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5067
This page is http://www.lawyerdude.8m.com/5067.html
The formatted version of this brief is www.lawyerdude.8m.com/5067.pdf
The brief is also found in the files at my Yahoo group: www.groups.yahoo.com/group/lawyerdud/files
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I did a second successful demurrer a year later. See my demurrer page.
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Lawyerdude’s Successful demurrer #5067 to Unconstitutional Overbroad statute which purports to forbid you to sleep in a car on private and public property day or night.
The formatted version of this brief is www.lawyerdude.8m.com/5067.pdf
Memorandum of Authorities supporting Demurrer to Unconstitutional Vagrancy Statute:
Procedural Status
On 16 August 2001 I waited for this case to be called. It was called last called. The court had nocopy of the motion in its file. I filed on time on August 2 and served the district attorney on the same day. The district attorney had no comment in court although they appeared previously and have not substituted out - which is why I served them. The case is captioned "People v Palaschak". The DA represents the people.
There is no complaint on file.
Complete Text of the Offending Statute
The defendant was ticketed by Ventura Police for violating Ventura City Ordinance 10.150.070
which reads as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person to park a motor vehicle or a transportable living facility on any street, highway, or public or private property for purposes of living or residing or sleeping therein, except as otherwise permitted by law. "Living" or "residing" as used herein shall include use of a facility as living or sleeping quarters for a single day or night. This section shall not apply to registered guests, campers or residents at mobile home or recreational vehicle parks validly existing pursuant to city zoning requirements. In addition, sleeping in a parked vehicle for a limited time, not exceeding four hours, under bona fide conditions of emergency, or in the interest of public safety, shall not constitute a violation of this section. - Ventura City Ordinance Emphasis has been added by Palaschak to illustrate the over-reaching aspect of this statute.
A comparison to PC 647 f (drunk in public) demonstrates that a valid statute addressing
problems of presence in public can be written.
This is a minor point.
Enforcement here chills my right to sleep and travel. Where a statute on its face forbids activities
that are clearly protected by the constitution, such as sleeping on private property in a car (or a
waterbed or a lunar landing module) and enforcement of that statute would tend to chill and impede
enjoyment of fundamental rights such as the right to speak, to sleep, to pursue happiness, to awake
refreshed, and to be left alone, then that statute fails in its entirety. The right to sleep is like the right
to breathe; it is essential to life which is indeed specifically enumerated in the constitution.
Overbreadth is not limited to speech!
Overbreadth is not new nor limited to free speech.
1Shuttlesworth v Birmingham (1965) http://www.lawyerdude.8m.com/5089.html (There are 4 Supreme Court cases with this same name.
Shuttlesworth was a busy dissident - like Palaschak.) 15 L Ed 2d 176, 382 US 878, 86 S Ct 211.
Unfettered discretion results in a regime in which the poor and the unpopular are permitted to "stand on
a public sidewalk . . . only at the whim of any police officer."
2State v Penley (1973) 276 So 2d 180 struck down St. Petersburg public sleeping ordinance.
3People (Santa Barbara) v Davenport (1985) 176 Cal App 3d Supp 10 Not binding precedent.
Poor decision.
2
Shuttlesworth v Birmingham 1 demonstrates that overbreadth is not limited to speech. Prior to
Shuttlesworth, overbreadth was the basis for the decisions in Howard v Illinois Central Railroad (1908) 207
US 463 and also perhaps Gibbons v Ogden 9 Wheat 1 2 196, 6 L Ed 23 @ 70.Shuttlesworth was accused
of failing to disperse from the sidewalk. The statute permitted unfettered discretion. Ventura's statute
pertains to anybody who parks on any private property (or public) to sleep in his car at any time of day or
night.
A statute as broad as Ventura's have never been upheld and has always been overturned.
The florida statute in State v Penley 2(1973) is closest in similarity to Ventura's overbroad statute.
It was overturned.
Ventura's statute is broader than Santa Barbara's or San Francisco's
San Francisco upheld its own statute in Vehicular Residents v Agnos (1990) 222 Cal App 3rd 996
but it did not pertain to:
1. Cars;
2. Parking on private property;
3. Daytime parking.
By comparison, Ventura's statute pertains to parking at all times (day or night) on all private property
in all cars.
Similarly the statute upheld in Santa Barbara in People v Davenport 3(1985) did not pertain to
1. Cars;nor
2. Parking on private property; nor
3. Daytime parking.
Ventura's overbroad statute is broader than the one upheld in Santa Barbara which was limited to
certain public areas and only at night time and did not pertain to cars. The Santa Barbara case is not binding
precedent. It was simply a Superior Court decision reported in the supplement to the appellate reports.
Demurrer is the proper vehicle
A demurrer was the vehicle used in Howard v Illinois Central Railroad to deal with overbreadth.
Footnote 4 Douglas v California (1963) 9 L Ed 2d 811, 372 US 353, 83 S Ct 814 says that equal
protection demands that an indigent be provided counsel on appeal.
5Gideon v Wainwright (1963) 372 U.S. 335. Henry Fonda portrayed Gideon in the movie
Gideon's Trumpet. Defendants are entitled to appointed counsel even in non-capital cases. The court
extended this right even further in Argersinger. They are founded on Equal Protection.
6Williams v Illinois (1970) 26 L Ed 2d 586, 399 US 235, 90 S Ct 2018. Indigent cannot be
ordered to "work off" a fine if the imprisonment will extend the imprisonment beyond the maximum
sentence. This was the key case in Palaschak's brief #2871 for Melvin Looser, the smoking gun on
which his extradition was based.
3
This statute constitutes invidious wealth based discrimination. Williams v Illinois
Ordinance 10.150.070 is designed to chase away 21st Century Okies from landing in
Ventura. The U.S. Supreme Court in Douglas v California4 , Gideon v Wainwright 5, and Williams v
Illinois 6 has ruled against statutes that deny equal protection regardless of wealth. The equal protection
clause is an important part of U.S. law. The California constitution also mandates equal protection under
the law. Palaschak discussed the concept in his brief #2871 which was the smoking gun upon which his
unconstitutional extradition was based. Palaschak was acquitted and is now litigating in federal court against
Ventura County and others who conspired to violate Palaschak's right to petition. See brief #2871 and the
story of Palaschak's illegal extradition at http://lawyerdude.50megs.com . See Palaschak's brief #3789
entitled Free Speech for Lawyers at the same website.
It violates the commerce clause and the 14th amendment. Edwards v California.
Ventura's law writers desire that wealthy people come to Ventura (and leave their money with the
probation department) but they don't want poor folks - Okies. Okies are discussed in Edwards v California
(1941) 86 L Ed 119, 314 US 160, 62 S Ct 164. In Edwards, California's law forbidding the importation of
an indigent was ruled unconstitutional on the basis of the commerce clause - and more. In Edwards, Justice
Douglas quoted Former Chief Justice Fuller in Williams v. Fears, 179 U.S. 270, 274 , 21 S.Ct. 128, 129,
stated:
Undoubtedly the right of locomotion, the right to remove from one place to
another according to inclination, is an attribute of personal liberty, and the
right, ordinarily, of free transit from or through the territory of any state is a
right secured by the 14th Amendment and by other provisions of the
Constitution. - Chief Justice Fuller in Williams v Fears
This situation is all the more ironic considering that Douglas Palaschak was plucked from his corn
and soybean farm in Illinois by FBI agents duped by the Ventura District Attorney's Investigator Kitzmann
who failed to reveal that he possessed a tape that proved that his main witness, Deputy Vido was lying when
he said that Palaschak practiced law and spoke in court for Melvin Looser. Palaschak is here without money
because he lost his farm home in Illinois due to the dishonesty of the very prosecutor's office who
prosecutes him now (unless they have recused themselves).
It was the lies of former Ventura Police officer David Matz which convinced sleeping just McNally
to deny Palaschak's suppression motion. Palaschak will attempt to reopen that case on the basis of Matz's
having been caught shoplifting.
I have a right to locomotion, to privacy, and a right to sleep. I need not give up one for the other.
Therefore I have a right to sleep in my car on private property without being rousted by the police
until I find a home - especially where the district attorney brought me here and kept me here until I lost my
home in Illinois.
The ordinance is deceptively written to give the appearance of equal protection. In fact sleeping
in a car is a proxy for the status of being poor. Similarly California in about 1963 created the bogus
crime of "being under the influence" H&S 11550 to use as a proxy for "being an addict" which was
declared a status and therefore note punishable.
You are punishing me for my status of being poor and using the proxy of sleeping in my car. You
don't care if the rich sleep in their cars in their driveway but you make the law overbroad to give the illusion
of equal protection. The rich would be sleeping in your overpriced motels.
Ventura's statute speaks in terms of "living" or "residing" (which it does not define - but rather
delimits) but forbids also the essential human act of sleeping.
Sleeping is a necessary function. If you don't sleep, then you die - after first becoming very cranky.
The Pompano Beach statute cited herein was declared unconstitutional because although the court could
accept a statute that forbade "lodging" in a vehicle, it could not tolerate making it illegal to simply sleep.
Implicit in this argument is that "lodging in a public place" has as its essence the usurpation of public property
for a private home. By comparison, mere sleeping is, well, mere sleeping. A properly written statute might
set out some indicia for lodging - and everybody sorta knows that. However, enforcement would then entail
gathering more evidence. Mere sleep is easier to prove - and that virtue is also its fatal flaw, because in
making the statute so easy to enforce, Ventura has vested unbridled discretion in its police. Unbridled
discretion is used to enforce other agendas - and this type of case demonstrates that the drug war is the
other agenda that is fostered by unbridled discretion.
Palaschak has suffered 3 unconstitutional raids of his law office since 1991. All of them were without
probable cause. All of them resulted in no valid conviction - albeit the 1991 raid resulted in a misdemeanor
conviction unconstitutionally affirmed on appeal by the California Supreme Court in retaliation for
Palaschak's having sued them for a client. That case is not yet in repose. In 1999 Ventura duped the FBI
into raiding Palaschak's Illinois farm house alleging that Palaschak had written a petition illegally in
California. Palaschak was held on $250,000.00 bail, extradited to California, and imprisoned for 4 months.
A jury took only 2 hours to find him not guilty. In 1993 Palaschak's law office was raided by Glen Kitzmann.
This time Palaschak promptly convinced Kitzmann that Kitzmann was mistaken. The district attorney had
never filed a criminal complaint and did not ever file a criminal complaint in that case. They simply kept all
Palaschak's computers, printer, and office equipment, money, and files for over a year. They also issued
a lying press release saying that Palaschak had committed 7 felonies - the very felonies that they rejected
for prosecution - because the accusation was that Palaschak had performed bankruptcies without a license,
when in fact Palaschak had cleared his federal license prior to ever engaging in the bankruptcy practice.
His state license suspension was unconstitutional. Consider how much different would have been the
outcome had Kitzmann or the FBI found drugs in any of the raids. Although it is patently
unconstitutional to justify a raid on what was found in the raid, it happens all the time. Unbridled discretion,
which is the result of overbroad statutes, fosters raids which promote hidden agendas - such as the
drug war - or selecting outspoken anti-police spokespersons for stricter scrutiny.
Similar statute in Florida was declared unconstitutional in Pompano v Capalbo (1984)
The offending statute in City of Pompano Beach v Capalbo (1984) 455 S 2d 468 was Pompano
Beach Municipal code 31.66 which reads in its entirety as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person to lodge or sleep in, on, or about any automobile,
truck, camping or recreational vehicle or similar vehicle in any public street, public
way, right of way, parking lot or other public property, within the limits of the city. -
Pompano Beach, Florida, statute.
This statute was held unconstitutional for essentially the same reasons that I challenge the Ventura
statute today. Notice that this Pompano Beach statute does not prevent sleeping on private property. The
Ventura statute prohibits sleeping in a car on private property even with permission of the owner of the
property - which is precisely the situation of Defendant Palaschak in today's case.
A narrower statute was upheld in (Santa Barbara) v Davenport (1985) 176 Cal App 3d Supp 10
The statute at issue in Davenport (1985) was Santa Barbara Municipal Code 15.16.085 which reads
in its entirety as follows:
"It shall be unlawful for any person to sleep in: (1) Any public park during the period
of time from 10:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m.; (2) Any public street; (3) Any public parking
lot or public area, improved or unimproved; or (4) Any public beach during the
period of time from 10:00 pm to 6:00 a.m. - Santa Barbara Ordinance.
Davenport is not even an appellate court decision. It is founded in part on Batts v Superior Court
(1972) 23 Cal App 3d, a pathetically empty opinion citing only 4 cases - all low level appellate decisions.
Although this statute should have been overturned on proper appeal, it is nonetheless narrower than the
Ventura statute in question today. This Santa Barbara statute permits street people to sleep on the beach
or in the park 16 hours per day. Presumably during the other hours one may be there at the park but one
must be awake - although generally parks and beaches "close" at night. (This type of ordinance reveals the
omnipotence of our legislators in being able to "close" a beach. I propose legislation to mandate a low tide
during daylight hours to facilitate shell collecting.)
Where do the homeless people go at night? If they had a car they couldn't sleep there either if they
were in Ventura - unless of course they did not park the car there - or if they did not intend to sleep when they
parked the car.
Santa Barbara Statute is not binding precedent. It was upheld only by the county court sitting as
the judge of its own decision.
I have long said that the corporate instruments of oppression recognize each other and give each
other preference over humans. I have also said that West Publishing is an instrument of corporate
oppression - and their books are biased in that they feature cases where the instruments of oppression win.
Example: In my LSD case, the Spann opinion was not mentioned in West's annotated California statutes,
but it is mentioned in Deerings. The Judicial Council is an instrument of oppression and that is why they
published this Davenport decision which is not even from a court of appeal. Had the decision gone the other
way they would not have published it. Example: My LSD appellate victory was decertified - until I sued the
California Supreme Court in federal court. Then they took the case up to their own court, reversed it - and
suddenly the more oppressive decision was suitable for reading in the opinion of the Supreme Court.
What is the purpose of this statute? Vesting of unbridled discretion.
Its purpose is to vest complete discretion to police to roust people sleeping in their cars for any
reason.
Example #1: UPS Driver stops at depot at noon.
This driver discovers that the office has closed for an hour. He leaves his truck parked on private
property at the UPS depot. He waits for 10 minutes and drifts off to sleep. One minute later the police
arrive. He can be rousted and ticketed under this statute.
Example #2: Driver feeling high blood alcohol.
This statute forbids sleeping for almost any reason short of a bona fide emergency. Thus, a patron
of the bowling alley who may have an elevated blood alcohol level, could not sleep in the parking lot to
permit the alcohol to leave his central nervous system.
Example #3: Bowler is tired.
If a bowler tires but his friends want to continue to bowl, this tired bowler may go to the parking lot
and sit in the car but if he falls asleep he can get a ticket.
Example #4: Earthquake. Pinned under a fallen overpass. If you sleep 5 hours, you get a ticket.
If there is an earthquake and a bridge falls on your car in Ventura, you had better stay awake. Even
in a bona fide emergency, you may only sleep 4 hours. Otherwise you will be given a ticket. Oh, the police
would not give a ticket in such a situation? Well, this is exactly the unbridled discretion that makes this
Ventura statute unconstitutional.
Griswold v Connecticut (1965) 14 L Ed 2d 510, 381 U.S. 479, 85 S. Ct. 1678 Penumbra.
Relaxed standing. Vicarious standing.
This law abridges the right to sleep in your own property
By pertaining to all public and private property, this statute forbids both the rich and the poor from
sleeping in their cars. In doing so, it vests excessive discretion in the police to investigate anybody in a car -
even those persons on private property. Palaschak was on private property with permission of Palaschak's
friends, John and Kathy, owners of the bowling alley. Palaschak also had permission of the custodian of the
space who obtained custody of that space (and 5 other spaces) from John and Kathy by granting to John and
Kathy permission and right to park their trash dumpster on the premises of the auto repair shop adjacent to
the bowling alley - thereby freeing up several parking spaces that would otherwise be blocked by the trash
dumpster.
Furthermore, Palaschak is a patron of the bowling alley as are many of his friends from the car shop.
In particular, Palaschak's mechanic friend Jeff celebrates Thanksgiving with John and Kathy.
However, Palaschak need prove none of this because a statute that fails constitutional muster is void
ab initio. This is not merely an affirmative defense. Under theory of jus tertii the Supreme Court announced
long ago in Griswold v Connecticut 7 that persons in the situation of Palaschak may assert vicariously the
rights of others who may beaffected by a statute that abridges fundamental rights as does
this overbroad statute.
The Ventura statute draws no distinction between harmful and innocent conduct
An earlier statute from St. Petersburg, Florida was even simpler:
No person shall sleep upon or in any street, park, wharf or other public place. - St.
Petersburg Statute.
Adequate Notice is an element of Due Process. Strict scrutiny Analysis applies here. The statute
is presumed invalid absent compelling state interest if it covers protected activity such as speech
or sleep. There is no state interest in preventing people from sleeping in their car on their own
property - or other private property where they had permission to be - which is what the Ventura
statute permits the police to do. The only state interest is here is obvious: Keep the poor people
moving on. Don't let them rest.
The St. Peterburg statute failed for lack of adequate notice. Implicit in the logic of that case is that
everybody knows that you really can't forbid a person from sleeping in general. Some years ago a truck
driver fell asleep on highway 101 near the Holiday Inn. The ensuing crash snarled traffic for the entire day
but the driver received no ticket. You can't fairly prosecute a person for falling asleep. I thought that the
driver should have been ticketed for something - but that is not my point here. When you are making laws
abridging a fundamental or essential human right such as speaking, writing, eating, breathing, or sleeping,
you must do so carefully. The first amendment needs room to breathe. Humans need to sleep. A law that
abridges a basic human right or need is presumed invalid absent compelling state interest. Authority:
Keyishian v Board of Regents (1967) 17 L Ed 2d 629, 385 US 589 @ 603, 604, 87 S Ct 675 @ 683-684
a case striking down an ordinance inhibiting the right to sell door to door; Colautti v Franklin (1979) 58 L
Ed 2d 596, 606, 439 US 379 @ 390-91, 99 S Ct 675 @ 683;
Thou shalt not walk at night while being a Negro
In Kolender v Lawson (1983) 75 L Ed 2d 903 @ 909-910, 461 US 352 @357-58, 103 S Ct 1855 @1858-59
the court struck down a vague California statute requiring people to produce "credible and reliable"
identification to any police officer who had an articulable suspicion. The decision to arrest was left to the
whim of the officer. Such unbridled discretion resulted in the repeated arrest of a person who liked to walk
at 3 a.m. - and was a Negro. The private agenda in that case may have been racism - but we need not
prove some private agenda. The unbridled discretion is the flaw in the statute - and that flaw exists in the
Ventura ordinance before us today.
Private agendas and personal predilections
Smith v Goguen (1974) 39 L Ed 2nd 605, 415 US 574, 94 S Ct 1247-48 warns that where a
legislature fails to provide adequate guidelines, as Ventura failed to provide adequate guidelines here, a
criminal statute has the unconstitutional effect of fostering "a standardless sweep [that] allows policemen,
prosecutors, and juries to pursue their personal predilections." We suspect that the police do not ticket the
wealthy parked on their own driveway. Palaschak could simply not sleep in his car in Ventura. Stay clear
out of prudence. Be intimidated by the police state. This is similar to the solution proposed by the
prosecutors in Smith v Goguen, a flag desecration case involving a statute that trampled on rights vaguely.
In Goguen prosecutors argued
[Anyone who] wants notice as to what conduct this statute proscribes . . .,
immediately knows that it has something to do with flags and if he [415 U.S. 566,
579] wants to stay clear of violating this statute, he just has to stay clear of doing
something to the United States flag. - Losing proposition in Smith v Goguen.
A Florida court struck down the St. Petersburg statute in State v Penley (1973) 276 So 2d 180 based
on vagrancy laws that draw no distinction between harmful and innocent conduct. In the words of the
Supreme Court in U.S. v Harris (1954) 98 L Ed 989 @ 996, 347 U.S. 612 @617, 74 S Ct 808 @812 the
Ventura statute "fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated
conduct is forbidden by the statute." A legislature will not be heard to say "you know what we mean".
If the statute can be construed as forbidding conduct that is clearly protected by the enumerated or
unenumerated rights then the constitution forbids the law.
Unfettered discretion fosters invidious private agendas. - Palaschak.
The poor and the unpopular are permitted to "stand on a public sidewalk . . . only at the whim of
PALASCHAK'S DEMURRER #5067 TO UNCONSTITUTIONAL VAGRANCY STATUTE.
8State v Penley 276 S. 2d 180 was cited in City of Pompano Beach v Capalbo 455 So 2d 468 @469.
9
any police officer. - Shuttlesworth v Birmingham
The following excerpt from Papachristou is pertinent to the offending Ventura statute.
Those generally implicated by the imprecise terms of the ordinance - poor
people, nonconformists, dissenters, idlers - may be required to comport
themselves according to the lifestyle deemed appropriate by the Jacksonville
police and the courts. Where, as here, there are no standards governing the
exercise of the discretion granted by the ordinance, the scheme permits and
encourages an arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement of the law. It
furnishes a convenient tool for "harsh and discriminatory enforcement by local
prosecuting officials, against particular groups deemed to merit their
displeasure." Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97 -98. It results in a regime
in which the poor and the unpopular are permitted to "stand on a public
sidewalk . . . only at the whim of any police officer." Shuttlesworth v.
Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87, 90 . Under this ordinance,
"[If] some carefree type of fellow is satisfied to work just so much, and no
more, as will pay for one square meal, some wine, and a flophouse daily, but
a court thinks this kind of living subhuman, the fellow can be forced to raise
his sights or go to jail as a vagrant." Amsterdam, Federal Constitutional
Restrictions on the Punishment of Crimes of Status, [405 U.S. 156, 171] Crimes
of General Obnoxiousness, Crimes of Displeasing Police Officers, and the Like, 3
Criminal Law Bull. 205, 226 (1967).
The 14th amendment prohibits Ventura from enforcing this statute
"No state shall make or enforce any statute that abridges the privileges or immunities of citizens of
the several states"
Overbroad ordinances are calculated to give unbridled discretion and are unconstitutional.
Ventura's ordinance fosters arbitrary and erratic action in violation of Papachristou
An ordinance which "as written, may result in arbitrary and erratic arrest and convictions"
must be stricken. Authority: Papachristou v City of Jacksonville 31 L Ed 2d 110, 405 US 156, 92 S Ct 839
as cited in State v Penley8 in striking down the St. Petersburg Ordinance.
A statute that permits unfettered police discretion is unconstitutional. Lanzetta v N.J.
A statute that permits unfettered police discretion is unconstitutional. Authority: Lanzetta v New
Jersey (1939) 83 L Ed 888, 306 US 451 @453, 59 S St. 618 @619. See also Grayned v City of Rockford
(1972) 33 L Ed 2d 222, 408 US 104 @108, 109, 92 S Ct 2294 @2298-99.
Ventura's statute fails to give notice to police - who are not required to perform remedial
interpretation on the statute in the field; where, as here, a statute on its face abridges a fundamental
right, such as the right to sleep on private property, without compelling state interest, that statute
fails totally and is void ab initio regardless of the ability of a constitutional scholar to remedially
interpret it.
Void ab initio is that wonderful concept given to us in Marbury v Madison (1803) 2 L Ed 60, 5 U.S.
137.
What do you get when you cross the right to privacy with the right to pursuit of happiness? A
penumbra!
Justice Douglas in Griswold v Connecticut (1965) 14 L Ed 2d 510, 381 U.S. 479, 85 S. Ct. 1678
announced that a combination of rights produced a penumbra. In California, Article 1 of our California
constitution grants Californians the right to pursuit of happiness. Douglas also stated that:
[We each have a right] "as against the government . . . to be let alone - the most
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men." - Justice
Douglas in Griswold v Connecticut (1965) 14 L Ed 2d 510 @521, 381 U.S. 479
@ 494, 85 S. Ct. 1678 @ 1687.
Effective Law Enforcement Can Be Had Without Resort to a Police State. Brinegar v U.S.
We have a right to be free of dependance on the "mercy of the officers' whim or caprice".
Brinegar v U.S. (1949) 93 L Ed 1879, 338 US 160, 69 S Ct 1302.
Summary
Ventura's statute fails to give notice to police - who are not required to perform remedial
interpretation on the statute in the field; where, as here, a statute on its face abridges a
fundamental right, such as the right to sleep on private property, without compelling state
interest, that statute fails totally and is void ab initio regardless of the ability of a
constitutional scholar to remedially interpret it.
Surely Ventura's lawyers can draft a more narrowly construed statute to achieve their goals. If their
goal is to prevent people from ever sleeping in any motor vehicle on private property then they may have
some difficulty - but we need not speculate. We have the current statute. If fails constitutional muster.
There is a plethora of sound ancient venerated decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court supporting my
propositions in this demurrer.
_____________________ 2 August 2001
Douglas Palaschak