworn charge or complaint [from California] and affidavit upon which the warrant is issued [which] shall be attached to the warrant." 1.Although adequate material was available from California, that paper would have demonstrated the triviality o Palaschak's alleged crime and the insufficiency of the factual basis.Paperwork was Available to Test Sufficiency of Warrant - but withheld 1.The following paperwork was available in California (having been obtained by Palaschak's then attorney, Charter Claiborne Hughes of Santa Barbara, from the Ventura district attorney in approximately August (an estimate without benefit of my diary) 1998 - nearly a year ago at which time Palaschak concluded that this information would not sustain extradition: 2.A. The approximately 13 page brief #2871 explaining Melvin Looser's case and why Ventura could not lawfully order Melvin Looser to serve jail time for inability to pay a $100 fine - as describe herein at paragraphs #130 to #153 - because Williams v Illinois (1970) 399 U.S. 235, 90 S Ct. 2018, 26 L Ed 2d 586 forbids it. 3.B. The cover letter containing the title "attorney at law" which is the sole basis for the alleged felony complaint. The letter exculpates Palaschak. 4.C. The police report demonstrating that commissioner Covarrubius who talk to Palaschak in the audience (while reading the predecessor to brief #2871) obviously did not see any violation of law. The police report names another member of the Ventura bench, Palaschak's enemy, who took it upon himself to initiate prosecution. Palaschak forgets his name now but speculates that he sat on the appellate panel for Melvin Looser's case. This police report exculpates Palaschak in that it demonstrates the triviality of this alleged "felony." A judge did not even notice it. Whoops. The notice of appeal came later. 5.D. The complaint in Ventura state court. 6.E. The arrest warrant issued by Palaschak's enemy, Judge Klopfer whom Palaschak sued in approximately 1993, and who previously signed a malicious warrant against Palaschak in 1992. Klopfer signed a warrant reneged on a plea bargain and sent Palaschak to jail before the end of his 1992 trial for eating LSD. 7.This warrant show a bail of $5000 - which is relevant to Palaschak's contention that his $250,000 Illinois bail is excessive. 8.F. The statement falsely implying that Palaschak wilfully failed to appear at a court hearing thereby demonstrating that Palaschak's California bail should have been O.R. He was not given notice to appeal prior to issuance of Klopfer's warrant. 9.Klopfer should not have issued the warrant. 10.The ulterior motive: A felony stigma will jeopardize Palaschak's planned exoneration and retroactive (nunc pro tunc) reinstatement of California bar licensure. 11.203 Reserved 12.Although Palaschak appeared for arraignment 17 May 1999, after being arrested Friday 14 may 1999, the arraignment was a sham and pretext for the following reasons: 13.A. I was without counsel despite having requested and qualified for appointed counsel; 14.B. The complaint was patently perjured in that prosecutor David Day who signed the complaint that very day obviously had no personal knowledge of the facts - (and hear I speculate) having never seen the documentation described in paragraphs 194 through 200; 15.C. The only true purpose of the appearance was for Palaschak to contest extradition (or not); 16.D. Bail was handled in a manner denying Palaschak's rights in that: i.The only obvious basis for the high bail was the very fact of having been arrested by the FBI - and the word "detention" on the federal warrant in the space marked "bail;' ii.The 44 factor pertaining to bail (as listed in 725 ILCS §5/110-5) were not discussed; iii.FBI arrest and the words "detention" are not in the 44 factors; iv.Judge Lanuti said "Somebody in California wants you bad" thereby completing discounting Palaschak's statement that the California bail was only $5000 in state court; v.The FBI warrant was never shown to Palaschak at the hearing! Palaschak only saw it after a week or so when Palaschak learned how to use the Illinois statutory demand for the warrant of commitment; vi.Later (on June 8) Deputy Karen said to Palaschak : " Our procedure on "detention" warrants is to set bail"; vii.Illinois Prosecutor Dave Day's perjured complaint called Palaschak a "transient" thereby triggering a high bail, but in fact Palaschak was born in LaSalle county, graduated from the University of Illinois, and has for the past 1.9 years farmed and lived on a farm in Streator; viii.Palaschak was denied the right to call witnesses on his behalf; ix.Palaschak was not told what 18 USC §1073 is. Section 1073 is the crime for which Palaschak was arrested. One purpose of arraignment is to tell the accused what he is accused of. If you tell him a code number but refuse to give him the book to look up the number, than you have denied him an adequate arraignment because you have not told him what he is accused of. 17.Reserved 18.Reserved 19.Reserved 20.Reserved 21.Reserved 22.Reserved 23.Reserved 24.Reserved 25.To his credit Lanuti did not issue a warrant of commitment (apparently - based on my having a warrant from Lanuti in response to my statutory demand to see the warrants of commitment). This means that the only basis for detention remained the federal warrant alleging (falsely) violation of 18 USC §1073 which is flight to avoid prosecution for which I should have promptly been arraigned in federal court as directed on the face of the federal warrant from Santa Barbara. 26.Therefore Palaschak should have been taken before a federal magistrate or released. 27.Palaschak subsequently wrote a 12 page bail motion #3396 and "mailed" it to the public defender who copied it and did nothing more with it. (Query: Did he even file it with the court?) 28.Reserved. 29.Palaschak thereafter went to court twice. 30.One court appearance was before a different judge, Judge Chris Ryan. There Palaschak met (for the first time) public defender Dan Bute who said that he was "too busy." There was an immediate continuance. 31.On the 3rd and final Illinois court appearance so far, public defender But again sought a continuance despite having received nearly 80 pages of briefs and pleadings from Palaschak. 32.Palaschak on 8 June 1999 wrote and served motion #3420 set for Monday 14 June 1999. He served it on all parties and counsel and the court. 33.Palaschak's LaSalle County case number is 99-MR-79. 34.Motion #3420 is a Faretta motion pursuant to Faretta v California (1975 422 US 806, 95 S Ct 2525, 45 L Ed 2d 562. It is a habeas corpus petition, a demand for effective assistance of counsel, a motion to be released on my own recognizance, and a demand for release after the 30th day pursuant to 725 ILCS §225/15 (which is an issue previously handled by another court which held that there is no such right). 35.June 14, 199, came and went without Palaschak ever having been called to court. 36.Palaschak believes now on the basis of chief Jailer Preci's word, that public defender Dan Bute has been on vacation. 37.But did not inform Palaschak that he was planning to vacation, nor do any of his staff communicate with Palaschak in Bute's absence (or ever). Extradition procedure in Palaschak's situation 1.Palaschak was not arrested on an Illinois Governor's warrant, nor on a California "requisition" (as the term defined in 725 ILCS §225/ 3 requires a supporting affidavit from California which only Palaschak has seen - by virtue of discovery one year ago). See paragraph #242 of this complaint. Therefore the procedure is, by process of elimination, the procedure of 725 ILCS §225/ 13, 14, and 15, namely: "arrest prior to requisition", "arrest without a warrant," and "commitment to bail to await requisition" (although, as I stated in paragraph 49 herein, the FBI arrest was not authorized by Illinois extradition law). 1.Statute 725 ILCS §225/ 15 permits commitment (subject to fail) "not exceeding 30 days". Palaschak has been imprisoned for 37 days as of 19 June 1999. 2.We inescapably return to the possibility that Palaschak's detention is somehow justified by 18 USC §1073 - the statue cited in the federal warrant that FBI agent Eley used as the basis for his arrest, the warrant from Santa Barbara on 7 May 1999. 3.More realistically the procedure used by LaSalle county is the lazy man's process - and it was wrong. 4.The FBI admitted so much through it agent Eley by repeating that "the federal case is usually dismissed." 5.Chief jailer Preci admitted so much when he admitted that "We've spent all day [9 June] trying to figure this out". What he was trying to figure out was which warrant then committed Palaschak who had demanded to see his warrant of commitment pursuant to his statutory right enunciated in Illinois statute 735 ILCS §10-105 (which provides a monetary award to be paid to a prisoner who suffers a denial of a request for a copy of a warrant of process for more than 6 hours).
6.Both Deputy Karen and Chief Jailer Preci told me that they were on the phone a long time on the evening of June 8 when they released me and then arrested me a 2nd time - this time without benefit of arraignment.
7.Supporting evidence: Prosecutor Day shouted at me in anger on 17 May 1999 in court outside the presence of the Judge (and without benefit of counsel). I now see that he was frustrated and likely angry at himself at being "found out" when I accused him of perjury afer he handed me the perjurious badly written machine generated pretextual complaint which was silently ignored by Judge Lanuti as describe elsewhere herein - but I digress. Back to. . .
8.Prosecutor Day's 17 May complaint did not meet the standards of ILCS §225/ 13. It lacked the supporting documentation prescribed in this statute.
9.Bad unconstitutional Illinois discovery procedure seems to permit prosecutors to withhold exculpatory evidence until the 60th day after arrest. Perhaps, accustomed to that slack standard, Prosecutor Day withheld the federal warrant.
10.After 30 days, ILCS §225/17 (Illinois Extradition Act) permits optional additional commitment for up to 60 more days - but a hearing seems to be mandated.
11.I contend that if an additional 60 days(or any time) is ordered, then a warrant of commitment must be issued by the judge (and because Lanuti failed to issue any warrant of commitment - and no other judge in Illinois did, then I should have been released).
12.Authority regarding the affidavit discussed in paragraph 230 above:
"Affidavit called for was one stating facts of affiant's own knowledge which would warrant finding of probable cause; and affidavit and complaint had to be read together." - Rafferty ex.rel. Huie Fong v Bligh (1832 CA1 Mass) 55 F2d 189 cited in Bancroft Whitney's annotated 18 USC §3182, note 55, page 117.
1.Incidentally, my brother brought me a few paperback law books from home. My law library is in storage. The jail rules forbid hard covered book. The jail would not provide a word processor nor permit me to use my own word processor. We have no access to any law library or typewriter. That is unconstitutional - but why would anybody need a law library since we are each presumed to know the law - and if we are presumed to know the law, then why do we need to take the bar exam? (Sarcasm is a legitimate form of argumentation.)